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ABSTRACT
Conflict and Cooperation: Western Economic Interests in Ottoman Iraq 1894-1914
By
Jameel Haque

Advisor: Elena Frangakis-Syrett

This dissertation investigates underutilized U.S. archival sources in order to discuss
certain aspects of late Ottoman history in Baghdad and Basra, between 1894 and 1914. Since
these sources have been underutilized, their inclusion will widen the scope of possible historical
investigation in the study of Late Ottoman Baghdad and Basra. This research will suggest that, in
this period, there was an expanding role/presence for America and Americans that is not
currently reflected in the historiography. This should, of course, be qualified since Americans
and American interests in the region, although on the increase, were still significantly less than
those of other nations. However, as the global economy expanded, the U.S. imported increasing
amounts of raw materials from the Ottoman Empire. Due to the same economic forces, U.S.
investors also began to see Baghdad and Basra as possible sites for significant financial
investment and development in infrastructure projects. These infrastructure projects are
examined in the dissertation as are American trade with the Ottoman State and the role of the
U.S. Department of State in fostering and expanding these economic activities. Crimes
committed by and against Americans are also investigated as both instances of economic activity
and of conflict and cooperation. This study seeks to augment established points on a variety of
issues concerning the Ottoman Empire. These issues include the degree to which the Ottoman
iv

Empire was centralizing, and the implementation of some of the 19th century, Tanzimat era
reforms during the early 20th century. Finally, this dissertation discusses the role of inter-imperial
competition in Ottoman Iraq. The Ottoman State was able to, in line with existing literature,
profit from and exploit inter-imperial competition. Negotiations over large scale infrastructure
projects showed the Ottomans as savvy negotiators, able and willing to use one Western group
against another. Likewise, Westerners and in particular, Americans worked with and against
each other and Ottomans within the Ottoman Empire and economy. The conflicts and
cooperation that occurred between among Western and Ottoman economic agents is examined,
particularly as it relates to the licorice trade, the date trade, criminal activity and infrastructure.
Methodologically, this dissertation uses archival sources to examine historical economic
activities. These economic activities are framed as being examples of conflict and cooperation.
By examining conflict and cooperation carefully, this dissertation focuses on the underlying
historical relationships between economic interests.
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Introduction

1

This dissertation delves into previously overlooked U.S. archival sources, which are
augmented with British archival sources, as a means to illuminate the economic activities,
primarily of Westerners, in Ottoman Baghdad and Basra between the years 1894-1914. The
sources used investigate economic activities of the period, the economic conditions of the region,
economic disputes, complicated infrastructure projects, and crimes committed upon and by
Westerners to argue critical points about American and British activities in the Ottoman Empire
and to engage with existing literature on aspects of Ottoman governance. The economic activities
investigated include the seeking of small and large scale infrastructure concessions from the
Ottoman state, trade promotion, the export trade in dates and licorice, as well as, brigandage,
burglary, and the legal and illegal activities of American archaeologists. While the lives of
Westerners in Ottoman Iraq were typically mundane, on occasion they were the victims or
perpetrators of crime. These crimes are economic as well, as they are mostly acts of robbery
and/or of smuggling. Many of these same crimes are also evidence of brigandage, a violent and
well documented trend throughout the Ottoman Empire in this period. These events are well
recorded in the archival record and these instances of conflicts, compromise and/or negotiation
that arose amongst and between Westerners and Ottoman are used to argue key historiographic
points. First, these sources demonstrate that the United States, and in particular, American
economic interests, were significantly more involved in the area than the historiography
currently suggests. This problematizes the narrative of the United States as largely uninterested
in the Middle East generally and Iraq specifically before the First World War. It should be noted
that this dissertation does not argue for a U.S. government based plan for an increased presence
in the Ottoman Empire, but rather that the actions of Americans, whether they were economic,
diplomatic or cultural agents, have been under-recorded in the literature. Evidence suggests that
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significant trade links were being forged, and that American cultural agents such as missionaries
and archaeologists met resistance from the Ottoman State. This agrees with the literature in many
ways and these specific examples used here are new to the literature. This resistance concerned
the Americans ability to move and act freely within the Ottoman Empire. American businessmen
attempted, unsuccessfully, to invest in infrastructure projects. The evidence calls for a more
historiographically visible role for the United States in the period, and particularly a more
pronounced economic role. This is justified by the United States’ economic activities, its cultural
agents, and the expansion and increased professionalization of the U.S. State Department in the
region. This argument is in agreement with literature on the expansion of U.S. global interests in
the period, however, it should be noted that these interests do not add up to American
imperialism in Baghdad and Basra at the time. This research also augments the current literature
on the expansion of the global economy and the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the
world economy.
In this period, the United States increased the quantity and monetary value of imports
from the Ottoman Empire. These included two key imports from Ottoman Iraq – dates and
licorice. Dates were an easily transported confection that were increasingly popular with
American consumers in this period. Date picking and subsequent shipping followed a strict
timeline. This was due to both the dates’ natural ripening process and to the difficulties of tide.
Ships needed to sail at a specific high tide that only occurred every two weeks in order to avoid
the sand bar that restricted travel at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab.1 Therefore, Western or Indian
merchants who shipped the first cargoes were rewarded with higher prices. This competitive

1

The Shatt al-Arab is the term for the river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the
Euphrates. Technically it is the Shatt al-Arab that then flows into the Persian Gulf.
3

trade led to both conflict and cooperation and examples of those are here used to discuss the
organization of the trade, its merchants, the role of Ottoman notables, and the Ottoman centerperiphery relationship. Licorice was an important item for the U.S. tobacco industry as a
flavoring agent and as a humectant. Licorice was subject to tax farming resulting in several
conflicts which suggest crucial information about taxation and land ownership. These in turn
demonstrate to what degree the centralizing reforms of the 19th century Ottoman Empire, known
collectively as the Tanzimat, were implemented in practice in Ottoman Iraq in this period. The
Tanzimat or reordering, were government decreed reforms of the Ottoman State for the complete
reorganization of Ottoman society. They began with the Gülhane Decree of 1839 which
nominally made all subjects of the Empire equal. This major era of reforms ended with the
promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876. During those almost forty years, reforms
aimed at centralizing the Empire were decreed, including refining penal codes, maritime trade
regulations, land ownership, provincial government structure and function, conscription, the
codification of the sharia, and the elimination of the death penalty as a punishment for apostasy.
The conflicts reviewed here, in conversation with the literature, provide evidence for the degree
of implementation of two reforms in particular, changes in the tax farming system and the 1864
Provincial Council Reform.
This dissertation discusses American attempts to invest financially in Ottoman
infrastructure and the detailed discussions, negotiations, and failures of these projects. The
Chester Plan called for a “gigantic railroad”2 to be built, some of it in Ottoman Iraq and for
accompanying mineral rights and additional infrastructure projects. Two small infrastructure
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John De Novo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1963) p.28.
4

projects preceded the Chester Plan and negotiations for the small projects originated both with
local Ottoman officials and the U.S. Vice Consul in Baghdad, Rudolf Hürner. Rudolf Hürner was
a Swiss national that served as the U.S. representative in Baghdad from 1897 to 1906. Since
Hürner had been working in Baghdad since 1876, and was not an American, it would be
tempting to consider him as a native agent, akin to those that Olney deems responsible for the
creation and maintenance of British influence and informal empire in Ottoman Iraq.3 However, it
would perhaps be more accurate to see Hürner as part of the Ottoman system, operating and
prospering within it. Hürner’s long tenure in the region ensured that he understood local
economic systems and how infrastructure contracts were acquired. Hürner understood that many
infrastructure projects and contracts in Baghdad were awarded to a local individual, who then
negotiated with foreign companies for the fulfillment of the contract. Hürner was blocked, in
part, by the actions of the U.S. State Department in the Ottoman Empire. The U.S. State
Department was itself experiencing a major shift towards becoming a more professionalized and
trade oriented institution, which occurred too late for the Baghdad specific U.S. infrastructure
projects. Had the infrastructure projects been completed, U.S. based businesses might have
invested considerable sums in Ottoman Iraq before World War I. Two Baghdad focused projects
that U.S. based businesses considered, suffered from the rigidity of U.S. State Department
procedures. These smaller projects can possibly be seen as paving the way for the larger Chester
Project by demonstrating that U.S.-Ottoman ventures were a real possibility. The Chester Project
suffered from competition by the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad and was masterfully undercut by

3

James Olney, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the
Nineteenth Century Gulf (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 12. Olney argues that
Britain’s informal empire in the Persian Gulf was made possible by the use of natives –
Eurasians, Indians, Persians and Arabs that worked for them, whether it was on a semi-official or
clandestine basis.
5

vested European powers.
However, Hürner’s blatant self-interest as a businessman may have served as a brake on
US trade growth with Baghdad. Hürner was able to pick and choose opportunities and typically
interposed himself as the sole agent, via Hürner and Company, for U.S. based businesses looking
to import and export to the city. The career diplomats that came after Hürner seemed to be more
effective at promoting American trade interests in Baghdad. After 1906, American Vice Consuls
and Consuls in Baghdad increased their attempts to promote American trade, whether import or
export, particularly once this no longer clashed with their self-interest as merchant-diplomat.
Along with a growing interest in commerce, American diplomats displayed an increasing focus
on sanitation in the Ottoman Empire, as they did elsewhere in the world. This is evident in an
increased focus on securing goods that did not carry disease and on trying to regulate the
conditions of production of those goods. Therefore, the combination of increasing trade ties,
infrastructure attempts, activities of American cultural and economic agents and the new
professionalization of the Foreign Service all demonstrate a wider importance for Americans in
Ottoman Iraq than is currently demonstrated in the literature. While occasionally referencing the
actions and attitudes of the U.S. State Department, this dissertation does not argue that increased
American involvement in Ottoman Iraq was a U.S. government initiated and driven policy.
Rather, it argues that the increased American presence in late Ottoman Iraq was driven by
American individuals; entrepreneurs, merchants, financiers, middlemen, and locally hired agents
(of various nationalities). While the U.S. State Department did work to push American trade and
financial interests and activities in the region, they did not do so as a reflection of an attempted
U.S. government led expansion, rather, it was an extension of their own personal interest and a
product of completing the essential tasks of their jobs to promote U.S. interests everywhere.

6

Secondly, the compromises, negotiations, crimes and conflicts that occurred related to the
activities of Westerners in Ottoman Iraq suggest certain conclusions concerning Ottoman
governance in the period. These include aspects of the relationship between Istanbul and its
peripheral areas and the degree to which the centralizing reforms of the 19th century were
implemented in turn of the century Ottoman Iraq. The implementation of these reforms led to a
process that suggests the creation of, both intentional and unintended, transitional nationbuilding. This transitional nation-building involved the Ottoman State, like many
contemporaneous decentralized empires, undergoing a process of centralization. In this period,
traditional multi-empires4 from Austria-Hungary to Qing dynasty China were struggling to
develop cohesive national identities to confront the rising challenges of territorial loss and
(ethnic) nationalism. In the Ottoman case, it can be argued that the increased attention paid by
Osman Hamdi Bey and the Imperial Ottoman Museum to the activities of American
archaeologists demonstrated the desire to curate a national narrative. Using artifacts recovered
from their empire, the Imperial Ottoman Museum tried to frame the Ottoman story as a cohesive,
progressive one. This research reinforces the literature and provides additional examples that
demonstrate the modernizing trend in late Ottoman history. This is manifested in the literature
that concerns the increased attention the Ottoman state paid to education in response to the
activities of missionaries, as well as, the ways that the Ottoman State tried to settle and control
the pastoral portion of the Iraqi population.
Regarding other aspects of Ottoman governance, this study argues that the conflicts and
negotiations in these sources reveal the degree to which certain Tanzimat era reforms were
evident during this time period in Iraq, while other reforms were not evident. In line with the

4

Multi in terms of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious, i.e. diverse.
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historiography these sources suggest that taxation reforms were largely not implemented. As has
been demonstrated in the literature, tax farming was still the dominant mode of revenue
collection in Ottoman Iraq in this period. This dissertation found, as Elena Frangakis-Syrett
found, that frequently Western merchants would even fill the role of tax farmer.5 Export tax,
which should have been governed by trade treaties between the Ottomans and the U.S. and
Britain, was arbitrarily applied to licorice exports.6 Monopolies still existed, and were frequently
foreign (non-Ottoman) owned. However, other changes were implemented in Ottoman Iraq,
particularly reforms that concerned the structure of government. The restructuring of provincial
governments that was supposed to have taken place in the 1864 Provincial Reform Law was
apparent during disputes over goods. It was clear, both from my findings and the historiography,
that the Ottoman State implemented this structural reform. The court system that was created by
the Ottoman state seems to have functioned well, both for the settling of mercantile disputes and
criminal disputes. In terms of criminal justice, the Ottoman State was unable to protect
Westerners outside of urban centers and established trade routes, which is generally in line with
the historiography on brigandage. It was however, able to provide compensation for victims and
to dispense justice against the accused parties.
Finally, the competition over infrastructure projects illuminates the inter-imperial
rivalries and Western economic competition in the region and throughout the Ottoman Empire.
This dissertation’s engagement of inter-imperial rivalry is an analysis of how Western economic

Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “British Economic Activities in Izmir in the Second Half of the
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” New Perspectives on Turkey, (Fall 1991, 5-6, pp.
191-227)
6
This arbitrary application of export tax was also noted in work by Elena Frangakis-Syrett
concerning Izmir in the 19th Century. See Frangakis-Syrett, Elena, “Implementation of the 1838
Anglo-Turkish Convention on Izmir’s Trade: European and Minority Merchants”, in New
Perspectives on Turkey, (Spring, 1992), 7, pp. 91-112.
5

8

competitors operated in the Ottoman Empire. Rather than the discussion of the clash of nations
or governments, this research attempts to illuminate how British, German, French, American and
economic competitors of other nationalities competed and cooperated over infrastructure projects
in the period in Ottoman Iraq and how that process ultimately benefited the Ottoman State.
Therefore, while this competition was in some ways a reflection of inter-imperial rivalry, it was
more accurately a process of economic conflict and cooperation and not necessarily a political
struggle. These sources augment the literature that argues the British were the paramount
Western influence in the region. They also suggest that the Western competition over resources
tended to benefit the Ottoman State. More frequently than not, these rivalries ended in
compromise deals between the parties involved. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway (BBR) was a
massive construction project that aimed to connect those two cities by rail; it also included
concessions for the right to exploit mineral rights within a certain distance from the railway
tracks. Due to both economic and strategic objections, British diplomats stalled the project
considerably in the early part of this period. Yet frequently, and just before the First World War,
British and German negotiators came to compromises. These typically involved the German
concessionaires conceding significant points to their British counterparts. Indeed, it wasn’t
German economic competition that typically threatened the entrenched British monetary interests
in the area, but rather other British entrepreneurs. Regarding the oil concession, British
investment groups undermined each other: the Foreign Office stuck doggedly, against official
policy, to the D’Arcy group. Within the transport industry, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam
Navigation Company (ETSN), which had been cruising the waters of Iraq for over 70 years,
found themselves replaced in the mail concession and then were annexed by Lord Inchcape’s
British Indian Steam Navigation Company. Additionally, these infrastructure projects reveal, in
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line with the literature, that even when the Ottoman Empire did not act intentionally, the
economic competition among Westerners benefited them. As has been noted, the Ottomans
understood how to play the concessionary game to their own benefit. In line with the literature,
these projects and the conditions under which they were negotiated benefited both the Ottoman
Empire and its constituent population.
This study uses Western sources to peer inside the local governance of Ottoman Iraq,
with all the limitations inherent to such a perspective. The advantage of using these sources is
that the American sources used in this study have been ignored and therefore, contain previously
unknown information. While the lack of Ottoman sources in this dissertation is a hindrance to a
wider scope for this argument, it is not a fatal shortcoming. These documents and the incidents
they record are a valuable and unexplored part of the historical record. This dissertation
discusses the period of 1894-1914 for two major reasons. First, the U.S. State Department
opened its Vice Consulate in Baghdad in 1894 and therefore, the American sources I use for the
region, as well as the permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Ottoman Iraq, begin in 1894.
Secondly, during much of the period, there was a continuity of executive administration in the
U.S. – the Republican Party was in power from much of this period and therefore, there was
significant stability in U.S. State Department personnel as well as, in official U.S. foreign policy.
That foreign policy was, as is discussed elsewhere, not necessarily focused on the Ottoman
Empire, but it was focused on increasing U.S. economic interests around the globe. Therefore,
the period is held together as it traces the beginning of official U.S. diplomatic engagement in
Baghdad and Basra and follows the growth of U.S. economic interests in the region. 1914 and
the economic disruptions that occurred at the beginning of World War One provide the end point
for the period.

10

As for the geographic rationale, Baghdad and Basra were linked by the riverine trade
route and the date and licorice trade discussed in this dissertation. International trade from
Baghdad flowed through Basra and international trade destined for Iran flowed from Basra
through Baghdad. The two cities were also linked in this research because they were considered
together in many of the concessions discussed here, particularly in regards to oil and
transportation. Furthermore, it is possible to consider Baghdad and Basra as being connected
politically. The Vilâyet of Basra was administered from Baghdad at times during the late 19th
century and was directed militarily by the sixth army corps of Bagdad. Baghdad’s court of
appeals had jurisdiction in Basra and officially, custom duties were collected from offices in
Baghdad.7 Reidar Visser notes that Yitzhak Nakash and Hala Fattah both argue for a “continuity
approach” to Baghdad and Basra, suggesting that the two cities can be considered, to some
degree at least, historically tied together.8 Thus, this dissertation, due to the existing literature
and the manner in which these economic conflicts and cooperation tie the two cities together,
discusses Basra and Baghdad as a unit.
Looking at the historiography, the period of 1894-1914 saw vast changes in U.S. foreign
policy, in particular the rising imperialism and economic expansion that accelerated in the wake
of the Spanish-American War. While I argue for a reevaluation and expansion of the historic role
of the U.S in Ottoman Iraq, the prevailing historiography on America in the Persian Gulf9 region
prior to the First World War states that America had little or no interest and interaction in the
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Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq
(Münster: Verlag, 2005), pp. 19-20.
8
Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, p. 8.
9
I chose to use the term Persian Gulf because it is the officially sanctioned term of the United
States government and the most commonly used moniker for the area in both the United States
and the United Kingdom.
11

region. Important and rigorous studies like Hala Fattah’s Politics of Regional Trade, pay limited
attention to the role of Americans in the Gulf. Briton Busch’s detailed Britain and the Persian
Gulf 1894-1914, focuses on the role of France, Russia and Germany in the Gulf; Americans are
mentioned only as having, along with Italy and Portugal, had “minor roles to play.”10 Gary Sick,
argues that the United States had no real involvement or interest in Iraq before World War II. 11
John De Novo, asserts that, before oil exports from the Middle East acquired importance to the
United States after the First World War, American economic interests and aspirations in the
region far exceeded their reality.12 Emily Rosenberg has argued that in this period, the U.S.
followed a foreign policy of Dollar Diplomacy which was both a strategy of investing in other
nations to raise their standards of living and to “expand imperialist domination and
exploitation…”13 Yet Joseph Grabill dismisses Dollar Diplomacy in the Middle East, stating that
the Chester Project, the largest example of it in the Ottoman Empire, was “A sign both of the
small investments and of the ineptitude that was the misguided venture in Dollar Diplomacy, a
railroad and mining scheme known as the Chester Project.”14 De Novo notes that the U.S.
consulate in Istanbul, which was for some time housed above a dentist’s office, was shabby and
that the overall role/skill of the State Department in the Ottoman Empire was demonstrably
lacking.15 The ineffectuality of the State Department and a general hands off attitude led to “do-
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Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967) p. 1.
11
Sick, Gary. “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century” in Potter,
Lawrence editor, The Persian Gulf in History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p. 197.
12
De Novo, American Interests and Politics in the Middle East, p. viii.
13
Emily Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar
Diplomacy 1900-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 1.
14
Joseph Grabill. Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American
Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971) p. 37.
15
De Novo, American Interests and Politics in the Middle East, pp. 19-20.
12

it-yourself” diplomacy; the Presidents of American Colleges in Istanbul directly negotiated with
Ottoman officials rather than through the State department. Michael Oren notes that, after antiArmenian pogroms in the 1890’s, the U.S. public collected money to provide relief for the
affected Armenians in the Ottoman Empire; in 1896, it was Clara Barton that was nominated to
bring the donations to the Armenians due to the U.S. public’s perception of the State Department
as incompetent and disinterested.16 However, during the period of this study, the State
Department underwent reform and professionalization that is reflected in the attitude of the
Foreign Service in Baghdad and Basra after 1906.
Besides trade and infrastructure, the American presence in the Ottoman Empire was
limited to the State Department’s personnel, and to its missionaries and archaeologists. As
previously stated, this period saw an expansion and professionalization of the U.S. State
Department in the Ottoman Empire that warrants a closer examination and particularly one that
shows how the domestic reform movements spurred on by missionaries affected the activities of
U.S. personnel in the Ottoman Empire. Barnes records that the U.S. diplomatic mission to the
Ottoman Empire was opened in 1831, making it the first U.S. mission to an Asian country and
second to an African state.17 Throughout the 19th century appointments were entirely based on
the “spoils system” and “determined by political consideration.”18 However, after the American
Civil War and aligned with a more aggressive foreign policy, many in the U.S. government came
to see the State Department as essential for foreign trade. U.S. congressman Jonathan Chace19
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Oren, Michael, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present
(New York: Norton, 2007) p. 295.
17

William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins,
Development and Function (Washington D.C., Department of State, 1961) p. 340 Appendix 3.
18
Barnes and Morgan, The Foreign Service, p. 68.
19
Chace was a Congressman from Rhode Island from 1881-1885 and in the Senate from 18851889.
13

asserted in 1884 that any attempt to limit or minimize the role of the State Department overseas
would cripple trade, arguing “when you propose to strike down the diplomatic service, you aim a
blow at the commerce of the United States in foreign countries as directly as if you should strike
at the consular service.”20 Proponents of reforming the service focused their efforts against
wealth as a criterion of appointees and idealized the British Foreign Service; Ilchman writes that
other reform proposals included the end of rotating staff after a period (creation of a tenure
system), having a merit based grading system and the institution of standardized examinations as
a means for entering the service. The Foreign Service played a major role in the protection of
missionaries abroad and Ilchman notes that these same missionaries were vociferous for a
reformed, robust and professional U.S. Foreign Service.21 Barnes notes that the 19th century’s
rapid growth in American overseas commerce and the extension of diplomatic representation to
more nations saw a massive expansion in the size of the Foreign Service; yet, this expansion had
little to do with official government policy and was the diplomatic flag following trade and an
accidental “process of accretion.” This process expanded rapidly after the Spanish-American war
when the personnel of the department doubled between the years 1898-1908. Barnes shows that
the State Department had a new focus on trade and sanitation, including the demand that U.S.
consuls keep invoices for imports to the U.S. valued at over $100 and the certification of the
health of ships coming to the U.S. A major reorganization and professionalization of the Foreign
Service took place in 1906 which established and expanded salaries, created a consular
inspection corps, required paid clerks making more than $1000 per year to be Americans and no
longer permitted those same clerks from engaging in business or legal practice. A procedural

20

Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779-1930: A Study
in Administrative History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) p. 37.
21
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, pp. 45-6 and p. 58.
14

change ensured that consular agents paid their fees into the Treasury, rather than using them as a
de facto salary. Further professionalization and improvement in the Foreign Service included the
creation of “politico-geographic divisions”, including that of Near Eastern affairs, in 1909 and
the Lowden act of 1911, which set aside money to acquire better buildings for US foreign
missions.22 This shift towards professionalism and the trade/sanitation focus of the Foreign
Service occurred too late to help the two projects that Hürner, the U.S. vice consul in Baghdad
proposed in this period. Likewise, once the Chester Project was advanced by a more
professionalized group of diplomats, it ran into the already entrenched European interests that
outflanked it and led to its failure. While this demonstrates that American investors and the State
Department were unable to compete with the entrenched European economic interests in terms
of finance and investment, it does not mean that Americans were indifferent to the Ottoman
economy and the opportunities it presented. It also does not mean that the State Department
failed to increase its sophistication in the promotion of U.S. economic interests in the Ottoman
Empire.
Frequently, the only American citizens consistently resident in Ottoman Iraq were
missionaries and archaeologists. De Novo acknowledges that the Ottoman government was
suspicious of U.S. missionary activity.23 There is a significant literature on U.S. missionaries in
the Ottoman Empire, although this historiography focuses more on the missions sponsored by the
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in Anatolia and Lebanon
and less on the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church that was active in Iraq. Lewis
Scudder, however, provides a lengthy, uncritical narrative of the Arabian Mission. The Arabian
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Barnes and Morgan, The Foreign Service, p. 68, p. 154, p. 157, p. 165, p. 160 and p. 175.
De Novo, American Interests and Politics in the Middle East, p.7.
15

Mission was launched in Basra during the year 1891 at an estimated initial cost of $25,000.24
Like missionaries throughout the Islamic world, the Arabian Mission discovered that simply
evangelizing was inefficient (and could lead to significant danger for converts) and they
modified their approach to focus their energies on building up a medical infrastructure.25 The
classic study on ABCFM missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, Joseph Grabill’s Protestant
Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927, argues that
after realizing their initial mission – to convert Muslims and Jews – had failed, American
missionaries turned their attention to Ottoman Christians and in particular, Armenians.26 Perhaps
American missionaries found it easier to connect with a population that was already Christian, or
perhaps they viewed the Armenians as a stepping stone to proselytizing amongst Muslims and
Turks.27 Grabill agrees with Scudder that missionaries were not particularly successful
evangelizers, but shows how they (ABCFM) expanded education in the Ottoman Empire,
beginning with only a few hundred students in 1850 and expanding to over 33,000 by 1914.28
Grabill records the effect that missionary demands on the State department had, including the
increased attention and professionalization of the U.S. diplomatic mission in the Ottoman Empire
after 1906.29 Ussama Makdisi’s less sympathetic work Artillery of Heaven, paints U.S.
missionaries as hapless interlopers in the Middle East.30 On the Ottoman side, Selim Deringil
shows the Ottoman State to be effective at regulating and diminishing American missionaries;
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they are fully informed of contemporaneous United States missionary activity in Hawaii.31 This
study examines the problems that missionaries could potentially face in the Ottoman Empire and
uses those to offer insights concerning the roles played and relationships established by
American missionaries. These conflicts, roles and relationships may suggest certain conclusions
about or perhaps aspects of the daily functioning of Ottoman governance.
While there are several studies that detail the role of American archaeologists and
archaeology in modern Iraqi archeology and preservation32 there is little that discusses the role of
American archaeologists in the Middle East before the First World War. The two major
American led dig sites, Nippur and Bismaya, were both involved in conflicts with the Ottoman
bureaucracy. Meade’s Road to Babylon and Wilson’s Bismaya: Recovering the Lost City of Adab
are both narratives concerning early American digs in Iraq. Wilson’s book is an attempt to
rehabilitate the criminal reputation accorded to the Bismaya excavations that are discuss in this
dissertation.33 In the 20th century, nation-states have employed archaeology to create and foster
national identities by presenting a curated version of their own history and excluding narratives
that conflict with the official history.34 Bernhardsson notes that the Ottomans during the
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Tanzimat reform period started to regulate antiquities and the antiquity trade, beginning with the
1874 designation of antiquities as being under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and
provisions for allotting the finds of the excavations, with at least 1/3 going to the Ottoman
State.35 Additionally, a school was created to train archeologists in 1875, and further legislative
changes gave the Ottoman state full control over antiquities that were excavated.36 Wendy Shaw
details the rise of the Ottoman Imperial Museum and notes that by 1884, all antiquities were
considered the property of the Ottoman State.37 Ahmet Ersoy has argued that Tanzimat era
reforms regarding antiquities led to the rise of Art History as a discipline of study within the
Ottoman Empire. Particularly, Ersoy states that the creation of an Ottoman artistic and
architectural heritage was necessary for the construction of a national Ottoman identity. 38 The
failure to create a coherent Ottoman identity is documented particularly within literature
analyzing the Armenian Genocide; Taner Akçam and Vahakn Dadrian list it as a major cause of
that event.39 Likewise, failure to create cohesive national identities after the fall of the Ottoman
State has also been much documented, particularly by scholars of Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi
history. According to Shaw, the Ottoman Imperial Museum disregarded the Western art history
narratives of progress and universalism, instead using their antiquities, particularly those
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collected by Hamdi Bey, a painter who had studied in Paris with Jean-Léon Gérôme and Gustave
Boulanger, to emphasize how the Ottomans were part of the Western powerful nation-family.
Benjamin Porter wrote that “Near Eastern archaeology often played a role in European and North
American imperial and colonialist enterprises in the region…currently the region’s nation-states
manage their own antiquities often using them to construct narratives that legitimate postcolonial
circumstances.”40 History, Bernhardsson notes, is a necessary ingredient for nationalism and the
nation building process.41 This research adds to this literature by demonstrating that the conflicts
that American archaeologists had with Ottoman officials over property rights and antiquities fit
into the overall argument of Westerner’s perception concerning antiquities as a commodity to be
exported and the way that the Ottoman State asserted its authority. These conflicts ended, in
these instances, with Americans acquiescing to Ottoman demands in order to maintain access to
the sites. Additionally, these conflicts demonstrate the growth of some of the ideological
prerequisites to a nation-state ideology within the Ottoman Empire. By focusing on retaining
antiquities for display in the Imperial Museum, the Ottoman State and in particular, Hamdi Bey
were demonstrating their awareness that doing so was necessary in order to craft a cohesive
national narrative. The Ottoman Imperial Museum’s actions also suggest that the Ottoman’s
interest in antiquities and ability to control those antiquities was significant in this period.
According to Köksal a major aspect of the centralizing reforms of the Tanzimat was the
sedentarization of nomadic and semi-nomadic people.42 Several Tanzimat reforms factored into
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this effort, but the 1858 Land Code and the 1864 Provincial Reform Law are especially relevant.
The 1858 land code sought to make all Ottoman land into formal private property. The task of
registering land, according to Peter Sluglett and Marian Farouk-Sluglett shifted the focus of
power struggle from being one of the central state against tribal leaders to one between tribal
leaders and tribesmen and in the process, tied the formerly competitive tribal leaders to the
central state. The increasing incorporation of Iraq into the global marketplace also made both
land and labor more valuable there, which itself was an economic impetus towards
sedentarization.43 Created by the Provincial Reform Law, the provincial council was the highest
appeals court in the province and the arbiter of commercial, civil and shari’a disputes.44
Elizabeth Thompson writes that the council was supposed to be independent of the Vali and was
an example of how top-down reforms like the Tanzimat could led to reform from below, wherein
local notables were given a space within the governing structure.45 Köksal argues that the settling
of peoples was also a top-down initiative, but when carried out successfully, it was done through
local intermediaries. One of the problems faced in Iraq was trying to settle its pastoral
population, which, if not done successfully would leave that population outside of the structure
of the state and more importantly, dislocated from the economy.46
The expansion of the world economy in this period led to economic incentives for
governments to settle previously pastoral populations. Attempts to settle these populations, in
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Ottoman Iraq proceeded in a similar manner and with similar uneven results as it did elsewhere.
This process led to an incomplete sedentarization and to an incomplete integration of those
populations into the world economy, thus creating periodic social and economic disturbances.
Kemal Karpat, in examining the causes of Syrian emigration between 1860 and 1914, listed
brigandage as one of the causes, along with population disturbances caused by Ottoman policies
that aimed at settling nomads.47 David Kushner wrote that brigandage was a concern in this time
period in the Ottoman governance of Palestine.48 Benjamin Fortna notes that Ottoman
autobiographies, during this period, recorded rampant brigandage in the Balkans provinces.49
Nathan Brown demonstrates that the Egyptian state dedicated a fair amount of effort to
eliminating brigandage in the late 19th century.50 In Ottoman Iraq and elsewhere in the Ottoman
periphery, the state attempted to either settle the pastoral people for agricultural purposes or
harness them for state sponsored military purposes. Selim Deringil, in his discussion of
centralizing reforms writes that the “Ottoman Center found itself obliged to squeeze manpower
resources it had not hitherto tapped. Particularly nomadic populations, armed and already
possessing the military skills required for a modern army, now became a primary target for
mobilization.”51 Uyar states that the Hamidian Regiments were intended as a way to integrate
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different ethnicities into the state and organize excess population. Another effort of the time, the
establishment of Albanian and Arab imperial guard battalions had similar intentions.52 The
literature on the implementation of centralizing reforms and sedentarization demonstrates that
the process was seen as a means to confront brigandage and to incorporate the peripheral areas of
the empire into the state. Like the above literature, case studies discussed in this dissertation
suggest that this occurred with uneven results and that brigandage was a concern for Ottoman
officials in Iraq.
Other Tanzimat reforms have been discussed in terms of the relationship between
Istanbul and the Iraqi periphery. Sarah Shields, in her study on Mosul, describes a continuing
struggle between Istanbul and local elites. Ultimately, in Mosul, many of the reforms instituted
by Istanbul were either not enforced, or only loosely implemented; some only by the end of the
19th century.53 Likewise, Eugene Rogan investigates the relationship between center and
periphery in nearby Transjordan, detailing the struggle that ensued as the Sublime Porte
attempted to incorporate the area more firmly into the Empire.54 Hala Fattah elaborates on the
relationship with, and competition between, British merchants, Najdi merchants, local Arabs and
Ottoman elites in the Persian Gulf area to help demonstrate this center-periphery relationship.55
By showing similar instances of conflicts and rivalries among merchants, this research
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contributes to the aforementioned literature by demonstrating the complicated nature of the
relationship between Baghdad, Basra and Istanbul.
Britain’s preeminence in the Gulf is not questioned in the literature. Olney qualifies it by
stating that rather than Britain, it was British India that was the dominant foreign power in
Ottoman Iraq which he argues should be considered “a British Indian Sphere of Influence…”56
Olney goes so far as to argue that Ottoman Iraq in the 19th century should be included in the
definition of British India.57 Blyth details how British Indian officials saw Mesopotamia as a
possible colony of India that could accommodate “as many as twenty-five million Indian
settlers.”58 Headrick agrees, noting “Imperialism in the mid-century [19th] was primarily a matter
of British tentacles reaching out from India…”59 Busch calls the Persian Gulf an “international
waterway of steadily increasing importance in the age of imperial rivalries…”60 As Busch notes,
if shipping alone is to measure importance, in 1896 out of 170,566 tons exported from Basra,
136,693 were British. Britain accounted for about 60% of the export trade and a similar number
in Baghdad. One by-product of inter-imperial rivalry in the Persian Gulf was the creation of the
state of Kuwait. The British maneuvered to create the state as they were worried that Kuwait, the
best deep water port in the Gulf, would become home to a German submarine base via the
working of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway concession and a declaration of Kuwaiti independence
would be the best means of countering that possibility.61 McMeekin notes that British concerns
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over the Berlin-Baghdad Railway led to many international negotiations and a conscious effort
by the concessionaires to appear less German, “The more ‘German’ the Baghdad railway
appeared, the more cause Paris, London and St. Petersburg would have for trying to sabotage it,
or for putting up rival bids for the concession…Germany must appear not to be building the
railway alone, while somehow still securing the benefit.”62 This study contributes to the
argument that Western infrastructure concessions had to appear international both for the sake of
Western business rivalry and to make them palatable to the Ottoman government. Likewise, and
as is demonstrated by Frangakis-Syrett, Clay, Eldhem, Thobie and others, large scale capital was
international by nature.63 Also, as has been demonstrated in the literature, the Ottomans were
able, by manipulating Western investors, to secure better terms for themselves and were active
participants in the concessionary process, rather than passive recipients of foreign influence.
For much of this period Russian expansionism was the foremost concern for the British in
the Persian Gulf. Busch notes that the fears associated with the “Great Game” in Asia, a struggle
of espionage, violence and diplomacy intended to keep Russia from threatening India were
exacerbated by a Russian gunboat, the Gilyak, visiting the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and
setting up a minor coal depot there in 1900. The ebb and flow of crises and diplomacy in the
Gulf were intimately linked with events occurring between these powers elsewhere, such as the
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Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War. Inter-imperial struggle anywhere inspired Britain to
tighten its hold in the Gulf. Britain and India were frequently in conflict over Gulf policy, with
India pushing a more aggressive policy.64 Seton-Watson notes that many foreign policy issues of
this era between Russia and Britain were based in Iran and Afghanistan, and that the negotiations
there were really between Russia, the Russian governor of Turkistan, Britain and British India.
The Anglo-Russian agreement of August 31, 1907 gave Russia large portions of northern Iran as
a sphere of influence and less economically important but more strategically important parts of
Iran (Southeast) to the British with Southwestern Iran being a shared sphere, where either could
compete for concessions. Likewise, Britain issued a statement supporting the status quo in the
Persian Gulf, to support British trade but without excluding the legitimate trade of any other
power. Russia also recognized both Afghanistan as being outside of their sphere of interest and
Britain’s special interest in Tibet.65 LeDonne discusses this rivalry and Britain’s containment
policy by writing that Britain entered the Anglo-Japanese alliance primarily to stop Russian
encroachment in Northern China. Putting it in candid terms, Lord Balfour declared in 1901 “a
quarrel with Russia anywhere, about anything, means the invasion of India.” The Portsmouth
Treaty of 1905 gave Japan hegemony on the Pacific frontier, significantly lessening the
perceived threat of Russia to British interest. After the rapprochement of Russia and Great
Britain and the entente cordiale which ended the Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean, the
new focus for British anxiety was Germany.66
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Robert Johnson notes that Ottoman and Iranian territorial integrity served as major
British bulwarks against Russian expansionism. Johnson argues that diplomats, consulates,
financial services, infrastructure projects, communications networks and commercial concessions
were the key to this struggle.67 Headrick argues that more than anything else, it was
communication and transport technology that allowed the British to dominate. He wrote “The
steamboat, with its power to travel speedily upriver as well as down, carried Europeans deep into
Africa and Asia. Few inventions of the nineteenth century were as important to the history of
imperialism.”68 Headrick argues that the importance of shipping contracts and in particular of
the mail contracts ensured vicious competition by and between British firms.69 Ebubekir Ceylan
notes that the first steamship navigation in the region was British and was an attempt to shorten
travel time to India. The Lynch Company was operating in Iraq as early as 1842 and with an
official concession from the Ottoman government by 1846. British riverboats seem to have been
both an irritation and a boon for the Ottoman State. The British presence and economic
penetration had to be contained, but their riverboats provided increased security against
recalcitrant tribes and made tax collection easier for the Ottoman governors of Iraq.70 While in
1911, the two largest global shipping companies by tonnage and number of ships were German,
(Hamburg-Amerika and Norddeutscher Lloyd), in 1914, the two largest British ones had merged,
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making it the largest in the world. That new company, the British India Steam Navigation
Company, in turn, swallowed up the local British steamer service, the Euphrates and Tigris
Steam Navigation Company (ETSN). Headrick also argued that the construction of monumental
irrigation projects and the transfer of plants were major features of imperialism.71 Clearly these
forces were at work in Ottoman Iraq as well. This study augments the literature by discussing the
internal British competition over contracts in Ottoman Iraq and the struggle between the
Ottoman State and the ETSN for control over the steamboat traffic on the Tigris River.
Elena Frangakis-Syrett demonstrates the complicated workings of foreign investment in
her work, and particularly in “The Making of an Ottoman Port.” The quay at Izmir was one of
the earliest harbor projects in the Ottoman Empire and is a complicated study in how
infrastructure projects work. Frangakis-Syrett writes that rivalry and competition defined the
European communities in Izmir, “Such fierce rivalry became the backdrop to the construction of
the quay.” Initiated locally and originally to be funded locally, the project began as a British
venture in 1868. Ottoman officials, realizing its value to their trade, helped the project along; the
French consul also approved of the project especially after the project became a French
concession. Frangakis-Syrett writes, “Inter-imperial rivalry kept antagonism to the quay
company alive even when specific issues had been resolved and reignited it every time another
point of contention emerged.”72 Jans Hannsen showed how local officials were active
participants in the urban improvement of Beirut and how they utilized mechanisms set up by
Tanzimat-era reforms to help them on their quest to develop Beirut. In particular, local elites
sought to make Beirut a provincial capital and concurrently, to tie their fortunes closer to the
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imperial center.73 These infrastructure projects are important points of contact between Western
nation-states and the Ottoman Empire. Leonhard notes that while the Ottoman State was
dependent on Europeans for infrastructure improvements such as railways, the Ottoman state
also needed to be able to provide the symbols of legitimacy and modernity that these
improvements represented.74 This research agrees with and reinforces the literature that states
that the Ottoman Empire manipulated inter-imperial rivalry and Western business rivalry for its
own benefit.
The act of incorporating remote regions is an example of nation building and the process
through which the Ottoman Empire moved, or attempted to move away from an Empire and
towards a nation-state. The process of identity formation within the Ottoman Empire has been
well documented. Selim Deringil argues that during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman
state used Sufi sheikhs and nationalism to attempt a synthetic, but more uniform, Ottoman
identity.75 Kayali argues that Turkish nationalism did not really play a role in this period but that
the creation of a new identity was based around an Ottoman identity or a process of Ottomanism.
Kayali writes that this nation building identity arose from the Tanzimat principle of political
equality and was defined by “a common allegiance of all subjects in equal status to the Ottoman
dynasty.”76 Taner Akçam and Vahakn Dadrian argue that the process of Ottoman identity
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formation failed and contributed to the Armenian Genocide.77 Bruce Masters complicates this
narrative by reminding us that, “the peoples of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were
not simply passive recipients of an order imposed by the Europeans. Rather, they took an active
role in devising strategies to cope with change and benefit from it, thereby determining their own
futures.”78 Deringil’s thesis, in “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery” and in the
Well Protected Domains, was that the late Ottoman State “came to perceive of its periphery as a
colonial setting.”79 Makdisi notes that this internal colonial attitude of the ethnic Turkish elite
was most obvious when it came to its application within the Arab province.80 Köksal argues that
the process of centralizing tanzimat reforms, the settling of pastoral people can be seen as part of
a transition from Empire to Nation-State, although not necessary along the same lines as that of
Western states.81 My research too shows the complicated realities of the center-periphery
relationship as it manifested itself in Ottoman Iraq through trade and other economic disputes.
Elena Frangakis-Syrett has shown that the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Trade Convention
produced positive results for British trade in the Ottoman Empire. The benefits for British and
later American merchants were real, however, these merchants still found it profitable and
necessary to work with the local partners the treaty was supposed to circumvent and that the
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treaty had “ongoing problems concerning its full implementation.”82 Pamuk shows that the 19th
century saw an unprecedented expansion of Western trade into the Ottoman Empire. This
expansion was not a steady process but a fluctuating one, subject to the whims of the nascent
global economy. Free trade treaties cleared a number of government restrictions on imports and
exports, however, Pamuk argues that these should not be seen as the cause of increased
trade/incorporation in the world economy, but as a symptom of it. Large amounts of capital were
invested by the industrialized countries into the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century and
most of it was invested into transport infrastructure to facilitate trade, rather than other forms of
development, particularly agricultural.83 Christopher Clay shows how banking, either completely
or partially bankrolled by Western capital developed in the Ottoman Empire. While Western
banks opened first in and only in Istanbul by the 1890’s these financial institutions began
opening branches throughout the Ottoman Empire. By 1913, over 140 banks or bank branches
were operating in the Ottoman Empire in eighty different urban centers. The three BIO branches
in Iraq were founded in Baghdad in 1892, Basra in 1904 and Mosul in 1907. Clay notes that
between 1889 and 1911 the Ottoman economy was growing rapidly and outstripping population
growth. Clay provides evidence that local merchants in the Ottoman provinces wanted Western
style banking institutions to expand into their territory and make their capital available to them. 84
In Iraq specifically, Issawi argues that floods, soil salinity/riverine silt, epidemics, tribal
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insecurity, and poor governance hampered what should have been rapid economic growth during
the 19th century. However, global trends, including increased demand for Iraqi agricultural
products and lower shipping rates saw a twelvefold increase in seaborne exports and an increase
of twenty-two times in seaborne imports between the 1870’s and 1912-3. This expansion made it
profitable to increase production and sedentarize the pastoral population of Iraq.85 Reşat Kasaba
notes that the incorporation of Ottoman Empire into the world economy was done mainly
through this mediation of trade activities which linked agricultural producers in the periphery
with manufacturers and consumers in core areas. Some monetary and infrastructure investment
took place in the 2nd half of the 19th century, but as Pamuk had also noted, this was mostly
transportation to facilitate trade.86 The economic vibrancy of the very late 19th and early 20th
century in Ottoman Iraq warrants using economic conflicts to investigate the history of the
region and time period.
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Chapter 1
Infrastructure and American Investment Attempts
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The late 19th and early 20th century saw significant foreign interest and investment in
infrastructure projects in the Ottoman Empire. These projects ranged from the large-scale BerlinBaghdad Railway, to more local projects, such as tramways, mail carrying concession and bridge
or quay constructions. This projects were both beneficial for local people and for the Ottoman
Empire, as well as being profitable for European and American investors. In the Ottoman
Empire, these projects, besides the profit motive (for foreign and local investors) and the
Ottoman desire to see local economic improvements, contained hints of an imperial and interimperial element, as typically expressed through the competition between rival investors. In the
case of the U.S. in this period, there was a desire to expand their own economic interests in the
Ottoman Empire. This attempt, although the work of individual entrepreneurs, was part of the
larger U.S. foreign policy of the period, particularly during the Roosevelt-Taft years, which
featured an aggressive expansionist economic policy. The three U.S. company sponsored
projects discussed in this chapter were not realized, yet their history and the interplay between
the U.S. and Ottoman officials contribute to our understanding of how the Ottoman Empire
functioned economically. In terms of securing these projects, U.S. investors were excluded, in
part by the U.S. State Department’s inability to see beyond its protocols and adapt to local
conditions and later by the intransigence of entrenched European companies. These projects can
also be seen within the evolution of the Foreign Service into a more effective promoter of
American interests and the general trend towards the growth of U.S. economic interests in
Ottoman Iraq. This evolution also involved the U.S. Foreign Service moving away from using a
self-interested businessman to using salaried, professional employees in Baghdad. These
economic interests evolved in this time period, from the mere self-interested actions of diplomatcum-merchants into a more sophisticated promotion of American business interests. Likewise,
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the foundation of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant is evidence of growing
ability and sophistication of U.S. economic promotion in the region as the organization was
founded both by U.S. concession seekers and by American diplomats.
Empire is a complicated and fraught term. This chapter utilizes the definition provided in
Joshua Freeman’s American Empire. Freeman adroitly describes empire as coming in many
forms, writing “not just the annexation of territory, the Roman practice, or the creation of
colonies, the operating mode of Spain, Portugal, Britain and other European powers. At its heart,
empire involves asserting influence and control over places, people, resources and trade outside
the original boundaries of a national entity. While empires almost always involve at least some
use of military force, or the threat of its use, power can be exerted in many ways. Political,
economic, cultural and ideological influence can be as important to empire as ships, planes, and
guns.”1 After the Civil War and especially after the Spanish-American War, the United States
experienced a resurgence in imperial interest and displayed an increasingly imperial stance in its
foreign policy. As part of and in reaction to this new foreign policy focus, the U.S. State
Department and individual American investors became or tried to become more active in the
Ottoman Empire as they did in other parts of the globe. If the United States and its investors
were unable to enter the Ottoman infrastructure market in any meaningful way, it is not a
reflection of a lack of desire or will, but a reflection of the shortcomings of state department
officials and even more skeptical U.S. businesses, as well as European imperialists having no
interest in expanding an open door policy in the region. It is also a reflection of the ability of the
Ottoman Empire to absorb this focus from the United States and use it to their own advantage.
For their own part, the U.S. State Department failed to understand how concessions were
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acquired and rather than adapting to local practices, insisted on following its own protocol.
These projects provide insight into the internal and external workings of the Ottoman Empire.
For example, Ottoman officials demonstrated considerable awareness for local infrastructure
needs and were savvy negotiators. Additionally, as local officials were able to initiate
concessions for their region, these projects also demonstrate the level of cooperation between
different levels of the Ottoman government.
Several authors have discussed the workings of infrastructure projects in the Ottoman
Empire. The most detailed examination of U.S. infrastructure projects in this period, is American
Interests and Politics in the Middle East: 1900-1939 by John De Novo. De Novo, asserts that
before oil exports from the Middle East acquired importance to the United States after the First
World War, American economic interests and aspirations in the region far exceeded their
reality.2 De Novo argues that starting in the 1870’s and culminating in the 1890’s (SpanishAmerican War), American foreign policy became increasingly imperial and expansionist.
Furthermore, De Novo argues that the Middle East was not a sphere that the U.S. typically
intervened in politically, but that it was an area where the U.S. would protect interests that were
“cultural, philanthropic and commercial…” Other locales, such as their newly acquired
Caribbean empire (Cuba and Puerto Rico) and Pacific territories (the Philippines and Guam) and
their surrounding regions – Latin American and China – were more important to the United
States government than the Middle East in this period. However, that does not mean that the U.S.
was disinterested in the Ottoman Empire. As Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt famously wrote
“Spain and Turkey are the two powers that I would rather smash than any other in the world.”
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Roosevelt got his chance to smash Spain, even resigning his post as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy to lead a volunteer military unit, the Rough Riders, into battle in Cuba. Roosevelt’s
administration as President lasted from 1901-1908 and then his hand-picked and groomed
successor William Howard Taft, was in office from 1908-1912. Therefore, there were eleven
years of administrations with expansionist foreign policy in the White House. De Novo notes, as
well, that over the years 1900-1914, U.S. interests in the Ottoman Empire expanded
significantly.3
Emily Rosenberg notes that the United States, during the Taft administration, followed a
foreign policy of Dollar Diplomacy which was both a strategy of investing in other nations to
raise their standards of living and to “expand imperialist domination and exploitation…”4 De
Novo points out that the U.S. consulate in Istanbul was shabby and that the overall role/skill of
the State Department in the Ottoman Empire could be said to be lacking before 1906.5 The
ineffectuality of the State Department led to “do-it-yourself” diplomacy with examples of
American educators in the Ottoman Empire negotiating directly with the Sublime Porte, rather
than through the U.S. State Department. Oren notes that after anti-Armenian pogroms in the
1890’s, the U.S. public collected money to provide relief for the affected Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire and that this money was distributed in the Ottoman Empire by Clara Barton.
Barton was nominated to bring the donations to the Armenians due to the U.S. public’s
perception of the State Department as ineffective.6
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While much of U.S. interest in the Ottoman Empire focused on missionaries, De Novo
writes that the optimism of U.S. missionaries and educators for their future in the Ottoman
Empire was “matched by the expectations of those [businessmen] who believed in the potential
for American business in the Middle East.”7 Between 1897 and 1907, 223 requests were sent by
U.S. firms to the Vice Consulate in Baghdad, optimistic about the possibility of exporting to, or
importing from, Iraq.8 While this was a common practice of Western companies at the time, it
perhaps indicates that U.S. businesses were interested in Iraq. MacAndrews and Forbes, an
initially Scottish licorice importer which was substantially an American company in this period,
had considerable sums of money invested in their own infrastructure in Baghdad, Smyrna
(Izmir), Alexandretta and Batum. These included offices, hydraulic presses and warehouses. The
Singer Sewing Company had nearly 200 agencies and offices in the Ottoman Empire by 1918,
and their machines were said to be even in “the remote interior.”9 As American corporations
became more involved in the Ottoman export trade, American financial interests likely began to
take notice of the possibilities of investment into the Ottoman concession acquiring process.
This chapter demonstrates how the scale of American funded infrastructure projects in
Ottoman Iraq evolved over this period. This evolution was contemporaneous and concomitant
with the evolution and professionalization of the U.S. State Department, the foreign policy of the
Roosevelt-Taft years and the expansion of the global economy. The evolution of the state
department has been noted extensively in the secondary literature. It was recorded in the
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archives, with the announcement of the elevation of Istanbul from a legation to a consulate,10 the
evolution of the position from an unpaid post to the creation of a $2000 annual salary for the
(promoted from Vice Consul) Consul in Baghdad, the allotment of $600 per year for contingent
expenses, $500 per annum to hire a clerk and $400 to hire guards.11 It should be noted that a
request for an expense account by the U.S. Vice Consul in 1898 was rejected.12 Likewise, U.S.
interests in potential infrastructure projects in the Ottoman Iraq expanded significantly in size.
Two early projects were conceived of and promoted by a local partnership in Baghdad between
the Ottoman State and an American diplomat. These early projects preceded the more extensive
U.S. projects in Ottoman Iraq, particularly both the founding of the American Chamber of
Commerce for the Levant and the Chester Project. In the larger context, this process and growth
of American interest provides evidence suggesting that the US was more involved in the
Ottoman Empire than is reflected in the literature.
The archives record two small scale projects proposed by the U.S. Vice Consul in
Baghdad. The U.S. Vice Consul was acting as a self-interested intermediary for Ottoman
officials, who wanted the project for local economic growth. The first was a bridge building
contract, wherein a U.S. steel company would design and build a bridge in Baghdad. The long
history of the steel industry in the United States begins before the nation was even founded; the
first known blast furnace in the area was built in 1645 in Michigan. The US steel industry was
producing 41% of British output by the 1870’s and in 1892 it equaled and then surpassed British
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production.13 William Willcocks, a British engineer and advisor to the Ottoman Empire on
irrigation matters in Iraq, ordered $30,000 worth of American made steel (from Lackawanna
Steel Co.) for construction purposes in Iraq, particularly on the Hindiyya Barrage. Frederick
Simpich, the U.S. consul in Baghdad at the time wrote, “for which he [Willcocks] has been
criticized by local British importers.”14 The second project examined here was a concession to
build boats to be operated on the Tigris River by the local Ottoman transport company. These
boats would have been in direct competition with boats that a British firm was also trying to sell
to the Ottoman state; as noted in this chapter the concession ultimately went to the British
Thorneycroft Company. Both projects were initiated by Ottoman officials, and as such are not
indicative of an imperial stance by the U.S. They do suggest, or hint that the U.S. was becoming
more interested in the Ottoman economy and that the Ottomans welcomed them to the
marketplace likely because they provided another option for trade and one lacked some of the
less savory aspects of the British and the Germans.
Rudolf Hürner, a Swiss national, was the U.S. Vice Consul in Baghdad from 1897 until
1906. During that period, he was also the head of a business venture known as Rudolf Hürner
and Co. a multi-faceted firm that participated in import and export, antiquities smuggling and
moneylending. On at least two occasions, Hürner also tried his hand at international investment
coordinator. On May 7th, 1900, in response to communications initiated by Hürner in November
of 1899, Thomas Cridler15 forwarded a letter to Hürner from Mr. J. V. W. Reynders,
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Superintendent of the Pennsylvania Steel Company.16 Under Reynders’ management, a major
foreign project was coordinated in Burma, then British India, known as the Gókteik Viaduct,
indicating that similar projects were pursued by this same company.17 The Pennsylvania Steel
Company, centered in Steelton, Pennsylvania, was one of the major U.S. steel producers of the
period. In 1900, The Pennsylvania Steel Company bid $104,600 to build a bridge in Baghdad
over the Tigris River. Reynders demanded half of the payment when the contract was signed.18
A lawyer for the Pennsylvania Steel Company, Joseph K. McKammon added further demands,
specifically that the $104,600 bid price did not include “local custom charges, port charges, or
any similar items that may be imposed by the government of Arabia19 or the authorities at
Baghdad; all such charges should be defrayed and guaranteed by the purchaser.”20 In April of
1900, in the midst of the Hürner-Pennsylvania Steel correspondence, Hürner received a letter
actually encouraging the idea of a U.S. built iron-bridge in Iraq from the American Consul-
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General in Istanbul, Charles Dickinson.21 From the contents of the letter and the timing, it seems
that Dickinson may have been unaware that such a project was already in the works, or only had
a vague notion of it. Dickinson’s letter, concerning attempts to increase American investment in
the Ottoman Empire, despite its pro-bridge sentiment was otherwise pessimistic. Dickinson
wrote that “There is serious mistrust among our exporters in extending credit to parties in the
East.”22 Yet Dickinson seemed, in theory, to like the idea of having an American company
invest in a bridge building project. Dickinson urged Hürner to contact the Berlin Bridge
Company of New Berlin, Connecticut, again seemingly unaware of the correspondence Hürner
had with the Pennsylvania Steel Company. By September of 1901, little had happened to move
the project forward. Finally, an actual proposal had been written up and sent to the Ottoman
Minister of Public Works. Consul-General Dickinson remarked, this time with clear knowledge
of the project “I trust the order for the American firm [Pennsylvania Steel Company] will
result.”23
The first hint of trouble for the bridge project came in December of 1902. Spencer Eddy,
Chargé d’affaires24 of the American Embassy in Istanbul wrote a letter to Rudolf Hürner
concerning the Tigris Bridge, wherein he assured Hürner that the plans were presented to the
Minister of Public Works. But he cautioned Hürner to follow proper procedure. Eddy informed
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Hürner, with a hint of impatience, that the next step in the process involved a special agent from
the Pennsylvania Steel Company coming to Istanbul to provide any information that might be
asked of them by the Ottoman Government. Eddy then noted “It is needless to say that this is the
procedure usually adopted by Companies seeking orders from this Government.”25 However, an
examination of other small scale and successful concessions, such as the ones cited later in this
chapter, suggest that local procedure would have been to allow Hürner to actually get the
concession himself or have a local Ottoman agent acquire the concession from the Ottoman
State. Then, Hürner or whoever locally would have received the concession could and perhaps
would have subcontracted the work to a Western business.
Hürner was reprimanded for this effort. In January of 1903, Dickinson cautioned Hürner,
warning that his actions were not appropriate as a consular agent. Dickinson cited paragraph 102
of the Consular Regulations, the full text of which states “In countries where there is a consul
general with supervisory powers the several consuls subordinate to them, respectively, will not
correspond officially with the diplomatic representatives of the United States in those countries,
unless in reply to communications or inquiries from them, but will make all their representations
through their respective consulates general.”26 Eddy had been surprised to hear directly from
Hürner in violation of regulations, and had taken it upon himself to tell Dickinson about the
Paragraph 102 violation. Dickinson was upset as well that Hürner’s letter to Eddy implied that
the bridge project was being ignored at the consulate. Dickinson wrote that Hürner’s letter and
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breach of protocol were “so unprecedented in my experience here that it calls for some
explanation on your part.”27
This response to a breach of protocol was harsh. No doubt there were several
irregularities in Hürner’s methods, and, as noted in another chapter, Hürner would eventually
find himself dismissed for gross violations of both procedure and law. Yet, what Hürner was
trying to do was a benefit to himself, besides also being an opportunity for U.S. businesses and
local Ottoman economic development. As Hala Fattah noted, land transport in Iraq was typically
significantly more expensive than riverine which led to a lack of adequate roads and bridges.28
Doubtlessly, Hürner also meant to enrich himself in the process, but the harsh reaction from
Eddy and Dickinson was overblown. It should be noted as well that some higher official dislike
for Hürner may have been caused by his imperfect English and that he was a Swiss national. In
other words, Hürner was not one of them; not a career diplomat, not a political appointee, not an
American and not of the same class. In a letter from Hürner to Eddy, Hürner wrote, “I never had
any informations [sic] that the plans were presented to the Minister of Public Works, but now as
such has been done, according to your above letter [From Dec 31st], permit me also to ask: what
has been the reply of the Minister.” Hürner continued his letter by stating that if the proposal was
approved, Hürner would communicate directly with the Pennsylvania Steel Company and inform
them to send the special agent that Eddy had mentioned previously. Hürner also noted that there
should be no obstacles to the bridge project, as the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire had already
issued an iradeh stating that one should be built.29 Hürner intensified his apology after receiving
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another rebuke on January 30th, this time from Dickinson. Hürner explained that the regrettable
misunderstanding that had prejudiced Dickinson against him, was really just that – a huge
misunderstanding. According to Hürner, the misunderstanding was over what capacity Hürner
occupied when he wrote to Eddy. Hürner was not Hürner the Vice Consul while writing to Mr.
Eddy, he was Hürner the business owner, “the dispatch is written and signed in the name of my
commercial firm and I was corresponding in the same manner with the Pennsylvania Steel Co.
since years.” Hürner added a second excuse, writing that Dickinson was, at the time, “absent
from Constantinople and then I was advised by Mr. Banks30 to write to Mr. Eddy.” Hürner
continued with an aggressive remark of his own, inquiring as to why he had not heard whether
the plans were ever presented to the Sublime Porte by the Istanbul legation, wondering “why
during 17 months I have not been favored with any respective communication from the
Consulate General?”31 In a follow up dispatch, Hürner reiterated the same points and expressed
frustration with the situation and the lack of communication, noting, “Why then did you not
inform me that the matter was in the Legation’s hands?”32
Indeed, why hadn’t there been any communication concerning the project for a year and a
half? Hürner seems to have been, in his mind and in actual practice, a business owner first and a
Vice Consul second. Hürner was not paid to be the Vice Consul, and was expected to do the
work of the post and find remuneration where he could. He took the job and held it for so long
because he saw the ways in which he could profit from it. Hürner sought promotion and an
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allowance for a clerk- both of which were denied.33 In the case of this contract, Hürner was
trying to get hired by a U.S. company and/or employed by the Ottoman state to act as an official
go-between. The final mention of the project occurred in a letter from the company’s
superintendent, Reynders. The latter’s letter, dated January 4th, 1904, was written over more
than four years after the correspondence about the bridge first began and nearly four years since
the Pennsylvania Steel Company had placed a bid on the project. Meanwhile, in April of 1899,
the Pennsylvania Steel Company had signed a contract to build a viaduct in Burma for the Burma
Railway Company. The project, requiring 9.7 million pounds of material to be shipped from the
United States was delayed by heavy floods for several months. The viaduct ran over 2,200 feet
and required material to be shipped over 10,000 miles to its destination. Finished in June of
1901, the Gókteik Viaduct was completed during the period that negotiations for the Tigris
bridge project were occurring.34 The Gókteik Viaduct showed the possibilities of US foreign
investment and specifically of the same company, which had tried, but failed to invest in
Baghdad. It should be noted that while Hürner seemed to have thought the project would
proceed, issues may well have arisen with the contract that were outside of his knowledge and
therefore not recorded in this archive. The final correspondence from Reynders urged Hürner to
make contact with the dragoman (translator) of the U.S. legation, Arshag Effendi Shmavonian.35
Shmavonian, besides serving as dragoman to the US Consulate, had a keen interest in bringing
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industrial development to the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. Upon meeting the American
missionary Reverend E.F. Carey, Shmavonian, himself a graduate of the American missionary
high school, Robert College and a future pastor,36 told Carey, “But the Armenians are Christians
already and have been since the time of Gregory in the fourth century. What my people really
need is industrial education, shops, factories and improved farming methods.”37 It appears that
neither Hürner nor Shmavonian, who both wanted to pursue foreign investment in the Ottoman
Empire for personal reasons, did not pursue this project further.
In December of 1905, Hürner again tried to liaison with an American business in
response to a local request. He corresponded with the Racine Boat Company (of Racine,
Wisconsin) and forwarded them a letter from Monsieur Mougel, a French engineer in the employ
of the Baghdad Vilâyet. Mougel had worked for the Ottoman State for several years. Mougel
was the son of a famous French engineer that had done considerable work in Egypt, Mougel
Bey; Mougel Bey (senior) was a French hydraulic engineer who had first arrived in Egypt in the
late 1830’s and had also been a part of the French team that constructed the Suez Canal.38 There
is a mention of the younger Mougel by Hormudz Rassam, the Assyrian Assyrianologist, who
noted that the engineer had done him a favor in Baghdad related to an archeological dig at
Sippara in the early 1880’s.39 Major Talbot, British Consul-General wrote, in an 1899 report on
the trade of Baghdad, that “A Frenchman (M. Mougel) is permanently in its [Baghdad Vilâyet]
service to advise and administer in irrigation and engineering works. In the event of any
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European machinist ever having a scheme or an apparatus bearing on irrigation, or land
reclamation, which he desired to have considered here, M. Mougel would be the proper person to
communicate with.”40 Mougel seems to be the forerunner or competitor to William Willcocks,
who would also act as special advisor on irrigation in Iraq a few years in the future.
The U.S. vice consulate in Baghdad received considerable amounts of unsolicited mail
from American corporations, 6% of which, during Hürner’s tenure were for vehicles. It may be
that the Racine Boat Company was one of the many corporations that wrote to Baghdad or
perhaps they were featured in a trade publication and came to the attention of the Vice Consul in
that manner. Regardless, Hürner selected the Racine Boat Manufacturing Company and
addressed them with this inquiry, “The engineer of this vilayet, Monsieur Mougel, having
informed me, that the local government is in want of steamers for the river Tigris, I permit to
hand you hereby enclosed Mr. Mougel’s letter, addressed to you, with the request to kindly let
him have, through this consulate, your reply.” Hürner continued, “Should you be in position to
contract the steamers, then my commercial firm – established here over 36 years – shall continue
to remit you other commands.”41 Further correspondence indicated that the State Department
was made aware of the attempt. Three more letters were sent to the Racine Boat Company.42 The
final correspondence indicated that the company responded to the State Department and that as
far as they were concerned, Hürner’s role in the process was complete.43 These two projects were
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speculative ventures and while burdened by protocol, their failure to proceed was also in some
ways simply a risk of capitalism.
The boat concession proceeded and collapsed in a similar manner to the bridge
concession. In both cases Hürner contacted a business either on his own initiative or that of an
Ottoman official and definitely with local Ottoman cooperation. The project was proposed
outside of regular diplomatic channels. Nominally, the bridge concession was initiated at the
behest of the Vilâyet, and the boat one on behalf of Mougel, who worked for the Vilâyet. This
correspondence drew the attention of the State Department. The State Department assumed
control of the negotiations and the negotiations ground to a halt. Ultimately, neither project was
realized. Hürner, in 1899 and again in 1905, representing both Ottoman and American economic
interests initiated a conversation concerning good business opportunities, which the U.S. State
Department had a part in silencing by taking over the negotiations. The Baghdad Vilâyet did
order boats, finally, but from Thornycroft and Company, a British firm. The U.S. boat
correspondence, if not initiated for that purpose, was used by the Ottoman Vali in order to secure
better terms from the British, or, at the very least to compare pricing in an era without the ready
availability of such market information.
In order to contact an American business, Mougel would do so through American
channels. If American businesses were unknown in Ottoman Iraq, they would likely not have
been chosen for this contract. Even if the Racine Boat Company were engaged in the
correspondence simply as a counterbalance to more established Western interests, they were still
enough a part of the economic knowledge in Baghdad to be considered in the overall concession
equation. The potential contract was in line with the local proper procedure for these smaller
scale concessions or rather the modus operandi in the Empire, including Baghdad in this period.
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Some of these projects tended to start with the Vali giving the concession locally and then an
agent, whether a foreign national or an Ottoman citizen, negotiating with the Western investors.
This procedure was strikingly similar to tax farming. Clearly, in this instance, as in the bridge
concession, Hürner stood to profit from the project as a go-between.
These two concession attempts reflect both on the U.S. State Department and on Ottoman
concession procedures, as well as the expanding global economy that made these sorts of
business ventures possible. The boat and bridge negotiations suggest that the U.S. State
Department was eager to follow protocol. Yet local U.S. consular agents – lower level agents - in
Baghdad and Basra were uniquely entrenched in local business affairs. The constantly rotating
vice consulate in Basra was primarily concerned with date exports, which were over $700,000 in
value in 1906. Hürner and his personal firm in Baghdad were well positioned to be aware of
local economic conditions and opportunities. As an unpaid employee, Hürner was not beholden
to the U.S. State Department for his future in any way. Although Hürner was aware of how the
Ottomans typically awarded these sorts of projects, he was either ignored or not effective in
communicating this with the legation in Istanbul. Similar British projects, including the same
boat concession that Hürner attempted to secure, provide evidence as to how these concessions
proceeded. A confidential memo from the British Consul General in Baghdad began, “Since his
arrival at Baghdad, Nazim Pasha [Vali] has shown a strong interest in financial and commercial
enterprises and organization, and at the present moment there is a feverish rush here for
concessions of all sorts, due mainly to the new Wali’s encouragement and the opportunities he
has created.”44 Before Nazim Pasha was Vali in Baghdad (1910-1911) Midhat Pasha’s tenure as
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Vali of Baghdad (1869-1872) had been marked by a series of municipal improvements. Midhat
Pasha left a legacy of development initiated by the local Ottoman government rather than
through private capital or from Istanbul. Under Midhat Pasha’s guidance, roads were improved,
street cleaning taxes initiated, parks built in the city, and the city wall was removed to further
urban planning and city expansion. Water pumps were also introduced in Baghdad during
Midhat’s governorship; shrines were repaired, a modern bridge built over the Tigris, government
buildings constructed, a clock tower was built, and gas lighting introduced from locally sourced
(Mandali) natural gas.45 This legacy contributed to Nazim Pasha’s desire to improve the local
conditions at Baghdad and bolstered his ability to carry out improvements on his own initiative.
During Nazim Pasha’s governorship, there were a variety of smaller scale concessions
being discussed. On May 22nd of 1910, a local official paper “Zaura” issued a call for bids on the
electrification of Baghdad and the construction of an electric tramway. Viollet, a French
archaeologist, was named as one of the bidders.46 Another bidder was Haji Ibrahim, whose most
identifiable trait seems to be that he once lived in Paris.47 A group headed by Mahmud
Shahbander was also listed as one of the bidders. Gertrude Bell provides us with more
information as to the identity of this man, “Mahmud Chalabi Shahbander…is the leading
{merchant} man of business in Baghdad and I like him particularly…”48 According to the British
Consul, it was this group that received the most consideration from the government, but this
assertion may well be biased and a way to explain why British groups did not enter the
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negotiations. An agreement between Nazim Pasha and Shahbander was accepted in draft form
for a period of 75 years. The agreement involved a ₤4,000 yearly payment to the Baghdad
Municipal Government and profit sharing above that at a rate of three shares for themselves to
one for the local government. The tramway was supposed to be completed in 2 years. The British
consul tried to steer Shahbander towards British electrical manufacturers and expressed his
concern that Shahbander would use other, foreign suppliers.
To fulfill that boat order, Nazim Pasha eventually ordered several boats from a British
firm; specifically, three 50 foot motorboats capable of carrying 60 passengers each were ordered
from Messrs. Thornycroft of London.49 The recalcitrance of the U.S. State Department and their
insistence that a certain, ineffectual procedure contributed to the concessions failing. Ottoman
officials and concession seekers may well have been using the Racine Boat Company in
particular to get a better deal with the British. It would have been unusual for the Ottomans to
not consider multiple companies and bids in order to get the best deal. However, U.S. concession
seekers and businessmen could not compete if they were unable to adapt to local custom or they
may simply have not offered as attractive a deal. The proper procedure, at least at this time and
in Baghdad, was to use a local intermediary, which in the case of the boat concession became
Nazim Pasha, who then contracted with a Western corporation to carry out the actual order.
Yet, while Hürner provided flexibility locally for the promotion of these small scale
contracts, his self-interest limited American trade and investment opportunities in general.
Hürner was a capitalist and, of course, his business interests came first. His interest in increasing
U.S. economic interest in Baghdad existed only if they coincided with the interests of his firm
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Hürner and Co. During his tenure as Vice Consul, Hürner expressed interest in response to
queries from U.S. businesses. In particular, he expressed interest in providing local
representation for American law firms.50 Hürner also indicated to U.S. export associations that he
would act as their sole agent in Baghdad,51 and he proposed to become the sole importer of fine
corsets,52 steel,53 shoes,54 washing machines,55 pharmaceuticals,56 and also to act as an agent for
U.S. companies wherein it was unclear what business they engaged in or product they
produced.57 While it would seem to fit his job description to encourage trade, Hürner’s ability to
dictate which companies would or would not be promoted was based solely on his own interests.
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Hürner responded to inquiries he favored by telling firms that he would like to do business with
them and please stop contacting him at the vice consulate and communicate with him privately.
Therefore, these deals were not recorded in the archives as Hürner obviously did not record his
firm’s business deals officially. Hürner would, however, cite regulations forbidding U.S. Vice
Consuls from providing individual references when it benefitted him; in one instance, after citing
the aforementioned regulation, he indicated that Hürner and Company would be glad to help and
were exceptionably reliable.58 The only examples of Hürner’s business dealings that entered the
consular record is when he sought help from the State Department over inevitable conflicts with
American merchants.59 While it seems that typically, U.S. companies contacted Hürner first,
there is evidence that sometimes Hürner initiated contact with U.S. manufacturers. The Coates
Brothers of Philadelphia, which imported wool and then resold it in the US market, contacted the
Baghdad Vice Consul (the letter was addressed to John Sundberg, who had previously been the
Vice Consul) asking about the reliability of Hürner and Company, which had solicited them for a
business deal.60 Hürner acted as a gatekeeper for U.S. businesses; companies that he did not want
to represent were told them there was no market for their goods.61
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After the professionalization of the Foreign Service in 1906, the vice consuls and later
consuls in Baghdad continued to promote U.S. economic interests, albeit without the same selfinterest as Hürner. The U.S. vice consulate became a paying position and these men continued to
be interested in the idea of developing American investment in the area. As salaried employees
they did stand to profit from individual business deals. William Magelssen, the U.S. Vice Consul
that replaced Hürner in Baghdad, responded to an unsolicited request for information by the Eck
Motor Company of New Jersey. While in the United States all major cities had electricity
available and about 15% of U.S. households were illuminated by the new technology, Iraq had
no electric plants and no electricity.62 In responding to a request about the feasibility of selling
electric fans in Baghdad, Magelssen, an American born in Minnesota, responded to the Eck
Motor Company that “There is no electric plant in Mesopotamia and Turkish Arabia. Damascus,
in Syria, some 600 miles from Bagdad, has now an electric railroad and that city is, as far as I
know, the only place in Turkey where electric fans can be employed.”63 Magelssen took the time
to write to an individual U.S. company and with accurate knowledge of the local market, he was
demonstrating a high level of interest in U.S. business ventures. Magelssen, who was once
reported murdered when a wedding celebration startled him in Beirut – the United States even
dispatched a warship to Beirut in response – took this interest a step further in another letter.
Magelssen replied to an inquiry about tramways and streetcars in Baghdad, to the Street Railway
Journal of New York that only a single rail existed in Baghdad. The five mile tramway
connected Baghdad to the suburb of Kazimiyah and was owned by the Kazimiyah Tramway
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Company, an Ottoman venture. The president of the company was Khaderi Bada Yasin Chalabi.
Horses pulled 14 passenger cars. Magelssen requested copies of the railway journal, stating U.S.
streetcar manufacturers should “watch old Mesopotamia!”64
While Magelssen saw a market for U.S. streetcars, other consuls saw the expansion of
agriculture as creating a possible market for U.S. farm machinery. Frederick Simpich, who was
consul in Baghdad from 1909-1911, provided detailed information on U.S. trade patterns and
ways they could be expanded. Simpich was concerned that transportation from the U.S. to
Ottoman Iraq took too long and cost too much. He also recorded what he perceived as
unfavorable terms of payment, but thought these could be remedied. Simpich recorded the
exchange rate locally, or what he perceived it to be, and lamented that the rate he received, of
4.54% had cost the consulate nearly $100 that fiscal quarter.65 Simpich felt that due to the
expansion of irrigation works, Ottoman citizens would soon desire to import American farm
machinery.66 The same sentiments regarding the expansion of agriculture and the possible
market thus created for American manufactures was also expressed by Charles Brissel, U.S.
Consul in 1914-1916.67 The possibilities identified by these U.S. consuls were reinforced by the
British Consul General in Baghdad who lamented, in 1911, that farmers in Mosul preferred
reapers made by the American Derring Company to British models.68

64

NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xiv, William Magelssen, U.S. Vice Consul,
Baghdad, September 30, 1907 to Street Railway Journal, New York.
65
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad,Volume iii, Frederick Simpich, U.S. Consul, Baghdad,
May 19, 1910 to Edward Ozmun, U.S. Consul General, Istanbul.
66
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad,Volume iii, Frederick Simpich, U.S. Consul, Baghdad,
April 16, 1910 to Edward Ozmun, U.S. Consul General, Istanbul.
67
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xvii, Charles Brissel, U.S. Consul, Baghdad,
April 23, 1915, to William Jennings Bryan, U.S. Secretary of State, Washington.
68
TNA, FO 371/1492. No. 2947. Concessions of the Electrical Supply at Baghdad. January 25,
1911.
55

By the beginning of World War One, the legation in Istanbul itself became involved in
U.S. economic investment in the Ottoman Empire. By 1911, the U.S. embassy helped organize
the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. The founding group included then ConsulGeneral G. Bie Ravndal, Oscar Heizer (a future Vice Consul of Baghdad) A.T. Chester of the
Chester plan, and James Levack then current (1911) Vice Consul of Baghdad.69 The group
published resources for the U.S. business community, including the publication Levant Trade
Review. The Levant Trade Review listed importers and exporters from each Ottoman city,
organized by commodity. In Baghdad, there were several importers ready and willing to trade
with U.S. merchants for items including those referred to in Table 1.
Table 1 List of Importers

Import Good70

Importer

Carriages

Stephan Ovessanoff

Clocks and Watches

Clement Enriquez

Cotton Goods

Apikian and Co.; Showa Bekhor; Berk.
Puttnam and Co.; Blockley, Cree and Co.;
Joseph Damien; Nessim Elishaa; Raphael
Elowe; Clement Enriquez; Beythoum
Jeboury; Hagop Kouyoumdjian; F.F.
Laugridge; Stephen Lynch and Co.; Joseph J.
Messayeh
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Table 1. Continued

Drugs and Pharmaceutical Products

Joseph Hannania and Son Showa; Ephraim S.
Toeg

Furniture

Abdulaly Bros.; Stephan Ovessanoff

Groceries

Abdulaly Bros.; Joseph Hannania and Son
Showa

Hardware

Abdulaly Bros.; Apikian and Co.; Berk.
Puttnam and Co.; Clement Enriquez;
Schamasch Georgi and Co.; Mahmoud
Shabandar

General Imports

Austro-Levantal Trading Co. Ltd; Mahmoud
Shabandar

Leather

Showa Bekhor; Berk. Puttnam and Co.;
Joseph Damien; Clement Enriquez;
Beythoum Jeboury; Stephen Lynch and Co.;
R.D. Messayeh

Lighting Devices

Raphael Elowe

Lumber

Maktoubi Zada Omar Fouzi Bey

Machinery

Abdulaly Bros.; Berk. Puttnam and Co.;
Blockley, Cree and Co.; Joseph J. Messayeh;
R.D. Messayeh

Manufactures

Chukur and Aziz
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Table 1. Continued

Metals

Showa Bekhor; Joseph Hannania and Son
Showa

Oils and other Lubricants

Blockley, Cree and Co.
Chukur and Aziz

Pumps

Joseph Damien

Sewing Machines

K.& D. Kevork Skender

Silk

Showa Bekhor

Wines and Liquors

Clement Enriquez; Schamasch Georgi and Co

Additionally, the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant published lengthy discussions
of a variety of economic activities taking place throughout the Ottoman Empire. Many of these
articles focused on Baghdad and Basra, including pieces concerning sericulture in Baghdad,
railways in Iraq, and the agricultural methods and the possible use of American farm machinery
in Iraq.71 These accounts were typically written by the regional U.S. diplomats in the Ottoman
Empire and dedicated to increasing the interest, knowledge and potential trade of US
manufacturers.
It was not coincidental that this new institution was created contemporaneously with the
Chester Project as one of the founding members was A.T. Chester, who served as the group’s
Vice President. Many of the other founding members were U.S. diplomats, including Honorary
President G. Bie Ravndal (served in both Beirut and Istanbul) and Secretary O.S. Heizer (served
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in Baghdad and Istanbul).72 Following Hürner, Magelssen and other local US diplomats
promoted American business in Ottoman Iraq. These employees show that the agents of the US
Ottoman legation were synchronized with local needs and American interests in the periphery,
i.e. Ottoman Iraq. In Istanbul this translated into the establishment of the ACCL and the Chester
Project. This process shows the growing official U.S. interest in establishing these projects, one
that was not as developed during the bridge and boat building concessions of the earlier period.
However, this maturing interest was not reflected in the United States’ ability to navigate the
stormy seas of European rivalry.
No infrastructure project looms larger in the U.S.-Ottoman story than the Chester Project.
Admiral Colby Chester, a retired naval officer with over 40 years of service conceived of a rail
and mining project during the Taft administration.73 Thomas A. Bryson writes that the Chester
Project represented a deviation from previous U.S. practices of non-involvement in the Ottoman
Empire.74 The Chester Plan in some ways competed with and in other ways compliment the
Berlin-Baghdad Railway. It was conceived of as a series of branch lines, including a line that ran
east from Sivas through Mosul and Kirkuk; its lines ran over 2,000kms. The plan was in direct
competition with another U.S. plan by the firm of J.G. White and Company, much to the
irritation of the U.S. State Department. In the competition over the two, the Chester Project was
able to prevail by promising better terms to the Ottoman state.75 Marian Kent notes that while the
J.G White concessionary plan failed, it eventually reformed under British capital, and then failed
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again.76 Competition between concessionaires allowed the Ottoman State to favor one project
over another and, by removing support from the less favorable, to work the concession game to
their advantage. Even without the agility of Ottoman negotiators, competition between U.S.
investors worked in favor of the Ottomans.
In November of 1909, the Chester syndicate was formally organized as the OttomanAmerican Development Company and was chartered in New Jersey. The Ottomans used their
chargé d’affairs in Washington, Ahmed Rustam, to try to get U.S. Secretary of State Philander
Knox to officially endorse the Ottoman-American Development Company, which Knox refused
to do. Hakki Pasha, then Grand Vizir, delayed the concession’s progress through the Ottoman
bureaucracy, which would have included submission to and approval by the Ottoman Council of
Ministers and then Parliament. The U.S. State Department tried to intervene by offering to tie
better deals on custom rates, loans, a reconsideration of extraterritoriality and access to
purchasing American warships to the Chester Project…however, when pressed for confirmation,
the U.S. later withdrew the offer of reconsidering extraterritoriality and the warships.77 Despite
the American concession seekers depositing over 20,000TL in an Istanbul Bank, the Ottoman
Parliament never discussed the concession, even when it seemed likely to be approved in 1910.78
German intervention managed to crush the efforts to get the concession. German negotiators
argued that the entire plan was a subterfuge by Standard Oil, wherein they would co-opt lands
and mineral rights that should be German by previous (Berlin-Baghdad Railway) agreement. In
fact, the European states made separate deals with the Ottoman Empire in order to shut out the
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Chester Project and to bolster the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. As the literature acknowledges in
regards to other infrastructure projects, the Ottoman state used the Chester Project as a
bargaining chip to bring the Europeans to the table. De Novo writes “A naïve notion of Dollar
Diplomacy as a commercial concept had not taken into account the realities of international
politics.” Despite additional attempts to restart negotiations and secure the concession,
eventually the Ottoman-American Development Company disbanded due to internal divisions.79
As noted previously, the Chester Project may have been overshadowed by the German
backed Berlin to Baghdad Railway, a concession signed in 1898. In order to appease the other
European powers, the Ottomans and the Germans facilitated negotiations that led to deals on
concessions for the other powers. The British picked up parts of the transport and mining aspects
of the BBR. The Russians, in order to overcome their objections, reached the Potsdam
Agreement in 1910, which swapped recognition of their claims in Iran for German claims in
Iraq. French consent was negotiated via the German recognition of their right to build a rail line
in Syria and Anatolia in early 1914. The Anglo-German convention that removed all British
objections to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway was negotiated in June of 1914 and the British agreed
to a rise in Ottoman custom duties.80 These extensions of influence precluded American projects.
In conclusion, the trend of an economically expansionist foreign policy of the U.S.
government permeated this period. The sophistication of the U.S. State Department’s promotion
of U.S. economic interests increased in tandem with the expansion of the global economy and of
U.S. imperialism abroad. However, American interest in infrastructure and trade promotion do
not quite add up to imperialism in Ottoman Iraq in this period. U.S. interests should, rather, be
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seen as working within the Ottoman system and their activities should be seen as being
beneficial to both parties. The trend of increasing U.S. economic activities, reflected elsewhere
in this dissertation, was augmented by the reformation and professionalization of the U.S. State
Department during this period. In the early part of this period, American interest in infrastructure
projects began as small, local projects that were initiatives of a lower ranking, highly selfinterested Foreign Service employee/businessman and local Ottoman officials. After the
professionalization of the Foreign Service, local employees, particularly in Baghdad, of the State
Department were more hands off regarding infrastructure projects but perhaps more efficiently
focused on increasing American economic ties with the Ottoman Empire. When the selfinterested businessman was supplanted by salaried career diplomats, U.S. concession seekers
created the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. This promotional organization
worked to help U.S. markets become more aware of and develop better approaches to Ottoman
markets. The flip side of the American presence in infrastructure negotiations was that they were
welcomed by the Ottomans as another competitor. American investor’s competition in the
pursuit of both small and larger infrastructure projects provided Ottoman negotiators with an
additional tool to acquire the best deal possible. This was a process that they were well
accomplished at. Additionally, the U.S. joined the British, French and Germans in having a
salaried employee with an expense account in Baghdad. While dwarfed by the estimated $20,840
yearly cost of maintaining the British Consulate in Baghdad, the American Consulate, at an
annual cost of about $4,000 was roughly comparable to the German ($6033.54) and the French
Consulates ($4568).81 However, while seemingly useful for the Ottomans, American concession
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seekers were unable to acquire any of these deals in Ottoman Iraq, in part due to capitalist forces,
European rivalries and the U.S. diplomatic rigidity.
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Chapter 2
Imperial Rivalry and Western Infrastructure Projects

64

The Ottoman government, both on a local and an imperial level, displayed the ability to
use Western investors against each other in order to maximize their gains. The projects discussed
in this chapter reinforce the existing literature by arguing that they represent not only rivalry, but
also cooperation. These projects, particularly the larger ones, involved investment from multiple
sources and nations, both as a means to raise significant capital and to diversify the foreign
interests and make the projects more appealing to the Ottoman State. Initial European interest in
the 1830’s in large transportation schemes within the Ottoman Empire was not reciprocated in
Topkapi.1 However, in 1879, the Sublime Porte received, and was interested in, proposals for the
development of the Asian portion of its empire. These proposals, conservatively estimated at TL
52.5 million at the time, included plans for thousands of kilometers of new rails, several new
harbors, and vast irrigations schemes. The Ottoman state placed a growing focus on improving
its transport network and many of the foreign loans that the Porte received were meant for that
purpose.2 The project that dominates the period of this dissertation was the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway, for which the concession was approved of in 1899 and construction began in 1903. The
Berlin-Baghdad Railway, like the other projects discussed in this chapter, was one of many that
the British and other European powers competed against and cooperated with each other within
the Ottoman Empire in this period. These rivalries allowed the Ottoman state and/or individual
Ottoman citizens to profit from infrastructure projects.
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Historiography on the First World War places significant blame on inter-imperial rivalry
as being a cause of the war. Ottoman Iraq was one arena where this rivalry was particularly
manifest. Britain, between sending an exploratory mission to Iraq in the Chesney Expedition of
1835 and the advent of German influence in both trade and the concession project of the BerlinBaghdad Railway, had enjoyed a largely uncontested sphere of influence in the Iraq region of the
Ottoman Empire. However, with the growing influence of the Germans and the rail project,
Britain’s domination in the region was less assured. This research did not find additional
evidence for the stark anti-German hysteria that is reified by the events of the summer of 1914.
Instead evidence suggests that the British were just as likely to collaborate with the Germans as
to oppose them in Iraq. British government officials and investors though, cited the threat of
German economic penetration as a reason to move forward with certain projects. This threat also
shaped the way negotiations between the Ottoman State and the British took place; the ability to
use inter-imperial competition to their benefit was a trademark of Ottoman officials.

Britain’s Role in the Region
In his work on the Ottoman Administration of Iraq, Gökhan Çetinsaya noted that a
feature of Ottoman governance was the fear of being undermined by European investors.
Ottoman officials feared that these investors brought with them “peaceful penetration” or the soft
imperialism that wide scale financial dependency on European finance might bring to the
Ottoman Empire. In particular, the Ottoman state feared the financial dependency that
accompanied large concession plans. In Ottoman Iraq, the clear and present foreign danger for
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this peaceful economic penetration was from Britain.3 Sevket Pamuk writes that the Ottoman
Empire was subjected to a category of “penetration of world capitalism under conditions of interimperial rivalry…” Pamuk notes that, for the Empire in general, no European power was able to
exert its own will over the empire, and that “no single power was able to exclude its competitors
from the Ottoman Empire.”4 Although the British were the dominant European influence in Iraq,
Ottoman officials knew there was always the possibility of bringing in other foreigners. A
general example, concerning an Empire wide concession, was the purchase of arms. As regards
defense imports, Jonathan Grant shows how the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th
century bought weapons from abroad and “combined arms systems and purchases from various
countries [which] demonstrated a “Take the Best from the West” policy.”5
Despite Britain’s special position in Iraq, the Ottoman Empire worked effectively to limit
or remove British concessions there. The Ottoman state abolished the British postal carrying
concession for a period (1881-6), and initiated various attempts to encourage Ottoman
competitors against the Lynch Company’s riverine transport concession. This included an 1892
decree that created an Ottoman company for navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates. Çetinsaya
argues that the appointment of Lord Curzon - a proponent of the “Forward Policy” – as Viceroy
of India led to a more active imperial stance from the British, which replaced the more passive
imperial stance of waiting for the Ottoman Empire to collapse before it presumably moved in on
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Iraq.6 Çetinsaya notes that there was a protracted struggle (1896-1902) between the Ottomans
and the British over Kuwait. This was prompted by German plans to build a Berlin-Baghdad
railway terminus, and possible deep sea port, in Kuwait.7 The potential of German submarines
having a base in Kuwait was anathema to British interests, particularly that of the protection of
India.
Ebubekir Ceylan notes that the first steamship navigation in the region was British. A
good portion of the interest in navigating the Tigris was an attempt to shorten travel time to
India. The Lynch Company was operating in Iraq as early as 1842 and with an official
concession from the Ottoman government by 1846. Ceylan argues that while the navigation
concession was a worry for Ottoman administrations concerned over the increased presence of
the British, the riverboats provided increased security against recalcitrant tribes. The increased
ease of tax collection was also a boon for the Ottoman governors of Iraq. As the literature on
concessions in the Ottoman Empire suggests, although these projects profited European
investors, they also benefitted the Ottoman Empire. Beginning in the 1850’s the Ottoman
governors of Baghdad bought steamers and founded their own navigation companies. During
Midhat Pasha’s tenure in Baghdad, the Vali helped make the Idare-e Umman-I Usmaniye the
leading transport company in the region and tripled the number of steamers running on the rivers.
Ottoman officials in this period also worked to develop the irrigation system in Iraq, dredging
and improving canals. Midhat Pasha helped build a tramway (which remained in operation for 60
years, until 1938) between Kazimiya and Baghdad in a financial configuration that Ceylan calls
the first Ottoman joint stock company.8
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Elena Frangakis-Syrett demonstrates the complicated workings of foreign investment in
her work, and particularly in “The Making of an Ottoman Port.” The quay at Izmir was one of
the earliest harbor projects in the Ottoman Empire and is a complicated study in how
infrastructure projects work. Izmir, an important Ottoman port, in 1900 received 19 percent of all
imports from Western countries and was responsible for 55% of all exports to the West. The
same trade figures from the 1840’s were 24% and 57%, representing the port’s historical and
continuing importance. Frangakis-Syrett writes that the European and American community was
defined by its competition with each other and “Such fierce rivalry became the backdrop to the
construction of the quay.”9 Initiated locally and originally funded locally, the project began as a
British venture in 1868. The Ottoman state approved of the project, realizing its value to their
trade and helped the project along; the French consul also approved of the project especially after
the project became a French concession. The shifting alliances of inter-imperial rivalry, “kept
antagonism to the quay company alive even when specific issues had been resolved and reignited
it every time another point of contention emerged.”10 Frangakis-Syrett also details a series of
compromises and a failed attempted British reacquisition of the project. The quay, complete with
a tramway was a classic example of inter-imperial rivalry, the activities of Western business and
finance in the Ottoman Empire and of the successful use of inter-imperial rivalry by the Ottoman
State for the purposes of urban planning.11 Likewise, Jans Hannsen showed how local officials
were active participants in the urban improvement of Beirut and how they utilized mechanisms
set up by Tanzimat-era reforms to help them on their quest to develop Beirut. In particular, local
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elites sought to make Beirut a provincial capital and concurrently, to tie their fortunes closer to
the imperial center.12
Gabriel B. Ravndal, the U.S. Consul in Syria at the time,13 sent a message to William
Magelssen, the Vice Consul in Baghdad14 that included an editorial published in the Times of
London on March 13, 1907, entitled “British Interests in Turkey.” Along with the newspaper
article, Ravndal commented “Great Britain apparently is preparing for a great contest with
Germany for supremacy in the Ottoman dominions.”15 The article constantly alludes to a past
wherein Great Britain occupied a more dominant position in the Ottoman Empire, beginning
with the nostalgic statement “There are few older British markets than the Levant and few more
interesting pages in our commercial history and biography than the annals of the old Turkey
merchants.”16 The editorial lamented that the British government held itself aloof while new
European interests penetrate the Ottoman economic sphere with the help of “diplomatic and
political influences of powerful Continental Governments.” In relation to Basra and Baghdad,
the author of the newspaper editorial cheered what he perceived of as a new aggressive stance of
the Foreign Office regarding shipping on the Tigris. The article referred to the ability for the
Lynch Company to run an additional (third) steamer between Baghdad and Basra as a major
policy shift and what it deemed to be a proper, aggressive stance for the Foreign Office to take in
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the region. In the end, the article is less about the German influence in the region, and more
about the author’s desire for a more interventionist British policy in the Ottoman Empire. It does
though, finally name the Germans in reference to the Smyrna-Aidin railway and ends by stating
that “Her [Britain’s] permanent interests in that [Ottoman] empire, both political and
commercial, are too great for her to ever abandon it wholly to the peaceful –or other– penetration
of third parties.”17 The German threat entered the historical record and this research at several
points. It is not necessary to evaluate the relative threat, i.e. how sincerely German interests
threatened British ones in Ottoman Iraq, but it should be noted that this threat seems to have been
used on occasion by British individuals to promote their own interests.

Transport
Since the company’s beginnings in the middle of the 19th century, the Lynch Company
constantly tried to increase the number of ships they could run on the Tigris. Officially named
the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation (ETSN), the company was founded in 1861.18 In
1906, Lynch was able to secure, with help from the British government the right to run an
additional permanent, third steamship on the Tigris River.19 Lynch also acted quickly to secure a
sub-contract for carrying material for the Hindiyya Barrage Concession. The Hindiyya Barrage
Concession was negotiated between Sir John Jackson’s Company and the Sublime Porte. In
response to shifting water flows in the area near Hillah, the Ottoman State constructed the
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original 19th century dam there in order to maintain water flow to existing irrigation works.20 By
1908, the original work had deteriorated and the Ottoman State proactively invited bids to
replace it. A new barrage was designed by a French engineer – possibly M. Mougel – for a
massive work built of concrete, and the Ottoman state stipulated that the builder would be
responsible for both the design and the upkeep of the work for seven years. William Willcocks
was hired and he completed a detailed survey with a team of experienced engineers.21 Willcocks
wrote an article about his expedition for The Geographical Journal of the Royal Geographic
Society. The article titled “Mesopotamia: Past, Present and Future” started with a Bible quote,
and took the Garden of Eden as its starting point. Willcocks devoted the first 10 pages of the 15
page article to a detailed, if questionable, history of the ancient world. Eventually, Willcocks
wrote, “the first works before the hydraulic engineer are the protection of the country from
floods, and the provision of water as free from silt as possible…the levels and the surveys show
that we can do both…An expenditure of £350,000 should suffice for the work, and it should take
three years to carry out.”22 Willcocks’s works and proposals were far reaching and he detailed
several projects that he thought would be helpful to Iraq, among them the Hindiyya Barrage.
Willcocks was hopeful that these projects would create huge surpluses for Iraq, such that
transporting the products of the region as he saw them – sheep, cows, buffalo, wool, licorice,
wheat, barley, and rice – would necessitate a project like the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, so that
products could be moved not just downriver, but overland, via rail, to the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Willcocks further discussed the railway and the advantages that the railway would bestow.23
Gertrude Bell, who attended the presentation of Willcocks’s paper at the Royal Geographic
Society, expressed her delight with the plan and agreed with the idea that a railway would also be
needed to exploit the coming abundance in Iraq.24
The contract for the Hindiyya Barrage concession was an agreement between Nizam
Pasha of Baghdad and Sir John Jackson of 53 Victoria Street, Westminster, London. The
agreement was negotiated on December 9th of 1910 in Istanbul, but not officially signed until
February 1911. William Willcocks was to hand over any work he had previously done in Iraq to
the Jackson concern.25 Willcocks was hired as a special adviser to the Sublime Porte on irrigation
works. The Hindiyya Barrage project was one that Willcocks helped negotiate over a competing
bid by a German firm and, one apparently by the previously mentioned French engineer M.
Mougel. Willcocks helped oversee the work from 1911 to 1913.26 The result according to a
British observer was a “very fine barrage 250 metres long, with thirty-six openings each 5 metres
wide, fitted with regulating shutters…”27
The Barrage was clearly a project that benefitted both the British concessioners, the local
farmers and due to the potential for increasing yields and preventing floods, the Ottoman state
stood to benefit. The Lynch Company hoped to benefit from the project as well. A letter from the
ETSN, referencing a verbal discussion, laid out the following terms for carrying materials for the
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construction of the Hindiyya Barrage. Lynch would charge 24 shillings per ton of cargo, with an
estimated total cargo of 10,000 to 12,000 tons. Lynch suggested the following conditions for the
deal: 1. ETSN would receive the cargo at Basra and deliver it to Hindiyya. 2. If Lynch’s wharf at
Maaghil28 needed to be used for the loading and unloading of extra cargo, they would charge a
rent of six pence per ton per month. 3. Lynch had the exclusive right to carry cargo on water for
the project, except for the hiring of small native crafts [i.e. no use of another European
company’s steamships] 4. Lynch however, could hire or subcontract other boats to carry cargo
and was not responsible for “loss from leaking or foundering of craft used; or loss, damage or
delay through capture, seizure, robbery, riots or civil commotions.” Lynch’s proposal
acknowledged that most of the goods – in particular coal, cement, rails and piping – would be
light enough for “coolies” to carry, but, in the event that freight was too heavy for human
portage, they would charge additional, unspecified fees.29
The Vali of Baghdad intervened and denied Lynch this subcontract, trying to take it for
the Ottoman company Idare-e Umman-I Usmaniye.30 It was also likely that the Ottoman officials
wanted to block the subcontract because they saw it as another attempt to expand Lynch’s and by
extension, British, influence in the area. Roger Owen notes that Ottoman opposition to attempts
to increase ETSN’s expansion attempts were based on the Ottomans being “rightly fearful that
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the Lynchs were being used as a spearhead for further expansion of British commercial
influence…[and the Ottoman’s]consistently tried to oppose such demands.”31 Mr. Lynch
himself, in London, went directly to the Foreign Office to remonstrate this turn of events. His
indignation spurred the British government into action and, as a consequence, the British
Ambassador in Istanbul rallied on his behalf. In the negotiation, Lynch promised not to use the
Hindiyya subcontract as a means to expand ETSN’s own transport concession in the Ottoman
Empire. The actions of Lynch embarrassed the Sir John Jackson Corporation, and, to assuage
their anger Lynch promised to “see the Foreign Office and inform them that nothing further had
better be done until they heard from [Jackson]…”32 Lynch was adamant that the Vali had
blocked them because the Ottoman State saw it as a concession expansion. In an official letter
stating that they had no intent to expand their concession, Lynch asked for the price the
Ottomans would be charging Jackson, indifferent to whether or not they were being undercut in
price.
In terms of inter-imperial rivalry, Lynch alleged that Ottoman resistance to his
company’s involvement was a German plot to push the British out of the area.33 This German
“conspiracy” was used by Lynch to attempt to secure support from his own government. For
their part, the Ottoman state managed to raise significant concerns about the Lynch contract. This
was an attempt by the Vali both to limit British economic interests and to bolster Ottoman ones,
particularly, the interests of the Ottoman owned and operated riverine transport company.
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Although the Ottoman state owned all concessions, they could, in this instance, award this
specific concession to an Ottoman owned business, rather than to Lynch.

Lynch Loses out
In 1899, the ETSN expanded its operations across the frontier into Iran. After Nasir al
Din Shah opened the Karun River to international service, ETSN steamships plied the river.34 A
special concession granted in 1898 by the Qajar government allowed the Bakhtiyari
confederation to negotiate the construction of an improved road in their area. Lynch won the
contract to build a road from the Karun River to Isfahan. It was known by many as the Lynch
Road and was a “modern imperial project that revived one of the ancient trade routes of Iran,
expanded British commerce and influence…”35 Despite this expansion of sphere and industry
and decades of being the sole British concessionaire to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates, the
ETSN was outmaneuvered by the shipping magnate Lord Inchcape. Lynch and Inchcape
collaborated in 1912 to try to acquire a concession for a railway in Iran, a syndicate that also
involved the APOC.36 However, the ETSN ended up losing their Iraqi river concession to Lord
Inchcape and were taken over by Lord Inchcape’s British India Steam Navigation Company
(BISNC).
James Lyle Mackay (Lord Inchcape), was rewarded with a peerage for helping resolve an
economic crisis in India and for his service on a variety of government boards and councils in
London. Mackay made his fortune in the shipping industry in India, where he became fluent in
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Hindustani (today’s Hindi/Urdu) after he arrived to work for Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co, the
precursor to the British India Steam Navigation Company.37 In the early 1900’s, Mackinnon,
Mackenzie & Co., where Mackay was a partner and soon to be controller of the company,
carried over 200,000 tons annually in the Persian Gulf, including to Basra. The firm carried
approximately 70-90% of traffic in the region. By 1914, Lord Inchcape became the largest
shipping magnate in the world when he merged the British Indian Steam Navigation Company
(formed from the ashes of MacKinnon, MacKenzie and Co.) and the Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company. Stephanie Jones’s monograph on Lord Inchcape states, “The
[Persian] Gulf trade continued to flourish, making approximately £100,000 in the first half of
1912, and £140,000 in the second half…Meanwhile, Inchcape was negotiating with the Turkish
government to gain monopoly trading advantages in Mesopotamia, free of official tax.”38 Jones
referred here to the ETSN merger with the BISNC. Lord Inchcape was also a man that had
considerable clout with politicians in London. He was a personal friend of future Prime Minister
Bonar Law, and Lord Inchcape served on the Commercial Information Committee, the Council
of India, and a variety of other influential committees.39
Lord Inchcape approached Lynch, according to Jones, in order to protect British interests
from foreign encroachment, specifically German encroachment. There were no German firms
engaged in the Tigris trade, so again, German encroachment seems as imaginary here as it did
with the Hindiyya Barrage. Jones wrote that Inchcape took a, “Firm stand from the outset: he
was to have the upper hand, and the Foreign Office agreed that the BI [British India Steam
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Navigation] would continue carrying mails from India on this route.”40 The concession was
provisionally approved in September of 1913 and a new company formed with British, German
and Ottoman interests. Jones records that, in addition, Lynch and Inchcape’s company received a
portion of the contracts regarding the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway’ rail terminals
in Baghdad and Basra and the right to carry the supplies to this construction. According to Jones,
it was Inchcape’s insistence that the British would control any line to Kuwait from Basra that led
to the British declaring a protectorate over Kuwait in 1914.41
As a prequel to the takeover, in 1909, Lynch began discussions with the Ottoman State to
merge ETSN and the Ottoman Idare-e Umman-I Usmaniye together, to create a monopolistic or
near monopolistic control over the navigation of the rivers of Iraq. According to Sir Edward
Grey, this was done without the knowledge of the Foreign Office and the matter was brought to
their attention by Sir G. MacKenzie of the BISNC, which had been trying to usurp the riverine
transport concession in Iraq since 1901. The merger, however, did eventually gain the favor of
both the British government and parts of the Ottoman government. It did not occur due to local
opposition from notables in Basra and Baghdad and the Ottoman Chamber of Commerce.42
These local protests were harsh and, despite initial support from some merchants, many of whom
were Christian or Jewish, eventually the protests and mass demonstrations were so widespread
and vehement that all local support for the idea was withdrawn.43 In 1913, Lord Inchcape, who
assumed control of the BISNC, succeeded in getting the navigational concession for the Tigris
and the Euphrates from the Ottoman state. Lynch’s company was invited to enter into
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negotiation with Lord Inchcape to see what role they would play, perhaps as a subcontractor.
Without a choice in the matter, Lynch reached an accommodation with Lord Inchcape by July of
1913. The negotiations, which took place through the Foreign Office, started with a proposal
made by Lynch concerning the integration of the two companies. Lynch’s conditions included a
shared, equal partnership between Lynch and Inchcape in a new company, and that Lord
Inchcape would own a controlling share of the stock of that new company. Lord Inchcape
suggested that he should be appointed a director of Lynch’s company and that a Belgian
company should be merged with their new venture– this Belgian company was formed by Lynch
in cooperation with Deutsche Bank in order to carry material for the Berlin-Baghdad Railway
(BBR).44 The Baghdad Railway Company had the right, according to the concession to exploit
the river carrying of all materials for construction purposes.45 The manner in which this project
internationalized serves as an example of how inter-imperial competition led to better
concessionary deals for the Ottoman State. Regardless of what role the Ottomans may or may not
have had, the multiple concession seekers involved muddied the concessionary waters and
prevented one national group from dominating the investment. Additionally, Germany renounced
any attempt to compete for navigation concessions in the area, but the idea was floated to allow
them to buy a certain amount of shares in the new corporation – shares that would be allotted to
the Ottomans but then sold to the Germans. In actuality, the merger, rather than cutting German
economic interests out, brought them in.
The merger demands of the ETSN led to a new round of negotiations, during which Mr.
Lynch died, in January of 1914 and his son John Lynch took over his interests in the deal. In July
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of 1914, after negotiations took place at the Foreign Office, during which Ottoman and German
agents were present, a final agreement was reached that determined the amount of shares and
capital split between Lynch, Lord Inchcape, the Ottomans and the Germans; and the creation of
Mackay, Lynch and Co., a modified version of the company Lynch had originally proposed. The
new company would charter the boats of Lynch’s ETSN and stipulated that both men would be
on the board of the new company.46 Despite the outbreak of World War I, the British
Government declared that it intended officially to uphold the agreement reached, although one
can assume that they did not mean honoring the German shares allocated in the plan.47
This merger should be seen as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire’s ability to control
the spread of the ETSN and internationalize the riverine transport concession. In both the
instance of carrying material for the BBR, and the riverine transport concession itself, the
Ottoman State was able to diversify the national interests involved in the project and get a cash
payment for bringing in the Belgians and, in the second case, the Germans. The Ottoman state
had also previously been in negotiations with the British India Steam Navigation company to
replace Lynch. Before that, the Ottomans had discussed the possibility of merging Lynch’s
company with their own. The interplay between competing British groups is another important
aspect of these negotiations. Lynch had enjoyed the sole ownership of the steamer business, and
then the sole British navigation concession for decades. Lord Inchcape muscled into a situation
wherein he was able to swallow up a business that was not in competition to his own. The move
expanded Inchcape’s business interests, and at the same time, the local situation allowed him to
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argue that he was moderating the effects of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway and German intrusion
into the Persian Gulf. Ironically, while citing German threats, the BISNC actually brought
German investors into a field in which they had not been involved.

The Oil Concession
Marian Kent, in her important work Oil and Empire, details British oil policy in Iraq
during the years 1900-1920. Kent notes that British interest in Middle Eastern oil was not merely
a reaction to imperial rivalry (German or otherwise) but a reflection of the fact that “Oil had
become important, and an area of such promising oil potential as the Middle East would have
attracted attention for this reason alone.”48 Likewise, Kent notes that the British turn towards
Iraqi and Iranian oil was aided by the partnership of Winston Churchill and First Sea Lord
Fischer in the Admiralty. These two men desired to see a lucrative oil source completely under
British control at a time when major oil fields were largely in the United States of America,
Mexico and Russia.49 Ferrier shows that American oil production accounted for 43% of global
output at the beginning of the twentieth century.50 Utilizing some of the same primary sources as
Kent – predominantly Foreign Office sources – this section discusses the investors and
concession seekers and their interactions with the Foreign Office, with each other and the
Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it looks at the shape of the concession and the various
interactions and conflict in the negotiations that led to a hybrid, internationalized concession.
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This is another example of concessions that were steered by the Ottoman State to include
multiple partners and multi-national interests.
There was a preexisting, albeit limited, history of oil exploitation within British colonies.
The history of British oil exploitation nearest to Iraq starts in Burma. Petroleum exploitation in
Burma began in the 1890’s by the Scottish controlled Burmah Oil Company (BOC). The
production of Burmese oil rose quickly from 19 million gallons in 1897 to 86 million gallons in
1908.51 The oil fields in Burma were contracted, in 1908, to provide 20,000 tons of fuel oil to the
British Navy and, in times of war, provide up to an additional 80,000 tons, or approximately 37%
of all oil (270,644 tons). Burma was an early supplier of fuel oil to British interests and, when
combined with later Iranian exploitation, ensured that India was flanked by oil producers.
Lessons were learned from the Burma fields, such as the undesirability of allowing independent,
small scale entrepreneurs to drill oil – oil production seems to have been carried on for some
time by local families. The Indian government favored large companies, or oil monopolies to
ensure that “independent haphazard drilling by competitors…”52 did not cause the “1. Flooding
of the territory with water. 2. The placing of wells too close together in the feverish haste to be
the first to reach oil. 3. Overcrowding of wells accentuates risk of damage by fire.”53 The
mistakes made in Burma were well recorded by the India Office. These mistakes, both in
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allowing small individual well owners and in the way the oil was extracted, would be learned
from in future oil exploration and exploitation by British investors.
When the British, through the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC), began to exploit oil
in Iran, they felt that the local labor force lacked the pre-requisite skills for the industry. They
were additionally reluctant to trust Iranians for use as security forces, and used Indian soldiers to
guard the oil fields at Abadan. The APOC argued that
Owing to the non-existence of such labour in Persia, and the impossibility of training
Persians in sufficient numbers for their requirements, the Company is compelled to
depend largely on India for skilled labourers of many kinds…At the present time the
number of Indian employees in Abadan and the oilfields is about 1,020. It is found neverthe less that it is very difficult to induce men of these classes to leave Bombay, Rangoon
Karachi or the other ports where they are recruited and to accept employment in Persia...
The result is that very high rates of pay have to be offered to obtain any men at all, and as
a rule the labour obtained is not of the best quality.54

It is illuminating that the British imported labor in such large numbers from India. Despite the
difficulties and no doubt the expense of transporting Indian workers, the APOC, rather than take
steps to train Iranians, worked to change the Indian Emigration Act. It seems likely that any
British oil syndicate in Iraq would have imported Indian labor.
The APOC used Indian soldiers for security at their oilfields in Iran. As early as 1907,
armed guards from India were sent to the Ahwaz oilfields. Twenty men were dispatched from
India, “for the protection of the Oil Syndicate’s works near Ahwaz.”55 Accompanied by an
additional eight cavalrymen from the 18th Tiwana Lancers, they were originally dispatched for a
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six month mission, but had been stationed in Ahwaz for over two years. They had been there
long enough that, by 1910, their equipment needed to be replaced at a cost of over £300.56 This
reliance on Indian labor and military units served both to provide an immediate workforce for the
APOC and eliminated the need to invest in local education/recruitment infrastructure. It also tied
Indians further to the British by providing them with labor and a modicum of responsibility in
Britain’s imperial project. The process worked both ways, as the British could conjure both
skilled labor and security forces that were tied to them and not to local interests.
As for Iraq, the first hint of British knowledge of and interest in the oil there occurred
during the Chesney expedition of the 1830’s. The expedition was commissioned by King
William the IV to find, in Chesney’s own words, “a more rapid Overland Communication with
India…”57 Although not nearly as important in the 1830’s as it would be later, oil was a
recognizable commodity. Chesney describes both bitumen and naphtha, by-products of
petroleum. Chesney wrote in his report of the “celebrated and inexhaustible bitumen
fountains…” and the “abundance of naphtha.” Both of these products were derived from crude
oil, and Chesney described bitumen being used in ship building and for fueling his own
steamship. Chesney wrote “the value of the bitumen as an article of trade can scarcely be
overestimated.”58 Chesney described an Ottoman governor, Sheik Mohammad, as being in
charge of the oil exploitation at Hit, although it is unclear if Sheik Mohammad was a tax farmer,
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a local notable or more likely, both. Later, in the mid nineteenth century, Chesney noted in great
frustration the lack of an increased British presence in Iraq and the failure to create a viable
overland route. Chesney wrote, “The way had been opened…But thirty-one years have since
passed and nothing has been done!”59
German nationals displayed an early interest in Iraqi oil as well. In 1871, German experts
visited both Mosul and Baghdad and reported favorably about the petroleum springs there.
Another German led mission, in 1901, gushed enthusiastically concerning the oil of Iraq.60 The
Ottoman State was also well aware of and interested in the petroleum of Iraq as early as 1890. In
that year, Ottoman citizen C.S. Gulbenkian furnished a report on the subject at the request of the
Sublime Porte. Before this report, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, acting on the advice of Agop Pasha,
the Directory of the Privy Purse, had fírmans issued in 1888 and 1898 that placed the possible oil
concessions under the Ottoman Civil Lists. These fírmans ensured that a certain procedure had to
be followed for any concession seeker, making any quick deal that might enrich a local notable
but harm the Empire’s finances or resources as a whole, unlikely.
Early in the 20th century, it appeared that German groups had the upper hand in oil
concession negotiations, based on previously signed agreements. These agreements were
products of railway concession negotiations. An 1888 railway concession and the 1903 Baghdad
Railway convention gave German interests “a preferential – but not monopolistic – right to oil
along the line…”A 1904 agreement with the Ottoman Civil Lists gave the Anatolian Railway
Company, which was acting for Deutsche Bank, a year to conduct a study concerning the
feasibility of oil exploitation in the Mosul and Baghdad Vilâyet. This agreement, which

59
60

Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, p. 76 and p. viii.
Attiyah, Iraq, p. 76.
85

stipulated the possibility of a forty-four year lease under certain conditions, became a point of
contention between the British, Germans and Ottomans concerning “whether or not it had been
fulfilled.”61 The appearance that the Ottomans gave serious consideration in the oil negotiation to
one national group at a time was a way to force the different Western rivals into bidding against
each other, lest the concession be quickly snapped up. According to Kent, the Sublime Porte
first negotiated with the Germans, then seriously considered the American Chester Project,
before going on the APOC/British concession. This process led to the concession’s evolution
into an international consortium.62 The Ottoman state was both looking for the best possible deal
and/or the deal that spread out foreign interest to the greatest extent, lowering the likelihood of a
single, overbearing foreign company forcing terms and conditions on them. Rather than divide
and conquer, it seems like an attempt to, lacking the capital and knowledge to exploit the oil
deposits themselves, they would at least divide the foreign interests so as to maintain an ability to
counterbalance them. The Ottoman insistence on a dual national concession group was strong
enough to overcome rising British and German animosity and should be seen in that context –
the concession was finalized on the day of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
One of the many influential figures in the pursuit of the Iraq oil concession was Thomas
Boverton Redwood. Redwood was one of the preeminent experts on petroleum use and global
petroleum deposits during the 1870’s and into the early 1900’s. Redwood worked as an oil
consultant beginning in the 1870’s and was hired by the British Indian government to analyze
samples of both Burmese and Iranian crude.63 Redwood, in his 1896 Petroleum: A treatise on
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the Geographical Distribution of Petroleum clearly stated that there was exploitable petroleum in
Iraq, “Various forms of ‘bitumen’ occur in the valley of the Euphrates…”64 Redwood was also a
consultant for William Knox D’Arcy, the progenitor of APOC, and counselled him to seek a loan
from the British government to exploit the oil concession in Iran. Redwood served as a member
of the Admiralty’s Fuel Oil Committee, he was, in addition, a leading advisor on petroleum to
the British government and a major proponent of using oil to replace coal as the fuel of the
British Navy. It was the advocacy of Redwood and the deal that he brokered to bring Burmah Oil
into the Anglo-Persian Syndicate that propelled D’Arcy’s concession in Iran.65 Redwood himself
was aware of rising German interest in Ottoman oil, noting, “Herr Bissinger, the German Consul
at Beyrout, states that oil springs occur in Syria.”66 The frontispiece to Redwood’s book,
reproduced in Figure 1, contains three dots within Iraq, each dot representing a significant oil
deposit.
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Figure 1 - The Frontispiece to Redwood’s book, Petroleum. The red dots represent large deposits of Petroleum.67
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Figure 2 - Close up of the Frontispiece to Redwood’s book, Petroleum. The red dots represent large deposits of Petroleum.

D’Arcy’s interest in Iraqi oil was unsurprisingly coterminous with his interest in Iranian
oil. D’Arcy sent two different representatives to Ottoman Iraq – Alfred Marriot in 1901 and H.E.
Nichols in 1904 – to investigate the petroleum and the political climate. Although he later
reconsidered, D’Arcy decided at the time that it was “not worthwhile pursuing the concession.”68
Other early entrants into the field were Shell Oil, which started negotiation in 1909 and also
demonstrated interest in creating an Empire wide company to exploit Ottoman oil. As noted
before, by virtue of the Chester Project and the J.G. White railway plan, American interests were
also part of the oil exploitation negotiation. Other British groups expressed interest in the oil too,
including the Eastern Petroleum Syndicate of Colonel Picot and MP Lynch of ETSN. Despite
this early interest, and ongoing Ottoman-German negotiations, the concession for oil in Iraq, as
far as the British were concerned, did not really bubble up until nearly 1914.
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In January of 1914, Baron Thomas de Ward attempted to acquire a concession to exploit
oil around Mosul on behalf of Central Mining and Investment Corporation (CMI), which
represented a rival, London based British concern, to D’Arcy’s APOC.69 Baron Thomas De
Ward seems to have been an Austrian nobleman. De Ward and the CMI were offering the
Ottoman State an advance of TL 500,000 at 6% to be paid out of the first loan issued. In a note
concerning this concessionary attempt, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Louis
Mallett, argued that the Ottoman Government was hesitant to commit to de Ward because the
Porte was already negotiating with the British; by this Mallet meant with D’Arcy, despite the fact
that, as de Ward frequently pointed out, he too represented British capital.70 Mallet noted that
Thomas de Ward, who was staying at the Pera hotel had frequent meetings with a Mr.
Antoniadis71 who Mallett thought may (he did not) have received a concession to exploit the
Mosul oil fields. De Ward met with Ottoman officials including the ex-Minister of Finance
Djaved Bey and with Young Turks. According to Mallett, De Ward and his visitors were known
to have “earnest and apparently interesting conversation.”72 This sort of spying on their own
national interests, albeit rival interests, is again demonstrative of the level of undercutting
competition that took place among British concession seekers in Ottoman Iraq.
Charles Greenway was the managing director on the board of the APOC and was,
according to Yergin, a large part of its success.73 Greenway noted that the new proposed
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concession arrangement foresaw a syndicate formed with a 50/50 split between the APOC and
the Turkish Petroleum Company. Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) was Calouste Gulbenkian,
an Ottoman citizen, then later British subject, that had studied petroleum engineering at King’s
College London.74 He was in many ways like the enigmatic Iranian Antoine Kitabgi who was
instrumental in the creation of the British concession for oil in Iran. Both men were from nondominant ethnic groups residing in their empires, with Gulbenkian being Armenian and Kitagbi
being either Armenian or Georgian. Both men were, perhaps necessary - but certainly selfinterested- go-betweens for their local empires and the British Empire.75 Gulbenkian put the TPC
together and was a silent partner (30% stake) in the British run National Bank of Turkey.
Gulbenkian had been involved in the Ottoman state, having served as the Ottoman governor of
an unnamed Black Sea port. Soon after Gulbenkian published a book on Russian oil, Ottoman
officials approached him to investigate the oil potential of Iraq. Gulbenkian accomplished his
mission without ever visiting the region. Coincidently, Gulbenkian and his friend Henri
Deterding (Shell Oil) looked at the prospective concession that Kitabgi was promoting in Iran
but passed on it, deeming it too financially risky. Later, they stated, after ruefully watching
D’Arcy’s concession succeed “Never give up an oil concession.” Gulbenkian eventually
brokered the deal between the British and the Germans that formed the D’Arcy concession for
Iraqi oil, and was given a 5% non-voting stake in the eventual concession; Gulbenkian was
nicknamed Mr. 5% in the process.76
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The syndicate formed by the merger of the D’Arcy concession and the TPC was to raise
capital of £100,000 – £200,000, half supplied by the APOC and half by the TPC with the intent
to “prospect and test” the oilfields of Iraq. If satisfied with the field results, the syndicate would,
through the floating of shares and public debt issue, raise £1,000,000 to exploit the oil. The
chairman of the syndicate would be a voting member appointed by the Foreign Office, with the
rest of the board being selected half by the APOC and half by TPC. The local managing agents
would be Messrs Strick, Scott and Company, who were already established in Baghdad. A major
sticking point in the negotiations with the Ottomans seems to have been German claims on
Ottoman mineral rights, specifically as they related to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The Foreign
Office, though seemingly loathe to admit it, stated that the agreements already in place would
“debar him [Mr. D’Arcy] from any claim to a monopoly to the oil wells in the vilayets of Mosul
and Bagdad, and that the only possible settlement of this question is by arrangement with the
Germans.”77
A rather alarmist Foreign Office memo noted that British concession seekers might be
out maneuvered by a mixed group of German and Ottoman investors. Along with unidentified
Germans, a group of Ottomans supposedly formed to exploit the concession.78 Registered as the
“Société Anonyme Ottomane” and possessing LT 200,000 in capital, the group was supposed to
have held frequent meetings and liaisons with their German partners through Mahmoud Mukhtar
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Pasha.79 It’s hard to tell if this Société Anonyme Ottomane existed – it may or may not have been
confused with other Ottoman infrastructure concerns specifically two Société Anonyme
Ottomane that were concerned with tramways in Beirut and in Damascus, or with other concerns
that had to do with mines and the selling of oil in Izmir – all of which seem to have been FrancoBelgian companies.80 Kent notes that H.W. Stock (the APOC agent in Istanbul) believed that the
group existed only nominally so as to acquire the concession and then sell it to Deutsche Bank.81
Izzet Pasha, who was at that time in Europe, was said to be there discussing the concession with
those same German partners.82 The same memo detailed other proposals for the oil concession,
such as the Hirsch application, and Suleiman Bey Nassif and friends – these two proposals may
have been connected and may also have involved Lord Cowdray. Lord Cowdray, or Weetman
Dickinson Pearson, was involved in oil negotiations with Shell Oil in his capacity as head of S.
Pearson and Sons.83 To the Foreign office, the situation was not clear at all, and although the
Foreign Office believed that D’Arcy would receive the concession, it was unknowable what the
final group of the concession would look like.84
In response to inquiries from the German Embassy, Sir Edward Grey wrote, “The best
course would be for British and German Ambassadors at Constantinople to inform the Ottoman
government that a definite scheme will be put before them by British and German gov’ts on or
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before March 23rd [1914].”85 While the Foreign Office worked with the D’Arcy and German
contingency, on April 10th, De Ward resurfaced. In a letter addressed to Mallett, de Ward
asserted that he had been pursuing the oil concession in Iraq since early 1913 and had made
“proposals which were accepted in principle by the then Minister of Mines, Djelal Bey…owing
to the political situation, the negotiations were suspended, to be resumed in December last.”86 De
Ward was informed by the Ottoman Government that “for reasons of policy touching the vital
interests of the Empire” the concession would only be awarded to an Anglo-German group and
he insisted that his group was both offering favorable terms to the Ottoman State and contained
“a very strong German element.” De Ward noted that the terms of his proposal were favorable to
the British government and in particular they conformed to the British Navy’s desire that the
pipeline to carry the oil would run to the Mediterranean. He further complained that the British
Government’s support for other concession seekers for Mosul/Baghdad oil were blocking their
plans, which, he argued were more favorable to Istanbul. Therefore, de Ward was bringing his
concessionary plan to the official notice of the British government, in the hopes that he might
attain official British support.87 Mallett wrote back quickly, informing “Baron” de Ward –
Mallett put the title put in quotations seemingly to have derisively chided de Ward - that His
Majesty’s government had been committed to supporting D’Arcy since 1906 and that, in a detail
unmentioned before, D’Arcy had been promised the concession by a “former Grand Vezir” and
therefore, they could not support de Ward.88
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In April of 1914, the Ottoman State attempted to tie the oil negotiations to the question of
raising custom rates in the Ottoman Empire.89 Although the British looked for possible ways
around this Ottoman negotiating tactic, the lack of this being a continuing thread in the
discussions suggests that they were willing to accommodate a rate hike.90 Additionally, Mallett
responded that the entire supposition of supporting D’Arcy’s application was that a German
agreement of 1904 was annulled and argued against “suggesting or recommending [to the
Ottomans] the course favored by Deutsche Bank and [that] it might even be dangerous to do
so.”91 Mallett expressed concerns about these irregularities in the concession to the Grand Vizir,
who argued that the concession had been illegal throughout its existence and that the proper
course would be to resubmit the concession to the Ministry of Mines.92 According to Mallett, the
Germans suggested a secret agreement be reached that the Sublime Porte not consider any other
applicants besides theirs. He noted that the Ottoman State was overdue in publishing an official
list of oil wells, but that it might be worthwhile to await its arrival. Mallett finished his
communication with the caveat “I think that it will be better not to commit ourselves to any
particular course nor will it be possible to get the matter through in a great hurry.”93
H.W. Stock – an Istanbul agent for APOC - wrote to Mallett about a meeting he had with
Mr. Ernest Weakly, British Commercial Attaché in Istanbul, about modifications to the draft
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concession. These modifications were approved by both the German Ambassador, and the man
setting British policy towards Saudi Arabia, Alwyn Parker.94 While this Anglo-German group
collaborated, de Ward’s CMI group continued to try to garner official Foreign Office support.
The CMI was directed by L. Reyersbach and the group was associated with Lord Murray of
Elibank. Lord Murray had a conversation with Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir William Terrell on May
4th on their behalf. The CMI, which formed in 1913, was composed of S. Pearson and Son and
Messrs. Hirsch and Company, both of which, as Reyersbach pointed out, represented London
capital. This group planned to construct a new company in the Ottoman Empire, which meant to
drill, transport and refine the oil of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.95 Dismissive of the CMI’s
conversations with the Foreign Office, Sir Eyre Crowe wrote that another Englishman, Mr.
Roland Silley should be supported for the claim to the Basra oil fields.96 Kent identifies Silley as
a former employee of Vacuum Oil Company and an independent agent in Istanbul. Kent notes
that Silley provided another alternative British claim on Iraqi oil that was at least partially
sponsored by the Foreign Office, particularly for the oil concession in the Basra Vilâyet.97
Crowe and by extension the Foreign Office did not trust De Ward asserting, “As to Baron
de Ward, the information of this department as to his antecedents is not altogether satisfactory,
and it is possible that he may not have given an entirely accurate account of the attitude of the
Ottoman government to his group.”98 The Foreign Office’s official version became that the
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concessions had been promised to two different groups, the Berlin-Baghdad group and to D’Arcy
and since these two groups had merged their interests to seek the concession together, the
arrangement effectively cut out the CMI and made any claims they had irrelevant. Crowe notes
that the concession was now tied to the issue of the Ottoman Customs increase, negotiations
wherein the Sublime Porte was demanding an increase form 11% to 15% ad valorum and “to the
institution of certain monopolies in Turkey.” The letter ended with the definitive statement about
the CMI concession, “Sir Grey is unable to support or assist your group at Constantinople.”99
Yet the CMI was not quite willing to concede the concession. George Reynolds, another
director of that company, asserted that an 1890 firman by the Sublime Porte actually gave the oil
rights to the Imperial Ottoman Civil Lists, and that the oil rights were expressly excluded,
according to him, from the Berlin-Baghdad railway agreement. The CMI also made certain
offers to the British government to try to carry favor, including offering the British government a
pre-emptive right for all fuel oil produced in the concession area. The eventual agreement
involved an equal split regarding access to the oil produced in Iraq between the British and
German navies.100 The CMI argued that since the terms they offered the Ottoman government
were more favorable than the terms being offered by the D’Arcy/Deutsche Bank/Shell group, the
Ottoman government would presumably favor them above their competitors.101 Crowe
responded that “Sir E. Grey sees no reason, from the arguments you adduce, to modify the
decision which has already been conveyed to you, and to which he must adhere.”102 However,
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dissenting arguments with the Foreign Office noted that it was against their own policies to not
support all concession seekers equally, and that the D’Arcy concession and the way it was being
handled might force the Ottomans to give the concession in violation of their own legal codes.103
As regards the existing firman related to exploration for oil and their validity, the Ottoman
Council of State met to discuss these issues on May 25th, 1914. No decision was reached on
anything, but an official from the Ministry of Mines pointed out that the two firmans previously
issued had been respected by his department and that this had prevented him from legally issuing
new ones.104
The concession for TPC was officially granted on June 28, 1914.105 Coincidentally, this
was the same day that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip. A
handwritten note from June 30th stated that the Ottomans notified both the British and the
Germans that “the Ministry of Finance consents to lease to Turk. Pet. Company oilfields
discovered and to be discovered in Vilayets of Mosul & Bagdad.”106 The confusing concession
granting process had briefly come to an end, only to be further interrupted by the coming of war.
Further questions were raised by the structure of the concession. The “Self-Denying” Clause
stated that the group of concessionaires, eventually collectively known as the TPC, would not
seek any other oil concessions in the Ottoman Empire without the other partners. This agreement
would eventually become known as the “Red-Line Agreement” - for the red outline of the
dissolved Ottoman Empire that excluded this group from most former Ottoman territories,
excepting Kuwait. This worked out quite well for Gulbenkian, but ultimately poorly for the non-
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Ottoman partners in the deal.107 This may indicate that the concession seekers and their backers,
the Foreign Office, did not see the war with the Germans as inevitable or perhaps they failed to
foresee the possibility that the Ottoman Empire itself would collapse.
After the First World War interrupted the search and exploitation of Iraqi oil, some,
especially Americans, disputed the legitimacy of the concession. The argument was that
American open door policy was stymied by the concession in a region which, by 1924 was, by a
contemporary scholarly account “the subject of American diplomatic interest involving long and
acrimonious correspondence between Washington and Whitehall.”108 Additionally, Americans
questioned whether the concession itself was legitimate. By American reckoning, two items
demanded by the Ottoman state were as yet unresolved when the war interrupted. Therefore, the
June 28th agreement was not a concessionary contract but the promise of a concessionary
contract to come.109 The U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain protested, in a letter to Lord Curzon
that, during the military occupation of Iraq and under the guise of war necessity, the TPC had
already laid pipe and began exploiting the oil resources of the Baghdad and Mosul Vilâyets.
Earle also points out that, during the war, the German interest in the company was seized by the
British government and Deterding of Shell Oil became a naturalized British citizen; meaning
that, the British now had effective political and military control of Iraq and the British
government effectively controlled over three quarters of the TPC. Earle noted that Woodrow
Wilson’s Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, was incensed by the San Remo Agreement
between Britain and France that set the boundaries for a post war Middle East, arguing that it

107

Yergin, The Prize, pp. 188-9.
Edward Mead Earle “The Turkish Petroleum Company--A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1924), p. 265.
109
Earle “The Turkish Petroleum Company,” p. 265.
108

99

was an agreement to exclude all but British and French interests in the region and was a violation
of the idea of a League of Nation’s Mandatory State. Earle argued that the British response was
to try to bring in American investors, rather than assuage or address the concerns of the State
Department.110 That strategy was remarkably similar to the way the British had previously
handled the Germans in Iraq.
Although, as in the transport concessions, the Germans likely had like a more legitimate
claim than the British, they were aware that the negotiating process would go smoother in
partnership with the British APOC. From the Ottoman viewpoint, pushing the oil concession
into an international syndicate was a masterful stroke. It diversified their risk and guaranteed
better terms. The Ottomans maneuvered in several ways. They served as local competitors for
the concession. Ottoman negotiations seemed to give favor to one group or another and then
switch, kept Western concession seekers off balance and, as demonstrated by the foreign office
records, injected a fair degree of confusion into the process. The tying of customs rates increases,
the insistence on a multi-national corporation, the issuing of a firman early in the process all
demonstrate the Sublime Porte’s ability to control the events and the process to its benefit. The
way these groups, whether multi-national or strictly British had to collaborate and/or come into
conflict with each other suggests that the existence of so many concession seekers helped the
Ottoman State secure a better deal. Despite the Foreign Office’s constant support for the APOC,
the existence of the CMI provided the Ottoman State with a useful, additional British competitor.

The Border and the Pipeline
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The frontier between Iran and the Ottoman Empire was first marked by an agreement
signed in 1555. While this treaty was vague on the exact boundaries it was the first signed
agreement between the Porte and Iran (at the time, Safavid Iran).111 By the 19th century, the
region became the subject of international tensions. The 1843 Quadripartite Agreement between
the Russian, Ottoman, Persian and British Empires sought to concretize the Ottoman-Persian
border and made this lengthy border a topic of discussion between the four empires. Sabri Ateş
notes that the formal agreement between Iran and the Ottomans – the 1847 Treaty of Erzurum was negotiated by the four empires and hailed as a growing sign of Anglo-Russian Entente just
six years before the Crimean War. Nothing definitive happened, however, until the 1911 Tehran
Protocol that was the final word in the border discussions.112
Which oil lay on the Iranian side and which lay on the Ottoman was an important
stimulus to settle the border question once and for all. It is worth noting that the British
Commissioner of the border delineation project, A.T. Wilson, would become the British
Administrator of Iraq from 1917-1920. The Commission was also of interest to Lynch, with his
substantial economic interest in the area due to the ETSN. Lynch, referring to an earlier form of
the commission that operated in 1907, brought the question to Parliament, asking Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary whether there had been any reports from the most recent workings of
the commission and asking that since the aforementioned border commission had been delayed a
year due to local conflicts, was there a way to “bring about a speedy settlement of the dispute in
conjunction with the Russian government?”113 Marian Kent notes that there was an additional
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agreement signed in November of 1913 called the Turco-Persian Frontier Protocol. Kent writes
that while the agreement was supposed to end inter-border conflict, the treaty served to help
APOC maintain their Iranian oilfields and possibly helped future British oil concerns along the
border.114 The treaty set up the final commission to delineate the actual border.
From January of 1914 until October of the same year, the aforementioned commission
physically demarcated 1,180 miles of the border and erected 227 pillars along the route. Ateş
notes that locals promptly destroyed the pillars, which, he argues occurred due to their desire to
limit governmental intrusions into their lives. Ateş further notes that the British commission of
150 people was composed of many Muslim Indians besides British, Russian, Indians, Iranians,
Turks, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Armenians, and Nestorians.115 It is unclear exactly what the diverse
composition of the committee signifies, but it may have been a strategy to get more local
compliance with their task and more detailed local geographic insight. It also demonstrates
another point of inter-imperial cooperation, in this instance between Russians, the British, the
Iranians and the Ottomans. While the range of participants and the variety of ethnicities may
have influenced the commission to focus on issues such as traditional grazing lands, the
commission was also insistent on designating all pastoral groups along the border as permanent
citizens of either the Ottoman or Iranian Empires, rather than the possibility of them being
citizens of both.116
One of the issues for the commission was an Ottoman protest against transferring a
location called Naft Maidan to the Iranians. Commissioner Wilson wrote in his report that, “As
regards the oil springs at Naft Maidan…they compare very favorably indeed with any other

114

Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 11.
Ateş, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands, pp. 306-7.
116
Ateş, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands, p. 311.
115

102

group of surface indications, both in the area over which they occur, and the present outflow of
oil…the objections of the Porte…were motivated by the knowledge of the existence of these
springs and by the desire to dispose of them on better terms than can be obtained by the AngloPersian Oil Company.”117 The possibility of running a pipe line from Chia Surkh or Naft Maidan
to the Persian Gulf was also explored. Wilson concluded that, for reasons of political stability
and geography, this pipeline would have to run in Ottoman, rather than Iranian territory.118 The
pipeline itself would be constructed in sections, the first of which was a 10 mile section from
Chia Surkh to Qasri Shirin, where, according to Wilson “no serious difficulties present
themselves.”119 Altogether, the pipeline would have run either 353 miles from Qasr-I Shirin or
298 miles from Naft Muqatassi to Ahwaz.120 Other than the political topography, the report
discusses where, in the certain sections, the crews would find water and what the geography was,
i.e. marshland, hills, plains or riverbeds. The pipeline’s course was meticulously laid out by the
report, which served to demonstrate the obvious importance of oil and political stability to the
commission and how that influenced exactly where the border would run.
In another memo from the Commission, Wilson discussed the oil springs at Naft
Muqatassi. The memo noted that the springs were 1 mile by ½ mile and there were about 40
individual springs, some man-made and some naturally occurring. The oil apparently emerged
green with copious amounts of natural gas, then turned brown as it thickened. The springs were
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subject to a tax farm, the terms of which were for a single year at a cost of TL 400 and had “for
many years been leased by a Turkish subject…”121 The oil was collected periodically and sold
locally, in Mendeli, Khanikin, and Qasr-I Shirin, where an unnamed Jewish family was
supposedly subcontracted to supply oil in that town. Wilson further noted that the area of the
spring was a contested territory – although the Ottomans exploited the oil from the site and were
sovereign there, the Iranian government nevertheless, claimed it as their own, because “The
lands for many miles around the spring have been occupied from time immemorial by the
Persian tribe the Sanjabi;122 no Turkish tribes have at any time entered or made use of the
lands…the Sanjabi have never paid revenue to or in any way recognized Turkish sovereignty in
these lands.” Wilson finally noted that a cart road to the springs from Mendeli could be easily
constructed and a road to Khanikin would not have been particularly difficult to construct
either.123
The demarcation of the border was obviously important to everyone involved. It was
moreover further evidence of the growing British and Russian entente and cooperation in the
Ottoman Empire. It was important both to the Ottoman Empire and the Iranian state as it
provided detailed information as to the borders of their state and the fixing of their borders and
clarification of their tax base. Either by defining the citizenship and location of border
populations or by defining which state held which resources, the border commission was clearly
valuable to both Empires. It was equally important to the British and their oil concessions.
Perhaps another reason the Foreign Office pushed the syndicate the way that it did, was that the
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transfer of wells between the Ottomans and Iran, as envisaged by the British, would actually be a
transfer between the two D’Arcy led companies. While the oil concession was fraught with
competition and conflict, the work of this border commission proceeded smoothly. It was an
international commission, as it was clearly in all parties involved interest to determine exactly
where both populations and minerals lay. Likewise, beyond British economic interests, the
importance to a fully defined border region to Ottoman nation-building existed. Without over
stating the case, modern nation-states required strictly drawn and regulated borders that replaced
the frontiers of Empire on the eve of World War I. In order to define their citizenry, a nationstate needs to have fully defined borders so that it can determined who is inside and who is
outside of their state and claim them and their lands accordingly. Therefore, the inter-imperial
rivalry over oil, which spurred a long process to its conclusion, was ultimately beneficial to the
Ottoman State, not solely in the development of oil exploitation infrastructure but also by
defining this border.

Basra Improvements
In 1913, the Vali of Basra contacted the British Consul in Basra, Mr. Francis Crow (not
to be confused with Eyre Crowe in London), about the possibility of conducting some municipal
improvement projects in Basra. The request was conveyed to two different British companies.
Earlier improvements in Basra had been initiated by the local Ottoman state. These
improvements included ones made during the 1850’s and were initiated by the Kaymakim Reşid
Pasha and the Vali Namik Pasha.124 Messrs Boulton, one of the two British firms contacted about
the concession, responded that they looked favorably upon the request, but only if adequate
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financial security were provided. Messrs Boulton requested additional information including
population data, amount of annual revenues from the municipality and the exact breakdown of
services required by the potential contract.125
There was also discussion in 1913 of creating a company to provide electric lighting in
Basra. The Vali of Basra, Sefik Pasha, asked the British ambassador to put him in touch with a
financial group that would be interested in forming a company that would acquire the concession
on the “basis of a thirty years’ local concession for electric light, construction of road, Ashar to
Basra electric tramway, and other possible municipal improvements [water supply to Basra].”126
The road was to be 2 miles long, combined with the tramway and hopefully with an extension to
the town of Zobeir. Apparently, the Vali had the authority to grant the concession locally for 30
years; however, the specifics of his plan and arrangement were vague in both scope and
financing. The British Consul offered some pieces of technical advice, such as the following on
road construction, “no stone is obtainable here but I understand it could be made with oil residue
on an earth foundation and this material is easily procurable from Abadan. The Sheik [of
Mohammerah] is in fact building a road of this material at Mohammera[h] and Messrs. Shaw and
Haynes, local English engineers, are doing the work for him.”127 The Vali expected that the
project would require TL 200,000 and he proposed, despite the doubts of the British ambassador,
to raise half of the capital locally.128 Crow expressed a great degree of uncertainty about the
feasibility of these projects, and noted his opinion that “the Turks always want to fly before they
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can walk…”129 Despite his doubts, Crow wrote that “The Vali is of course a new broom but he
seems sincerely anxious to carry out these much needed improvements and I think we would be
unwise to let slip the opportunity of helping him if we properly can.”130 Crow also noted, in
imperialist delight that “I pointed out to him [the Vali] that it was somewhat difficult to realize
these financial combinations [the forming of a financial group to fund the project] unless the
conditions were exceedingly advantageous, and I therefore advised him to draw up his
concession and let us see the exact conditions imposed in order that we might be able to form
some opinion as to its value.”131 The British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Louis Mallett, noted
that if the British did not show interest in the project, it was likely that the Germans would, and
that there was a need and desire to provide a telephone service in the area. The telephone
concession idea was in addition to what the Vali proposed. It was a response to a proposed
partnership between Marconi132 and Telefunken133 to provide both wireless stations and
telephone service in Basra.134 The two companies had also proposed to provide this service in
Iran, but Mallet believed that Iran would not award a concession without first consulting the
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British government. The British government protested, or was considering protesting it because
they simply saw it as a German attempt to further their own communication network in the
Persian Gulf.135
For both Mallet and Crow, a major reason to proceed with the Vali’s wishes was in order
to keep the Germans from taking advantage of the situation. Mallett wrote, concerning the
Germans, that in Basra they “display remarkable activity in development here, and have, I am
informed, just completed two days sounding operation [taking the depth] in the river below and
above Basra, but I do not know for what purpose.”136 Crow advised “I presume His Majesty’s
Government would prefer to see Basra developed with the aid of British capital rather than leave
the work to the Germans.”137 Crow cited several reasons as to why the area might become an
important investment site in the future, including improvements being made to port facilities
there and general improvements to the waterways. Crow continued “We are the first in the field
and the opportunity is a favorable one. Lord Inchcape, the Anglo Persian Oil Co and Messrs
Pearson and Jackson have already acquired vested interests in Mesopotamia and may not be
adverse to assisting us in the present matter…I trust therefore that our attention may be given to
the development of Basra before our German rivals supplant us.”138
As of late April, the Vali of Basra was gathering the information that Boulton Brothers
had requested and Mallet noted that the Vali was in fact contemplating doing the projects
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without asking for any capital investment (loans) from foreigners.139 Requests for additional
information about the project were answered with vague responses which was perhaps a tactic of
the Vali to keep his figures subject to favorable interpretation. Mallet grew frustrated with these
delays, but directed his ire towards Crow, noting, “Mr. Crow is not showing much ingenuity in
eliciting useful information.”140 A May 8th letter from Boulton Brothers reiterated the request for
more information asking for specifics on the form of financial security to be issued, as well as,
whether revenue was already being collected and by whom.141 Eventually, answers arrived - the
population of Basra was between 20,000 and 30,000 people with municipal revenues of TL
9,000. The Vali insisted that funds would be raised locally and not borrowed from the
concessionaire or indeed any foreign financier.142 Ambassador Mallett added that the population
figures seemed accurate but “as regards No. 2, municipal revenue, according to details obtained
from municipal books by my dragoman, was only TL 4,686 last year.”143 A later note from the
Vali set the income for Basra at TL 5,525.144
Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, then in London, met with Boulton Brothers to discuss the
possibilities for the concession and future meetings between the two were planned.145 A former
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Grand Vizir of the Ottoman Empire, Hakki Pasha travelled to London in order to discuss the
Baghdad-Berlin Railroad and Ottoman territorial claims in Europe (Adrianople or now, Edirne)
and Ottoman claims to certain Aegean islands.146 After a stop in Paris, Hakki Pasha arrived in
London on February 15th, 1913.147 Hakki Pasha received an audience with the King, as well as
one with Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey on March 7th.148 Besides negotiating
with the British and meeting royalty, Hakki Pasha got to launch the Reshadieh,149 a warship built
by British shipbuilders and commissioned during Hakki Pasha’s time as Grand Vizir (January
1910-September 1911).150 In April of 1914, Hakki Pasha lunched at the Carlton Restaurant with
such luminaries as Lord and Lady Inchcape and Sir Eyre and Lady Crowe.151 The Basra
concession process was expedited by Hakki Pasha’s visit and the Vali sent the final terms to Sir
John Jackson. The Vali required an Ottoman limited company to be formed which would include
some local men of capital, the concession would last 39 years and Boulton Brothers would have
two and a half months to decide whether they were interested or not.152 An agent of Sir John
Jackson’s Company looked into the water concession and said that it seemed to have already
been offered to a Frenchman.153 Suddenly the entire nature of the concession changed, as
described by a note from Hakki Pasha. Hakki Pasha confirmed that, “the Government of
Bassorah has actually no intention of according concessions for electricity of trams. The only
one intended concession was that for water to be brought into the City, and it [the water
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concession] has already been conceded to indegenous [sic] concessionaires.”154 As pertained the
tramway concession, the Vali provided detailed plans as to the concession including the length of
the concession, where and how long the tramway would be, how many houses would need to be
lit with electricity, what road would need to be built, what materials it should be constructed of,
how long it should be and how many people would be using it.155 By July, the Vali was replaced
by Colonel Subhi Bey, who would face the British in the near future, not on the concession
negotiation front, but on the battlefield at the Battle of Basra (November 1914). The final
telegram on the matter sent by the acting consul, R.W. Bullard to Ambassador Mallett shed some
light on the confusion. It stated “General council of Vilayet has refused for the second time to
grant more than two and a half months preferential option for construction and for half shares in
the electrical concession that has been granted to local people. Do the details sent in my dispatch
no. 33 justify my reopening the question with new Acting Vali?”156 The answer seems to have
been no. By this point in time, the diplomatic furor that preceded World War One was in full
swing. The thread in the file at the British archives comes to an abrupt halt and is replaced with
correspondence indicating growing concern over seditious activities carried out in the Ottoman
Empire by Indian Muslims.
The German threat made an appearance here and it seemed as overblown as it was in
other negotiations. Here, rather than drive the British to compromise with other Western
interests, the threat pushed the British to fast track an investment project that even the local
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British diplomat expressed significant skepticism about. No German investor was named and no
concrete German challenge to the concessions surfaced. The project was initiated by the Ottoman
Vali, who was trying to promote the economic welfare of his vilâyet. Mr. Crow stated the
obvious – these concessions would have to be at very advantageous conditions for British
companies to invest their money. However, that very concern could be allayed with the threat of
German economic penetration. This very threat was communicated to Sir Louis Mallett, who
communicated it to Crow and to the British concession seekers. Regardless of its authenticity,
the threat of German penetration spurred British investors into considering deals that they would
likely otherwise not have. Whether or not the British company would have bid on the concession
was not necessarily the point. The threat itself ensured that the British would consider a deal and
perhaps consider it when the financial terms for themselves were not ideal.

Conclusions
In June of 1914, on the eve of World War I, investors and financiers from Britain and
Germany were corresponding civilly over the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, the oil concession, and
irrigation schemes in Iraq. The German diplomat Prince Lichnowsky wrote, concerning an
agreement reached during previous negotiations that, despite a few grammatical changes the
German version of the agreement on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway “corresponds in substance
with the English version.”157 In the agreement, the Imperial German government pledged to
tolerate British investment in any German concessionary project, as long as the British were the
minority shareholders. They also promised not to interfere with concessions already granted to
British firms nor to provide governmental support for German nationals seeking irrigation
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contracts with the Sublime Porte.158 The border commission as well, demonstrated inter-imperial
cooperation rather than inter-imperial rivalry, and we thus see that British and German interests
coincided in the years immediately before the First World War. Therefore, imperial rivals
collaborated on several occasions in Ottoman Iraq during this period. Especially regarding
infrastructure projects, British and German groups worked together and made compromises in
order to secure that the Ottomans would grant concessionary rights to their companies.
The Ottoman State worked with and against the European concession seekers during
negotiations. Ottoman participation in the oil concession allowed the state to procure a better
deal and to guarantee that there would be at least some Ottoman representation within the
syndicate. The border commission served to further Ottoman centralization policies and move
along the incorporation of the periphery with the Ottoman center. Likewise, it also clarified the
amount of oil reserves available to them and their tax base along the Iranian border. With the
transport contract, the Ottomans proved adept at keeping Lynch and the ETSN from expanding
their interests in Iraq. In fact, the final deal, both in the carrying contract for the Hindiyya
barrage, the carrying contract for the BBR and in the ETNS-BISNC merger, moved British
interests towards international syndicates. All of these demonstrate a degree of Ottoman control
concerning the shipping industry in the region, demonstrating a high level of center-peripheral
coordination. The proposed projects in Basra again showed that local Ottoman administrators
could and did seize the initiative to create foreign investment in their area. The Basra projects
also show how far the mention of German competition could propel otherwise cautious British
investors.
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Chapter 3
Trade Between Americans and Ottomans: Merchants and their Discontent
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In 1912, the Hills Brothers Company of New York published the Dromedary Cook Book.
The book opens with a letter to the American housewife, advising that “The dietetic value of
such fruits as dates, figs, currant etc. is a high one and these fruits should appear on our tables at
least once a day.”1 Focusing on Hills Brothers’ main product, Dromedary Dates, the cookbook
includes a broad set of uses for the sweet dried fruit, including Breakfast dishes, Sauces and
Conserves, Sandwiches, Salads, Cakes, Cookies, Sweet Breads, Pies, Puddings, Gelatine and
Frozen Desserts, Candies, and Miscellaneous. Altogether, there are over 50 recipes for using
dates in food and also for a few household uses, such as a handy “Home-made Laxative.”2 The
recipes had all been submitted by the American and Canadian public in an earlier contest. The
wide market for dates and their popularity was reflected in the geographic diversity of the recipe
writers. They came from 27 different states, the District of Columbia, and British Columbia.
American magazines such as Collier’s and Good Housekeeping contained advertisements by the
Hills Brothers Company to promote their confectionary products. A 1917 advertisement for
Dromedary Brand dates, stated that they are “Ideal for grown-ups and children- a food, a dainty,
a confection.” Should you not feel like having a dainty confection by itself, the advertisement
also included a recipe for date muffins.3 Another Good Housekeeping advertisement evoked the
Garden of Eden and promised that dates were “Better than candy for your children.”4
Dates were just one of the many commercial items traded between the Ottoman Empire’s
provinces of Baghdad and Basra and the United States and Great Britain between 1890 and 1920.

1

The Hills Brothers Company. Dromedary Cookbook. (Bedford, Massachusetts: Applewood
Publishing, 2007) Originally published in 1912 by Hills Brothers from recipes submitted in a
contest in 1910.
2
Hills Brothers, Dromedary Cookbook, p. 34.
3
Good Housekeeping, Volume 64. International Magazine Co. 1917. pg. 147.
4
Good Housekeeping, Volume 64. International Magazine Co. 1917. pg. 134.
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Almonds, antiquities, carpets, colocynth,5 dates, dog excrement,6 gall nuts, ghee, gum
tragacanth,7 sheep intestines,8 licorice root, millet seeds, Persian opium,9 skins/hides of animals,
and wool were exported from Baghdad and Basra. In 1909, according to U.S. sources, the
Western-oriented international trade10 of Baghdad was $14,316,279, with exports composing
$4,560,706 and imports $9,755,573. The largest import to Baghdad, which was 57% of total
imports trade, was cotton piece goods, valued at $5,582,410. Other non-American imports
included yarn, Brazil coffee, sugar, copper and iron. American exports to Baghdad in 1909 were
predominantly oil, valued at $130,000, and Singer Sewing machines, valued at $42,000. Beer
was the third largest American export, valued at around $1,000. American clocks, air guns,
lamps, and toilet articles valued in the hundreds of dollars were imported to Baghdad via
Bombay.11 This puts the American share of exports to Baghdad in 1909 at approximately
$174,000 or 2%. British exports to Baghdad occupied about 56% of the trade and were valued at
approximately $5,848,870.12 In 1909, America imported $733,611 from Baghdad or 16% of all

5

A fruit used for medicinal purposes. According to Parke Davis and Company colocynth was
used to cure constipation. Parke Davis and Company, Descriptive Catalogue of the Laboratory
Products of Parke Davis Company (Detroit: Parke Davis and Company, 1896) p. 9.
6
Used in the leather industry, dog excrement has proteins used in the processing of leather.
7
A gum with similar uses to and properties of gum Arabic. Was used contemporaneously in
calico printing according to Alfred Henry Allen, Commercial Organic Analysis (London: J.A.
Churchill, 1885).
8
For sausage casings.
9
Opium from Persia was packaged in Baghdad.
10
This would also include the trade with India. This would not include the Persian trade, which
was also an international trade.
11
Department of Commerce and Labor. Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign
Countries: Calendar Year 1909 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911) p. 880.
12
British figures are taken from Charles Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800-1914: A
Documentary Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Figures on page
173 put the total export trade of Baghdad at £2,153,000 with British trade valued at £1,201,000.
These figures are taken from British sources. To their value in $, an exchange rate of $4.87 to £1
was used.
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goods that Baghdad exported. Exports to Britain were approximately $1,526,197 or 33%.
This chapter’s main contribution to the overall thesis and to the field is to argue that
American trade with the Ottoman Empire was a growing and noteworthy phenomenon. The U.S.
was an interested trading partner and one that, coupled with the professionalization of the
Foreign Service, was increasing in size and scope. The growth of American trade with the
Ottoman Empire was concurrent with the growth of the world economy and fluctuated in tune
with globalization. The expansion of the global marketplace was what drove the expansion of
American trade. This trend was noted and reacted to by U.S. diplomats and businesses. The most
significant trade commodities for American merchants in Baghdad and Basra were dates and
licorice. Between the years of 1894-1914, British, American, Ottoman and local Arab merchants
and investors all competed against and cooperated with each other concerning the export of these
commodities.
In the international sphere, British trade owned the largest share of the date trade but
American merchants, particularly MacAndrews and Forbes, were dominant in the licorice trade.
Hills Brothers Company of New York was the chief American importer of dates from Basra and
Baghdad during this period and Messrs. Grey and Mackenzie were the leading British firm,
although other British firms based in Basra participated as well. In addition to Grey and
Mackenzie, these included Hotz, Hamilton and Co., Basra (alternatively spelled Busreh) Trading
Company and Lynch Brothers. The competition between Western firms during the date season
was intense. Wratislaw, British Consul in Basra from 1898-1903 wrote “The good understanding
which characterized the relations between the British firms was suspended during the date
season.”13 Hills Brothers Company, the chief American firm involved in the date trade was

13

A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1924) p. 161.
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valued at a capital of $300,000 and also ran a fruit canning and packing business in New York
City.14 British sources approximate that the Americans owned a 12% share of the total date crop
of Basra and Baghdad and roughly a 25% share of date exports.15 British sources listed the
average yearly date crop at around 100,000 tons. Of that 100,000 tons, they estimated that
20,000 tons went to the United Kingdom,16 12,000 tons to the United States, 5,000 to various
Mediterranean ports, 3,000 tons to Australia, and several thousand tons as well went to India,
Singapore and East Africa.17
In 1898, the United States bought $1,447,218.65 worth of goods from the Ottoman
Empire, making them the 8th largest recipient of Ottoman exports. In contrast, the United States
only exported goods worth $227,319.37, or 15th on the list of countries exporting to the Ottoman
Empire.18 In the fiscal year 1911-1912, Ottoman exports (excluding certain items taxed by the
Public Debt Administration,19 which included tobacco – the US imported over $10 million in
tobacco in calendar year 1912) were valued at $108,733,312, with the United States accounting
for $6,712,139 or 6%. From 8th on the list, the United States moved up to 5th, eclipsing even
Germany in that year, and only eclipsed by Great Britain ($26,298,920; 24%), France

14

Polk's (Trow's) New York Copartnership and Corporation Directory, Boroughs of Manhattan
and Bronx, Volume 58 (New York: Association of American Directory Publishers, 1910) p. 373.
15
TNA, FO 368/1143, W.A. Buchanan, Grey, Mackenzie and Company, London, August 19,
1914 to Joseph Pease, MP, Board of Education, London.
16
This was qualified by noting that a few thousand of these 20,000 tons were actually for
Hamburg.
17
TNA, FO 368/1143, W.A. Buchanan, Grey, Mackenzie and Company, London, August 19,
1914 to Joseph Pease, MP, Board of Education, London.
18
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of State. Commercial Relations of the United
States with Foreign Countries During the Year 1901: Volume II (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1902) p. 762.
19
The Public Debt Administration was set up in 1881 by European creditors to insure Ottoman
repayment of loans.
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($20,607,706; 19%), Austria-Hungary ($15,226,878; 14%) and Egypt ($7,464,902; 7%).20 Yet
still, the US lagged behind in exporting to the Ottoman Empire, amounting for $5,393,151 in
fiscal year 1911-1912, or just 3% and ranking it behind Romania as the 12th (up from 15th) most
important exporter to the Empire.21
American import trade from Baghdad and Basra ebbed and flowed with the global
economy between 1894 and 1914. In 1895, this trade amounted to $351,893. In 1897 it was
only 11%. It peaked in 1904 at 43% of all sea borne exports. Although this was an anomaly, a
little less than 20% of Baghdad’s foreign export trade was typically headed towards the US per
annum.22 Trade between the United States and Basra rose from a mere $29,682 in 1896 to
$765,349 in 1906 and it peaked in 1913, with a total amount of $859,005.23 Table 2 and Table 3
illustrate these figures.

20

The Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of State. Commercial Relations of the United
States with Foreign Countries, Revised Statistics Calendar Year 1912 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1914) p. 82.
21
The Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Commercial Relations of the United States, p. 78.
22
Department of Commerce and Labor. Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign
Countries: Calendar Year 1909 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911) p. 880.
23
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xvii, Charles F. Brissel, U.S. Consul,
Baghdad, April 13, 1915 to William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, Washington D.C.
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Table 2 Trade with Baghdad

Year24
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

Total
Exports
$2,547,010
$3,107060
$3,223940
$3,111,930
$2,683,370
$2,800,250
$3,521,010
$2,956,090
$3,389,520
$4,124,890
$3,457,700
$2,707,720
$3,725,550

American Exports
$299,187.2825
$457,831.94
$448,482.15
$558,308.38
$613,012.30
$408,562.25
$644,188.32
$1,295,003.54
$782,950.47
$617,847.4026
$520,480.57
$326,927.00
$733,611.00

24

American share of total
exports.
11.7%
14.7%
13.9%
18%
22.8%
14.6%
18.3%
43.8%
23%
14.9%
15%
12%
19.7%

This chart was created using total export statistics from Charles Issawi, The Fertile Crescent
1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)’s
book. These figures were changed into dollars at a rate of $4.87 to each pound. American export
figures are culled from my U.S. archival sources.
25
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume iii, Rudolph Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul,
Baghdad, July 24, 1905, to Charles Dickinson, U.S. Consul-General, Istanbul. Figures from
1894-1905.
26
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume iii, Frederick Simpich, U.S. Consul, Baghdad,
April 21, 1910, to Edward Ozmun, U.S. Consul-General, Istanbul. Figures from 1906-1909.
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Table 3 Trade with Basra

Exports from Basra to the United States in Dollars
1895

$140,00027

1896

$29,68228

1905

$372,34629

1906

$765,34930

1907

$710,684

1908

$1,909,11031

1909

$615,27532

American merchants and diplomats, from the mid 1890’s until 1914, became
increasingly interested in the Ottoman Empire and in Baghdad and Basra. The creation of the
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant and its publication The Levant Trade Review
were steps forward for American merchants and commerce in the Ottoman Empire as a whole
and in Baghdad and Basra. The Levant Trade Review published two articles about the BerlinBaghdad Railway including one written by the then American Consul of Baghdad Charles

27

NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume ii, James Hamilton, U.S. Vice Consul, Basra,
June 30, 1896 to Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad.
28
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume ii, James Hamilton, U.S. Vice Consul, Basra,
March 30, 1897 to Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad.
29
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume iii, Annual Declared Export Return, December
31, 1905, Chalk, U.S. Vice Consul, Basra.
30
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume iii, Magelssen, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad,
March 19, 1908 to Ozmun, Istanbul. 1906 and1907.
31
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume iii, Magelssen, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad,
January 22, 1909 to Ozmun, Istanbul. 1908.
32
Department of Commerce and Labor. Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign
Countries: Calendar Year 1909 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911) p. 887.
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Brissel, with articles such as one concerning local Mulberry cultivation, another about a new mill
in Baghdad which also discusses the opening of new banks and shipping problems in Baghdad.
Further articles were on the appointment of Emil Sauer to replace James Levack as Consul in
Baghdad, a detailed analysis of agricultural methods in Baghdad, Djavid Bey’s economic
development plan, the state of harvests in certain years and other sundry pieces of information
related to trade concerning the US and Iraq.33 The interest of American businessmen, as
evidenced by the many requests sent to American diplomats in Baghdad and Basra, was finally
being rewarded with detailed information.
The American firm of MacAndrews and Forbes, headquartered in Izmir, were the chief
licorice importers of this period and they maintained offices throughout the Ottoman Empire.
Licorice root had many purposes in this time period and, as MacAndrews and Forbes themselves
stated “The licorice plant is vegetation with extraordinary properties.”34 It was used as a
flavoring for medicines, desserts and candy. However, licorice’s most prominent use was to be
mixed with tobacco to keep the tobacco from drying out and becoming stale. MacAndrews and
Forbes controlled as much as 95% of the licorice market in the United States.35 Though it was
an American company in this period, MacAndrews and Forbes was founded by two Scottish
business men – Edward MacAndrew and William Forbes -in 1850 and was headquartered in the
Ottoman city of Izmir. In 1870, the company moved to the United States and built a factory in
Newark, New Jersey.36 MacAndrews and Forbes was part of an anti-trust lawsuit against

American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, Levant Trade Review Volumes 1 – 4
(American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, 1914).
34
MacAndrews and Forbes Company, The Story of Licorice (Camden, New Jersey:
MacAndrews and Forbes Company, 1952) p. 2.
35
Jeremiah Whipple Jenks and Walter Ernest Clark. The Trust Problem. (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday Page and Company, 1917) p. 353.
36
MacAndrews and Forbes Company, The Story of Licorice, p. 11.
33
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American Tobacco Company et al. which was decided on May 11th, 1911. MacAndrews and
Forbes, which had been acquired by the American Tobacco Company was one of the 14
companies broken up in that decision, including R.J. Reynolds, and Liggett & Meyers Tobacco.37
Today, MacAndrews and Forbes survives as a holding company and maintains a small licorice
subsidiary, named Mafco “Magnasweet”, which specializes in products made from licorice
extracts.38
Examining the date and licorice trade, the conditions under which these commodities
were collected and transported and the cooperation and conflict that arose surrounding them,
highlights and suggests possible aspects of the local economic and social conditions. These
economic conflicts and cooperation occurred within the expansion of the world market and
within an increasingly present American interest in Ottoman Iraq. The prevailing historiography
on America in the Persian Gulf region prior to World War II states that America had little or no
interest and interaction in the region. Yet, literature on American foreign affairs shows that the
1890’s saw the growth of what Emily Rosenberg terms the “promotional state.”39 The American
promotional state had the twin goal of encouraging U.S. import/export entrepreneurs and
reducing foreign barriers to American trade goods and foreign capital investment. Although
much of this imperial thrust was focused towards Latin America and China/the Philippines, the
Middle East was another arena where the American government pursued, to a limited degree of
success, an open door, or unrestricted trade without colonization, policy.40 As Elena Frangakis-
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Compiled by John L. Lott and Roger Shale, Federal Anti-Trust Decisions 1890-1917
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917) p. 249.
38
The website of the company is http://www.magnasweet.com/en/. Last accessed on December
17, 2015.
39
Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) p. 48.
40
Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, p. 54.
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Syrett shows, the American business community in Izmir in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century was “prominent and ranked amongst the most active western communities in
the area.”41 As I found in Iraq, most American trade was in Ottoman exports, which, according to
Frangakis-Syrett, could be competitively priced in the American market.42 In Iraq and throughout
the Ottoman Empire, the firm of MacAndrews and Forbes was a large player in the American
export market, and their total exports from the Ottoman Empire could exceed $1,000,000 in a
single year.43 As I found in Baghdad and Basra, Frangakis-Syrett finds that it was much harder
for Americans to bring their goods to the Ottoman markets; there was a lack of direct shipping
options, and credit was difficult to obtain on good terms.44 However, larger and more capitalized
businesses, like Standard Oil and Singer Sewing Company, were able to bring their products to
Ottoman markets and developed local infrastructure to ease this process.45 Both of these
corporations were active in Baghdad and Basra. Of course, Americans were not as present,
involved or influential as the British, French and Germans in Iraq, however, they were there and
they were significant.
Throughout this period, the American diplomatic corps underwent a process of
increasing professionalization. Consuls evolved from self-interested archeologists or
businessmen to career diplomats, indicating both an increased professionalism within the State
Department and heightened interest in the region. The history of American diplomats in the
Ottoman Empire is complicated and one wherein American interests wax and wane. By 1830, the

Elena Frangakis-Syrett. “American Trading Practices in Izmir in the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries.” In Daniel Panzac, editor. Histoire économique et sociale de l’Empire
ottoman et de la Turquie (1326-1960) (Paris: Peeters, 1995) p. 177.
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Elena Frangakis-Syrett. “American Trading Practices in Izmir,” p. 179.
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Elena Frangakis-Syrett. “American Trading Practices in Izmir,” p. 180.
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Elena Frangakis-Syrett. “American Trading Practices in Izmir,” pp. 181-2.
45
Elena Frangakis-Syrett. “American Trading Practices in Izmir,” pp. 182-3.
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United States had formal diplomatic representation at the Sublime Porte.46 It was the Ottoman
Sultan Mahmud II that promoted the American chargé d’affaires, David Porter, to Ambassador;
the first American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire was therefore appointed not by the U.S.,
but by the Ottomans.47 By the 1880’s while British consuls in the Ottoman Empire were paid
£200 as a starting salary,48 comparable American diplomats in the region were not paid until
1906. However, despite the professionalization of the Foreign Service corps, obstacles remained
in promoting American economic investment in Iraq. As was argued in the infrastructure
chapter, this was due both to European competition, a reliance on following protocol and the
dearth of knowledge Americans had concerning local procedures and norms. In the case of trade,
entrenched local interests also competed with American merchants, particularly over the export
of licorice and dates.
American Vice Consuls and Consuls in Baghdad, after the professionalization of 1906
and the end of Hürner’s tenure, increased their attempts to promote American trade, whether
import or export, particularly once this no longer clashed with their self-interest as
merchants/diplomats. Along with a growing interest in commerce, American diplomats
displayed an increasing focus on sanitation, as they did in other areas around the globe. During
this period in the Ottoman Empire, the British and the French also demonstrated this expanding
interest in sanitation. This is evident in an increased focus on securing goods that did not carry
disease and on trying to regulate the means of production of those goods. While this chapter is
mostly concerned with American businesses and the actions of the U.S. State department, many
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(New York: Norton, 2007) p. 115.
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of the actors are British subjects. A lack of actual Americans in the Ottoman Persian Gulf was
compensated for by the use of foreign nationals for diplomatic employees, for business agents,
and for attorneys.
The degree to which the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, in this case Iraq, was
integrated economically and politically with the core area is one of the major concerns of
literature on the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The act of incorporating remote regions is
an example of nation building and the process through which the Ottoman Empire moved, or
attempted to move away from being an Empire and towards being a nation-state. The process of
identity formation within the Ottoman Empire has been well documented. Selim Deringil argues
that during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman state used Sufi sheikhs and nationalism to
attempt the creation of a more uniform Ottoman identity.49 Kayali argues that Ottomanism was
an attempt to build a new national identity around, rather than constructing a new identity around
ethnic nationalism. Kayali writes that this nation building identity arose from the Tanzimat
principle of political equality and was defined by “a common allegiance of all subjects in equal
status to the Ottoman dynasty.”50 Taner Akçam and Vahakn Dadrian both argue that these
processes of Ottoman identity formation were incomplete and their failure contributed to the
Armenian Genocide.51 Bruce Masters complicates this narrative by reminding us that, “the
peoples of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were not simply passive recipients of an
order imposed by the Europeans. Rather, they took an active role in devising strategies to cope
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with change and benefit from it, thereby determining their own futures.”52
Sarah Shields, in her study on Mosul, describes the center-periphery relationship as a
continuing struggle between Istanbul and local elites. Ultimately, many of the reforms instituted
by Istanbul were either not enforced, or only loosely implemented and at different times.53
Likewise, Eugene Rogan investigates the relationship between center and periphery in nearby
Transjordan, detailing the struggle that ensued as the Sublime Porte attempted to incorporate the
area more firmly into the empire.54 Hala Fattah elaborates on the relationship with, and
competition between, British merchants, Najdi merchants, local Arabs and Ottoman elites in the
Persian Gulf area to help demonstrate this center-periphery relationship.55 Instead of focusing on
political rhetoric or identity formation, we can see economic activities as illuminating aspects of
the center-periphery relationship and the infrastructure of nation-building. It would appear that
the center-periphery relationship in this region was complicated and at times unclear. As a
process, it was also uneven. The area was in some aspects being incorporated more closely, but
in other ways remained autonomous and unintegrated. On a local level this trade and economic
activity demonstrates both the success and failure of how certain aspects of the Ottoman 19th
century legal and economic reforms, known as the Tanzimat, were instituted in the provinces of
the Ottoman Empire. These instituted reforms, such as the settling of economic conflicts in
mercantile courts, indicates a higher level of integration between the Ottoman imperial center
and the periphery of the empire. However, centralizing tax reforms and anti-monopoly policies
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were not instituted. This indicates that, despite policy changes, the state maintained tax farming
as a revenue collection strategy. This was due to the benefits that collecting revenue in this
manner provided for the Ottoman Treasury, which still stood to gain from the practice.
In interaction with Western merchants, Ottoman officials and local notables often worked
in tandem to promote their own interests over that of Western merchants. Dates and licorice were
not unique to the Ottoman Empire, nor to Iraq but they were lucrative trade items that kept
Western merchants entranced. Iraqi dates were understood by Western merchants to be of the
highest quality available globally. Both local parties and Western merchants benefitted from this
trade. Western merchants were as likely to compete or cooperate with other Western merchants
as they were to compete/cooperate with Ottomans land owners, officials and tax farmers.

Dates, Conflict and Cooperation
The date trade in Baghdad and Basra was a seasonal trade, with date picking, packing
and shipping taking place between late August and December. Date groves and gardens lined
the Tigris River and these date gardens in Baghdad and Basra were the property of local Arab
notables.56 The American vice consulate in Basra existed, to a certain extent, to facilitate the
shipping of dates to the United States; by being there to certify shipping invoices it ensured
timely export of the commodity. American vice-consuls in Basra were typically business men
who worked in the date trade during the date season, but absented themselves during the rest of
the year. Wratislaw, who was the British Consul in the area and a substitute American vice
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consul, described the date trade as being a chaotic, industrious yet filthy, affair.57
James Hamilton, of the firm Hamilton and Hotz, served as American vice consul in Basra
in the beginning of the period under study, although James Hamilton and his firm were British.58
In 1899, Hamilton absented himself for health reasons to India in early September, creating a
diplomatic vacuum during the peak date season. When he left, Hamilton appointed Mr.
Wratislaw, British Consul and the agent for the British firm, Messrs. Grey and Mackenzie, as his
replacement American consular agent. It is a confusing situation, in fact, when one British date
merchant puts another British date merchant in charge of American date exports. However, it
seems to not have been other American firms that took issue with this decision, but Rudolf
Hürner, American Vice Consul at Baghdad. He wrote to Messrs. Grey and Mackenzie, “As the
United States Consular Agency is not only under the control of this Consulate, but also under my
personal responsibility, Mr. Hamilton could in no way appoint any other person for him during

“For a couple of months in the year, beginning when the dates were approaching ripeness
towards the end of August, the usually rather torpid town awoke to sudden activity. A meeting of
growers and exporters to fix the price of dates inaugurated the season. Long ago there may have
been some practical utility in this confabulation, but by now it had become a meaningless
ceremony, kept up merely in a spirit of conservatism, for no one adhered to the agreement unless
it suited him, and prices fluctuated according to the laws of supply and demand. Then the din of
universal hammering arose as hundreds of thousands of boxes were put together from nails and
boards sent out ready from Scandinavia. When the picking began, packing establishments called
Chadoks were established in the palm-groves along the river banks, and to them resorted all the
ragamuffin Arabs from the country round – men, women and children, filthy and half-naked- to
profit by the only season in the year when regular wages were forthcoming. The men for the
most part acted as porters, while the women packed. It was an edifying sight to watch the
packers squatted on the ground round a huge mound of dates and tightly pressing the fruit in
rows and in the boxes with their unclean fingers, which they moistened from time to time in a
bowl of slimy water from the nearest ditch; while the babies reclined amidst the dates, naked and
unrestrained, and swarms of flies browsed on the babies’ eyes and faces, which they seemed to
prefer even to the luscious fruit. Years ago I had witnessed the packing of figs in Smyrna, and
thought the spectacle unappetizing enough; but this was far worse, and I have never eaten dates
since I saw them prepared for the market in Basra.” Wratislaw, Consul in the East, pp. 160-161.
58
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57
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his absence, without previously consent of this Consulate.”59 Hürner proposed that all invoices
from Basra should be shipped to him in Baghdad for approval, which ultimately would give him
control over sailing priority; the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway that connects the Tigris at Basra
with the Persian Gulf, was hampered by a large sand bar. For steamships to clear this sand bar,
they had to sail at high tides which only occurred every two weeks. Even a slight delay might
mean that a steamship would have to wait two weeks or so to sail. By sailing late, they would be
later to the markets of Europe or America and the initially higher prices due to smaller supply
would have fallen, cutting into precious profit margins. Hürner, if he controlled the invoices and
sailing priority for ships bound to the US, would acquire some control over the process and
likely, use that advantage for his own monetary gain. Hürner would also profit by receiving the
fees for filing paperwork, a modest yet attractive revenue stream for him.
Wristlaw and Hamilton complained that the process of clearing all paperwork through
Baghdad would cause delays in the shipping of dates; Hürner countered his argument succinctly
with “I consider this uncorrect.”60 Hürner’s aspiration to become part of the date trade became
moot when the American embassy in Istanbul officially appointed Mr. Wratislaw as the
American Vice Consul in Basra.61 Hürner, however, was unwilling to let the issue drop. In a
letter to the absent convalescent James Hamilton, Hürner quoted the alleged stern words of the
American Consul General in Istanbul “The practice [of Hamilton] was clearly irregular and you
[Hürner] at least should have been promptly notified of any arrangement through the British
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Embassy.”62 Despite his efforts, Hürner was unable to expand the role of his business and the
reach of his vice consulate.
Hürner managed the Vice Consulate post for many years as an unpaid employee of the
U.S. and as a businessmen. Always keenly self-interested, Hürner was accused of stealing
antiquities, of cheating foreign merchants, of swindling James Hamilton, of being a
moneylender; moneylending was, it should be noted a widespread practice. Additionally, Hürner
tried to circumvent the State Department in the securing of infrastructure contracts and was also
accused of overcharging for his consular services. In a review of his submitted accounts, Hürner
was upbraided for charging fees of $2.50 instead of the proper $2. The same review accused
Hürner of manipulating foreign exchange rates in his favor as well.63 Furthermore, Hürner was
accused of using his office to extort money from victims of robbery. Jason Paige, an engineer
with the University of Chicago’s archeological dig at Bismaya was robbed while travelling.
Jason Paige, who was ambushed in the desert and literally had his pants stolen off of him,
applied for and ultimately got recompense from the Ottoman government for his losses. Of the
TL9764 that was received in compensation, only TL20 were remitted to Paige. Five Turkish Lira
went to Paige’s servant, Ali for undisclosed reasons and TL72 went to Hürner, for the purported
loss of a carpet that Paige had been carrying.65 In a separate incident, another accusation of
illicit fees was made by the British consular agent, Major Ramsey, who assumed the office
briefly after Hürner was replaced. Ramsey wrote that Hürner charged fees above what he was
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supposed to and pocketed the extra.66 Hürner would have been expected to use the fees charged
as a sort of informal compensation for himself, in what was a non-salaried job. However, he
would not have been expected to overcharge. Likewise, with the certification of the date
invoices, it seems that Hürner may have been looking to increase his personal profits by insuring
his own brokerage over who could sail first.
Much of the conflict and cooperation that took place surrounding the date trade, occurred
around the activities of Hills Brothers. In December of 1903, the Hills Brothers Company of
New York, the chief American date importing company, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State,
John Hay about difficulties they had in Basra. According to their letter, during the previous date
season, the Ottoman governor and local Arab notables conspired against Hills Brothers in a
manner that “refused to allow the growers, from whom we purchased, either to pack or to deliver
our dates, in consequence of which our steamers were delayed in completing their cargoes, thus
entailing heavy demurrage charges which we have had to bear.”67 The importance of an early
shipping date for profitable dates is underlined by David Fairchild, agricultural explorer and date
expert. Fairchild wrote, “The New York shipments, to be the most profitable, must be in [New
York] before Thanksgiving Day…”68 Hills Brothers filed a claim against the Ottoman authorities
for ₤3,912. According to the British owned Basra (sometimes written Busreh) Trading Company
official John Hiles, who was subcontracted by Hills Brothers to ship dates to New York, the
latter company had spent the sum of ₤1,800 as a pre purchase advance to date growers. Hills
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Brothers accused Sayyid Talib al Naqib of Basra, a wealthy landowner and date grower, of
intimidating other date growers into not delivering their goods in a timely manner. They further
accused the Ottoman Vali of Basra, of intimidating the date growers outside of Basra in the same
manner and acting in collusion with the Naqib. Hiles stated that Ottoman soldiers were used to
prevent date growers from moving their goods to market. Due to the Shatt al-Arab tides, the
shipment of dates for that year and month had to occur on the 22nd of September. Prices had
been set and contracts had been signed for the dates, previous to their packing into boxes for
shipment. These prices had been set at the public auction on the 10th of September. The auction
occurred in the town of Abu al Kasseb, at the house of one of the native date growers and
included both the principle date growers and European merchants.69
The story was further illuminated by Thomas Basmadjean, an agent for Messrs. R.D.
Warburg and Company, another sub-contractor of Hills Brothers Company. Basmadjean wrote
to inform Hills Brothers in New York that the man he purchased dates from, an M. Gareh, had
his temporary sheds where date packing occurred, known as cherdaghs, shut down by Ottoman
officials. He also implied that those workers, now idle, still needed to be paid by Hills Brothers.
Gareh argued that even if there were no dates to pack, these workers had been contracted and
therefore had to be paid.70 Wratislaw wrote about how the extreme competition between firms
could lead to subterfuge, “Quarrels sometimes occurred when two firms had contracts for
delivery from the same grower, and the question arose which contract was to be executed first.
The enterprising native clerks of one firm might piratically seize a lighter of dates on its way to
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another, which of course led to ill-feeling.”71
By September 13th Hills Brothers’ dates started to arrive and Yusif Badam, a clerk for the
Hill Brothers, received 120 maunds (18,336lbs )72 of dates. Badam assembled his tyndal73 and
his date packing team. When Badam heard of the prohibition on date packing, he applied for a
special permission letter, but was shut down by the Ottoman officials who, according to Badam
said, “I shall neither give you a letter, nor allow you to pack.”74 Reportedly threatened with a
stay in a Turkish prison, the date packers and Badam stopped their work. Hill Brothers placed the
blame for the entire situation on the Arab notables and specifically, largely on the Naqib of
Basra. The Naqib was one of the major date growers himself and had refused to take part that
year in the shipping of dates before the September 10th price was set. The Naqib then, according
to Hills Brothers, further refused to deliver the dates and with the help of the Vali, waited until
prices were driven high enough to make it highly profitable for him to sell.75 Another facet to
this dispute was that Hills Brothers also brought a suit against Thomas Basmadjean, an Ottoman
subject, in connection with this incident. The suit was brought to a local court, further showing
that Hill Brothers willingly used Ottoman infrastructure for redress.76
This was not the first that the Ottoman authorities had interfered in the date trade in this
period. In November of 1896, Muhammad Atullah, the Ottoman Vali of Baghdad issued an
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order prohibiting further date exports for twenty-five days.77 He rescinded the order on
November 29th.78 This shipping delay would have put significant pressure on Western merchants
to pay higher prices on dates. Combined with the 1903 incident, these examples of Ottoman
interference in the date export trade, albeit qualified by it coming from the viewpoint of partisan
Western observers, suggests that such interference was a common feature of the tough
competition over the lucrative trade. The date conflict of 1903 also shows that there was
significant cooperation between Western merchants during the auction process as well as,
cooperation between local landlords/date growers and those European merchants. It also
demonstrates the fluctuating nature of the trade and that profit and individual maximization of
profit was, not surprisingly, the ultimate driving force. Both groups would use whatever means
possible to seize an advantage. The Vali that sided with the Naqib may well be complicit because
of some sort of personal gain. That relationship also demonstrates that the Naqib and the Vali
were willing to work together. As Reidar Visser notes the most potent challenge to Ottoman
sovereignty in Basra was the wealthy Naqib family, which occupied a position of great power
and influence in Basra.79 Vissar argues that an international triumvirate of notables, the Naqib
family, the Sheik of Mohammerah and the Mubarak family of Kuwait, exerted effective control
over Basra and could oust Ottoman government officials if they chose, largely through their
influence with armed gangs and their ability to manipulate the crime rate.80 According to
Attiyah, Sayid Talib “had become by 1914 to all intents and purposes the de facto ruler of
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Basra.”81 The rise to power of the Naqib of Basra was tied to his control of large groves of date
palms and his ability to both affect trade and control the Ottoman governor. This is indicative of
the center-periphery relationship in the Ottoman Empire. Further from the imperial center, the
Porte would have greater need for the acquiescence of the local Arab notables. Hala Fattah notes
examples of this kind of subterfuge as well, saying that the Naqib pressured the Vali, Nuri Pasha,
into discontinuing shipments of dates so that the Naqib could “get a better price for his date
crop.”82 This also shows cooperation between Ottoman officials and local Arab notables against
Western merchants and the ability for the two groups to control a significant international trade
good.
During this incident, Ottoman officials also conspired to keep Mr. Chalk, a British
subject but an agent of the Hills Brothers Company, from acquiring the post of American Vice
Consul in Basra.83 By preventing the appointment of the agent of a corporation that had a
grievance against them, they were postponing or diminishing the amount of official protest that
Hills Brothers of New York could bring against them. The Ottomans were able to use this tactic
to delay or deflect any help the U.S. State Department might be able to give Hills Brothers
locally in Basra during proceedings in the mercantile courts. The concluding American
investigation into the affair determined that although the Ottoman Vali had done nothing to
ameliorate the situation, there was no proof of his culpability. The American report put the
blame squarely on the Naqib of Basra stating that he was “forcing up the primary price of
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dates…”84 However, Havemeyer, the eventual acting US Vice Consul in Basra wrote that since
the Naqib was acting as a date grower and a merchant and not a political official (technically he
was all three) he could not be held accountable for “Messrs. Hills Brothers losing money over
having bargained on buying dates at a lower price than this year’s market one.”85 Havemeyer
further exonerated the local agents (Basmadjean) writing that “Messrs. Hills Brothers agent
shipped the full quantity that was required of him by the First and Second tides (as far as I’ve
ascertained) and any loss that they may have incurred over high prices, I should say, should be
classed under the heading a “business risk” to be borne by those concerned without official
interference.”86 Hürner and Havemeyer ultimately blamed Mr. Chalk and Hills Brothers for the
entire situation and for their refusal to accept the terms of the Naqib and avert the entire delay.
Havemeyer wrote “You are quite right about Chalk being to blame for the trouble between Hills
Bros. & the Turkish Govt.”87 Following up on the incident, Hürner wrote another telegram to
the Department of State alleging foul play by the local tribunal investigating the dispute. He
accused the Ottoman Vali of influencing the tribunal and called the process a “Ridiculous
Comedy…”88 The American Legation in Istanbul instructed Hürner to ignore Hills Brothers
claims, stating, “Do not allow your relations with local government to become strained over
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question of indemnity.”89
Hamilton reappears in the history of date exporting on behalf of his date exporting
interest, Hamilton and Hotz. Hamilton filed a complaint against Hills Brothers for doing exactly
what Hills Brothers accused the Naqib of doing. Hamilton complained about Mr. Chalk, now an
official American consular agent that, “it is very difficult to distinguish between Mr. Chalk’s acts
as a Consular agent, in which capacity it is his duty to facilitate and assist trade, and other
merchants doing business, with America, and his acts representing the American firm that
attempts to monopolize the whole Date business with America and to restrain others by all
means in their power from doing this business with America.”90 Hamilton intimated that it was
well known that Hills Brothers of New York regularly paid other companies in Baghdad and
Basra to not export dates to the United States and writes, “This action is one which in America
under the Sherman act which renders illegal all combinations made in restraint of trade, would
not be tolerated.”91 Hamilton suggested that Chalk’s interests as an agent of Hills Brothers and
an agent of the United States were irreconcilable. There seems to have been little official
response to this complaint, either by Hürner or the U.S. State Department. Hürner and Hamilton
were never particularly cordial to each other and after the 1899 episode, Hürner went out of his
way to punish Hamilton for irritating him. In 1901, Hamilton and Hotz lost two lighters (smaller
steamships that were used to carry goods on the occasionally quite narrow, always winding
Tigris and Euphrates rivers) the Radieh and the Hajieh, at Aziziah. The lighters had been filled
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with licorice. They filed an insurance claim and under the necessary signatures, Hürner hand
wrote a comment, “The truth or otherwise of the contents of this document is wholly unknown to
this office.”92 Perhaps this unnecessary comment threw doubt on Hamilton’s insurance claim,
although it cannot be definitely demonstrated whether it did or did not.
The contentious date trade and the incidents involved in it, raise several significant
points. First, while there was cooperation between Western merchants and businesses abroad,
and there was also severe competition. The date trade was extremely time sensitive. The dates
ripened and had to be picked in a certain window and the geography of the Shatt Al-Arab was
such that shipping them internationally could only occur at certain high tides. This set of
conditions, combined with the timing of the Thanksgiving (in the U.S.) and Christmas season in
the U.S. and the West where many dates were consumed and during which time the fruit was
most popular, created price incentives to any merchant that could reach the Western markets
first. This led Western merchants to use underhanded means to acquire the best prices and stock
the quickest from the Basra date growers. Wratislaw noted that the British community in Basra,
which numbered in the high teens and was mostly composed of agents of British firms, all of
which exported dates seasonally, frequented the British Club every night to dine and play whist
or billiards in “great amity.”93 However, during the date season, the colorful Wratislaw noted
that his fellow Westerners were not as cordial as usual. He wrote hyperbolically about his fellow
British subjects that, “Until the first two or three steamers had left, the club was a miserable
place for an outsider, with the other members growling at one another like a pack of surly
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dogs…”94
Second, the date trade shows that there was, as is indicated in the literature, a great deal
of coordination between the local Arab notables and the Ottoman state in Basra. The Vali and the
Naqib worked together to create a favorable situation for the local date growers. Even if the Vali
was the junior partner in this, this level of cooperation is instructive. The Vali in order to ensure
Ottoman authority in Basra, had to cooperate with the Naqib. The same was true, however, about
the Naqib, who needed the cooperation of the Vali in order to manipulate the date trade. The
Naqib and the Vali operated and cooperated within the Ottoman system and were quite effective
at obtaining their aims.
Third, as the date trade was largely focused on the area around Basra, it raises certain
questions about what other possible trajectories Basra could have taken in a post-Ottoman future
and raises the question of whether Basra should be thought of as a separate entity from Baghdad
and Mosul. As Reider Visser asks in his book Basra, the Failed Gulf State, “Why did the
oppressed population of oil-rich Southern Iraq refrain from separatist activities for most of the
twentieth century?”95 Visser argues that there is no historical reason to consider the southern part
of Iraq, the Basra Vilâyet, as a separate entity, at least as pertains to indigenous separatist
movements. Visser discusses two concepts of Iraq, one as a long historical entity and the other as
a British creation and efforts by historians to mediate between the positions.96 Visser argues that
the most defining feature of the region is in fact its date palms and these are the economic glue
that binds the Basra vilâyet together. Visser notes that the annual export of dates increased from
40,000 tons to 70,000 tons between 1887 and 1908, indicating significant economic growth
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focused around the date trade. Visser also states that commerce in general, especially with
British India, was what defined the Basra economy.97 However, looking at the evidence, the
export trade, both bound Basra and Baghdad together and separated them. It bound Baghdad to
Basra as any goods that Baghdad exported by sea were sent through Basra and it bound Basra to
Baghdad, as goods that were to be exported to most of Iran went to Basra first and then upriver
to Baghdad. Wratislaw noted this in his book that Basra’s other distinguishing trade, besides the
date trade was Basra’s “importance as a port of transshipment for goods destined for Bagdad and
Mesopotamia generally, and through Baghdad for Persia…”98 These incidents within the date
trade suggest that Basra was economically connected to Baghdad yet not as effectively or
completely politically connected. The date trade, although the land was in the hands of the Arab
notables, was still facilitated through Ottoman oversight and infrastructure. It seems likely that
the unique power of the Naqib family and their cooperation with or domination of Ottoman
political influence, gave them a vested interest in the Ottoman State. Although they could
demonstrate considerable autonomy, it was the system in place that allowed them to do so.
Therefore, it was in the interest of the Naqib family to stay within the Ottoman system.

Licorice
Licorice was another commodity that American businesses and Ottoman economic
interests both worked together, and against each other, in order to procure and sell. Licorice root
was gathered either on farms or from wild plants in the desert south of Baghdad, especially
between Baghdad and Amara. First, a collecting station would be established and locals would
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be contracted to dig licorice root with payment given in advance for specific quantities.
Frangakis-Syrett noted, in and around Izmir, similar digging, collecting and tax situations to the
ones found in this period around Baghdad.99 Licorice root came in three quality levels, ordinary
licorice root valued at 200 piasters per ton, baguette root valued at 300 piasters per ton and
decorticated (peeled from its husk) root valued at 400 piasters per ton. The root was typically
taxed at a rate of 10-20% upon shipment.100 The roots then travelled, usually by local craft
known as sefinah, to Basra, where they were pressed into bundles. Some licorice travelled to
Kut101 a small town about halfway between Baghdad and Basra to be pressed before being sent
on to Basra. Goofah, a type of small rounded boat, were also used to transport licorice from
places like Samarra to Baghdad and occasionally lighters, or light draft steamboats would bring
licorice from Baghdad to Basra.102 On occasion, shipments of licorice would be lost on route to
alleged brigandage and/or shipments would vanish for reasons of insurance fraud.103
MacAndrews and Forbes’ headquarters in the Ottoman Empire were in Izmir, but they
maintained an office and a presence in the Ras ul Qurayya quarter of Baghdad. From 1904
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through 1907, MacAndrews and Forbes had several interesting interactions with the Ottoman
government. Broadly speaking, most of these incidents were due to disagreements concerning
taxation, either over the procedures and rates of tax levying or who had the right, as a tax farmer,
to work certain lands. As Frangakis-Syrett found in Izmir, MacAndrews and Forbes acted as tax
farmers in Baghdad too, presumably in order to attempt to control and monopolize licorice.104
Unlike in Izmir, where MacAndrews and Forbes faced competition primarily from Western firms
such as the German company Simon Co., in Baghdad, MacAndrews and Forbes only had to
compete with local merchants and Ottoman officials.105 Beyond the questions of taxation, other
issues arose and were fought over by the company and Ottoman officials, mostly by Kaymakam.
Kaymakam were in charge of Kazas, which represented the third level of Ottoman organization –
Vilâyets were the largest, then Sancaks, and then Kazas, which were roughly the size of city plus
that city’s hinterland. Other Ottoman officials in a Kaza besides the Kaymakam (who was
appointed by the Ministry of the Interior) were a treasurer and a judge – this structure was
created in the Tanzimat era reforms, specifically in the 1864 Provincial Reform Law.106
Although these incidents involved seem to imply an acrimonious relationship between
MacAndrews and Forbes and the Ottoman Empire, they are tempered by the quantity of licorice
that was exported smoothly and by the several years in which no conflicts took place. Overall,
MacAndrews and Forbes operated within the Ottoman system as tax farmers and merchants.
Although they complained about the tax practices of the Ottomans, MacAndrews and Forbes
clearly benefited immensely, as they were always willing, despite protests otherwise, to pay fines
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levied against them.
The town of Kut was at the center of many of these disputes between MacAndrews and
Forbes and Ottoman officials. Since Kut housed infrastructure that processed licorice, it was an
important part of MacAndrews and Forbes’ licorice trade. In 1904 the Kaymakam of Kut argued
that MacAndrews and Forbes should be paying a fee based on how many different locations they
were digging root at.107 Later that year, MacAndrew and Forbes protested another proposed
official Ottoman tax increase on licorice.108 Their complaint was that the Ottomans had raised
the standard tax on licorice from 25 piasters per 1,000 kilograms109 to 40 piasters.110 To try to
avoid these tax increase and several other Ottoman tax reforms, MacAndrew and Forbes
repeatedly attempted to pay the levy in kind, assuming that the state would not want to go
through the trouble of selling the root, “The option to pay this tax in kind is our only safeguard
against exorbitant exactions by the authorities…”111 But when presented to the Ottoman Vali,
the request to not raise the tax focused on the benefits of Western business activity, “It is through
the efforts and energies of foreign companies, that trade in licorice root has been revived, after it
had been lost in oblivion for a term of years.”112
Besides tax increase attempts, another frequent field of conflict was the actual
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agricultural fields and labor. In February of 1904, MacAndrews and Forbes complained that they
were forbidden from working land in the Jezireh district. The Kaymakam of the district refused
to let them dig, arguing that the land was already being worked by someone else. According to
MacAndrews and Forbes’s agent, the land in question was government land where any merchant
could have dug for licorice provided they paid tax on it.113 The Ottoman official’s argument was
that native merchants should be allowed to arrange digs first on Ottoman government land before
MacAndrews and Forbes was allowed to begin work. It is unclear what sort of land
classification this would be, but it seems likely that it was not cultivated land, as much of the
licorice that was exported grew wild. Either way, the Arab natives of Jezireh would have been
employed in the digging, so essentially, it was an argument of which merchants would prosper,
not which labor force. A few months later, two barges of licorice that MacAndrews and Forbes
believed was theirs, were seized by Kazim Beg, the Kaymakam of Aziziah on behalf of Ahmed
al Khalaf. Khalaf, an Ottoman merchant/tax farmer, believed it to rightly be his licorice. There is
some irony in this, as this was a tactic that MacAndrews and Forbes had used against their rivals
in Izmir in 1900 and again in 1906.114 The Ottoman official who was in possession of the seized
barges of licorice was persuaded, through Hürner’s intervention, to release the barges from
Aziziah and send them on their way to Basra. Hürner implied that this was accomplished
through a little “backschish” or bribery.115
The seizure of boats and their contents was another way the competition between
MacAndrews and Forbes, local business and the Ottoman State played out. Khalaf, the Baghdadi
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merchant/tax farmer, had protested that the two barges’ contents were actually his and when they
reached Basra, ready to be shipped the barges were again stopped.116 Khalaf brought a suit
against MacAndrews and Forbes in the mercantile court.117 MacAndrews and Forbes countered,
arguing that they had bought the licorice, which seems to have come from Samra, legally from
the merchant Hanna Minni and his son Anton. Minni and son were tax farmers (mültizam) for
two years on that specific plot and the land involved may well have been waqf land in the town
of Samra.118 Minni was paid for 80,000 kilos of licorice before his office of mültizam expired in
March of 1905. Later correspondence accused Minni and son of conspiracy to defraud
MacAndrews and Forbes.119 It seems that Khalaf was the new multizam of that parcel of land
and the agent of a Jewish Baghdadi merchant, Ezra Daniels.120 The Kaymakam, interestingly,
did not prevent the loading of licorice onto lighters at Azizieh, but he supposedly intimidated the
local Arabs chiefs and their employees into refusing to do so. The Kaymakam then used his
influence to delay the ships by threatening, indirectly again, the crews of the boats. The
Kaymakam was also accused of acting independently, not on the instruction of the Ottoman
government, but out of some sort of personal motive, which remains somewhat unclear if it was
anything else but the hopes of a little backsheesh.121 Besides the Kaymakam, MacAndrews and
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Forbes also implicated another official, the Mudür of Salman Pak as a conspirator.122
In the Mercantile Court, the Khalaf case of July 1905 was dismissed. This occurred not
due to its own merit, but because the Mercantile Court saw the matter as a criminal case, since
the allegation was the seizure of property by force.123 Three barges of licorice that were in route
to Basra had been seized, the Husseriah, the Djaferieh, and the Hamidieh. Between them, the
barges contained a total of TL20,000 of licorice.124 MacAndrews and Forbes still had other
cases pending in March of 1907 when Mr. Levack, a lawyer and future American vice-consul of
Baghdad, wrote to acknowledge that he would represent MacAndrews and Forbes in Mercantile
Court. For his services on March 18th Levack received five dollars (113 and ½ piasters).125
Another lawyer, Mr. Quartermaine was also hired to appear to represent the company.126
Khesrov Kouyumdjian127 served as dragoman on three mercantile court cases- Ahmed Khalaf vs.
MacAndrews and Forbes on July 26, 1905, MacAndrews and Forbes vs. Petros ibn Yusif on
March 18, 1907 and MacAndrews and Forbes vs. Petros ibn Yusif on April 16, 1907. For his
services as dragoman on those three occasions, he received $15 or 340 and ½ piasters.128
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Proceedings in the Petros case continued, another hearing being held on May 16th 1907 at
1:30pm and Mr. Cree, of the trading firm Blockley, Cree and Co.129 was asked to act as an
assessor for the company.130 Cree was asked to be assessor again on July 15th 1907, when the
case was being heard again as was Quatermaine and a new lawyer, a Mr. Reynolds.131
An issue in this case was who had the right to dig on government land and at what tax
rate. The Imperial Ottoman Government was bound by the capitulations to abide by certain
rules, but the local Administrative councils did not have to observe them if they could get away
with it. The same issue arose with tithes, which were set by the capitulatory agreements at 1/10th
of the value of the good and were typically paid in kind. Frangakis-Syrett notes that licorice,
since it grows wild, was not originally subjected to tithes. However, as it became a lucrative
export, MacAndrews and Forbes was willing to pay tithes levied on it.132 This negotiation shows
that the Western company and the Ottoman state were willing to compromise and work together
for both of their benefits. That does not mean, however, that MacAndrews and Forbes would not
complain about having to pay the tithes. They constantly tried to renegotiate the rates of the
tithes with MacAndrews and Forbes arguing that “The rates fixed for the payment of tithe on the
three grades of licorice root, in cash, is out of all proportion to the cost of this article, for, if
piasters 200 per kilo is levied on the ordinary quality then it would mean that the real original
cost of this article would be piasters 1,000. As the real price of 1,000 kilos of licorice root is
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piasters 100 this estimation made by the Illustrious Vilayet is evidently the result of an error.”133
MacAndrews and Forbes was well aware of the trade conditions and like any corporation was
trying to limit its tax burden. The Ottoman State, like any state, was also aware of the tax codes
but sought to maximize its tax revenue.
Tax disputes, work stoppages, and licorice seizures made 1906 a litigious year for
MacAndrews and Forbes. They complained that “according to the ‘Tax Regulations Tariff’ the
root is classed as agricultural produce and as such the Tax should be paid in kind either from the
peasants or from the merchants…”134 The tax issue was a complicated one and MacAndrews and
Forbes petitioned Hürner when one of their lighters was held up at Jezirah, on the Tigris River,
on its way to Basra over tax issues in April of 1906.135 MacAndrews and Forbes asked Hürner to
intervene with the Vali of Baghdad in their favor. The company asked Hürner to give the Vali a
letter that certified that they paid their taxes in the Kaza of Hillah on November 14 of 1905. The
tax was 6,000 piasters of what they termed Government Tax and 300 piasters of Public
Instruction tax on a crop of 300,000 kilos of licorice, but the firm met “numerous obstacles at the
hands of cameleers” that delayed the progress of the shipment.136 By this, MacAndrews and
Forbes was arguing that the licorice in question was actually from another season, but was slow
in getting to market. The Ottoman officials were suspicious of this and were asserting that it was
not from another season. Further delays occurred, and when the root was in Kut, MacAndrews
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and Forbes asked the local Mudür for a Tax Cochan – a tax receipt, certifying that tax had
already been paid on that particular produce – but he refused, saying that he did not accept the
validity of their original tax receipt.137 The Mal Mudür of Koot, Mejid Effendi, decided to stop
the lighter full of their licorice – MacAndrews and Forbes insisted that the root was dug and paid
for under one period of iltizam, the Mudür insisted it was from another; the tax had not been
paid.138 The Mudür referred the matter to the local Defterdar of finance inquiring what the proper
way to proceed would be and that was the decision they were waiting on and hoping Hürner and
the Vali could expedite.139 In the meantime, MacAndrews and Forbes was ordered to stop
digging licorice in the area altogether.140A follow up letter from MacAndrews and Forbes says
that they were confident that the lighter was now on the move and that the Vali had ordered an
inquiry into the situation and that the Vali would clearly see the validity of the MacAndrews and
Forbes tax documentation, at least according to MacAndrews and Forbes.141
Unfortunately for MacAndrews and Forbes, the lighter was not on the move, although
there was an investigation under way. In order to avoid further delay, MacAndrews and Forbes
proposed paying the tax again as a deposit for the government to hold.142 Yet as of May 10, even
though the committee of inquiry had made their new evaluation of the stopped licorice, the
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licorice remained in Kut and the work order was clearly attached to the issue, a further
punishment to induce MacAndrews and Forbes to pay. As for the halt to digging operations that
was ordered, a May 10th communication indicated that the work stoppage spread to encompass
another Kaza, the Hillah Kaza. A distinction arose there in Hillah, where the land in question
was, according to MacAndrews and Forbes, privately owned tapu registered land, versus the
government owned and tax farmed lands in the Kut Kaza. According to MacAndrews and
Forbes, the Ottoman government was arguing that, on government tax farmed land, the state had
the right to regulate work and who could dig there and MacAndrews and Forbes had no choice
but to respect that. However, on the privately owned land in Hillah, MacAndrews and Forbes
was incensed that the Ottoman state could seemingly stop work on private land that had been
leased to MacAndrews and Forbes, “for a three year period of which more than two years remain
still to run.”143 The firm did hope that since the licorice that had been seized was appraised by
the commission of inquiry, digging could resume in the Kut Kaza. The petition sent to the Porte
reveals a clearly frustrated MacAndrews and Forbes, requesting, “If the authorities do not desire
digging licorice root to be continued in the Koot Caza we beg that the same may be notified to us
in a plain way that we may retrench our expenses and loses as much as possible and defend our
rights.”144 The firm pointed out as well that the mültizam of the area, Shammoon Daniel, had
refused to participate in the commission that was evaluating the licorice. Shammon Daniel was
the individual responsible for remitting tax on licorice dug from that particular land to the
Ottoman State. In their petition, MacAndrews and Forbes pointed out that the work stoppage in
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Kut, threatened the interests of three groups. Obviously the corporation itself would be harmed,
but MacAndrews and Forbes made sure to note that the locals in Iraq would lose wages and more
importantly, the Ottoman Treasury would miss out on the tax revenue.145
In the final analysis, MacAndrews and Forbes elected to merely pay the assessed tax on
the seized licorice, effectively (at least according to them) deciding to pay double tax. Although
the company twice sent a representative to the Ottoman state offices in Baghdad, they twice had
their money refused on minor technicalities. Even with Rudolf Hürner’s cavass in tow, the clerk
for MacAndrews and Forbes was turned away, pockets full of tax money and without the lighter
freed from the state’s grasps. Hoping to free the lighters, MacAndrews and Forbes sent their
petition to the Vali with their messenger who would “deposit with the Serai any sum Your
Excellency chooses to fix against any demand that may be made against us and all we beg is that
our lighters should be allowed to leave for Basrah immediately.”146 By the 16th of May,
MacAndrews and Forbes informed Hürner that no response had come from the Sublime Porte
and they asked him to present the Vali, formally, with four questions, concerning MacAndrews
and Forbes’ right to extract licorice in Kut and Hillah, and how the investigation into the stopped
licorice’s tax payment was proceeding.147The Ottoman state was able to use its leverage to
effectively increase taxes on MacAndrews and Forbes. Taxes that MacAndrews and Forbes
proved eager to pay. MacAndrews and Forbes strategy, in all of these cases, seems to have been
simple: argue as much as possible and then pay.
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In August of 1906, MacAndrews and Forbes was wary of shipping any licorice out of the
Ottoman Empire. They wrote that “We have considerable stocks of licorice on the Euphrates,
and although the transport season is fast approaching, we do not feel safe in making our
arrangements for the carrying of our goods until the Vilayet reply to the above mentioned
petition, and, in such, a manner as to relieve us of any doubt as to their desire to continue their
policy of interference with the freedom of transport, in order that they may force us to pay tax
twice over the same goods.”148 It became increasingly unclear for MacAndrews and Forbes as to
who ordered the work stoppage and seizures that had been taken against them. Were these
actions sanctioned by the Vilâyet of Baghdad or only by their local representatives?
MacAndrews and Forbes felt their most effective strategy was compromise, likely because they
did not have a strong case and, whether they realized it or not, their local competitors were as
sophisticated and adept as they were. MacAndrews and Forbes pointed out that delays were
hurting both sides, “Owing to this state of affairs, the Government is losing its share (i.e. tithe),
and the company is suffering much loss. For these reasons we cannot believe that this
prohibition is authorized by the Vilayet and beg for the necessary explanations if it is.”149
It emerged that the local government ordered the work stoppage. Ristatany, a local agent
of MacAndrews and Forbes wrote that “Ground holders and laborers chiefs have strict orders not
to allow us to start work or allow a single arab to dig root and before these orders are withdrawn
by the local authorities, I do not see how I can open stations. The Caza even refuse to recognize
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me as Agent of the Company and say they only know the Tax farmer.”150 Additionally,
MacAndrews and Forbes wrote that “You will see that the Government [Ottoman] still adopts
the practice of prohibiting the commerce in licorice root and we beg you to make strong
representations to H.E. the Vali against this illegal action on the part of the Authorities which
amounts to a breach of the Capitulations between the United States of America and the Ottoman
Empire in as far as the principle of free commerce is concerned.”151 MacAndrews and Forbes
protested that these actions amounted to a violation of the trade treaties that governed American
and Ottoman commerce, although this grandstanding seems to have been merely another
strategy, perhaps overused, in their negotiating style.
Ultimately, MacAndrews and Forbes decided to pay the tax. They sent their
representative, Haji Hamed, to pay the tax on licorice in Hillah, presumably on the licorice they
argued they had already paid for.152 In this instance, the Ottoman State, via the Kaymakam of
Hillah, accepted the tax. MacAndrews and Forbes complained that the normal tithe, which had
already been supplemented with an additional 2.5% additional tithe for the Department of Public
Instruction, was now being augmented with a further tithe. This additional tithe would be an
additional 6% added to the original tithe amount. Identified as “Tehjizat [Teçizet] Oscarieh” this
tax was intended to help fund the Ottoman military.153 The tax was paid, in order to ensure that
their merchandise was not stopped or sequestered. The situation was eventually decided in their
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favor and the money was promised to be refunded by the Ottoman officials. Haji Hamed, agent
for MacAndrews and Forbes transported licorice overland through the Kaza of Jezirah. Due to
official misunderstanding or extortion, Haji Hamed paid additional taxes on the licorice. After
protest, the sum of 6,898 piasters that was levied on 172,406 okes of licorice root was refunded
to the company. The Ottoman Governor-General refunded the tax paid despite blaming it on
Haji Hamed, who he accused of having “failed to give the necessary information to the local
authorities in accordance with usual practice and regulations…”154
The Kaymakam of Azizieh relented in December of 1906 and allowed MacAndrews and
Forbes to resume digging in the area of Azizieh and Jezirah. The Kaymakam however, issued
orders to the local Arabs that they could not trade with MacAndrews and Forbes unless
MacAndrews and Forbes paid their tithe taxes in cash. The agents of MacAndrews and Forbes,
De Bono (Azizieh) and Seyd Allowee (Jezirah), the United States consular cavass and A.E.C.
Bird155 visited the Kaymakam of Azizieh.156 Bird argued that MacAndrews and Forbes had been
a good customer for licorice in Baghdad for three years. The meeting proved fruitful, the
Kaymakam telling them that there was no prohibition against digging for licorice root. They
were also informed that the tax rate of 200, 300 and 400 piasters on the different qualities of
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licorice had been a mistake – the correct rate was 40, 60 and 80157 piasters respectively.158 It was
the local administrative council that set these rates and the condition that tax must be paid as the
green root was pulled from the ground. Bird proposed a different tax system, wherein the tax of
1/5th would daily be paid in kind (in green root), which would then be purchased back from the
government at the rate the root was purchased from the Arab diggers. The Kaymakam countered
that everyone else had agreed to pay the tax directly in cash and that if MacAndrews and Forbes
refused, they would not be allowed to dig again. The Kaymakam later said that all licorice
would be taxed at a 40 piasters rate in cash.159 Bird supposedly went to check on the
Kaymakam’s claims of overseeing the taxation system and the cooperation of the local
merchants. He allegedly found Ahmed Bin Fwaili, the agent of Abdul Khader Khedery
apparently evading the tax and there was no government official present.160
Following the abovementioned meeting, Khedery Pasha brought an official complaint
against MacAndrews and Forbes.161 MacAndrews and Forbes denied any knowledge of the
alleged event and their supposed participation in court proceedings concerning a supposed
sequestration of Khedery’s licorice. MacAndrews and Forbes qualified their absolute dismissal,
arguing that it was root that had been sequestered from Petros ibn Yusuf and 45 tons, not
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Khedery Pasha’s claimed 120 tons.162 Khedery, in his complaint, accused MacAndrews and
Forbes of trying to “monopolize the licorice root trade in Baghdad and it’s neighborhood…”163
Khedery accused the company of acting against him through “their factotum, Michael, and their
attorney at law, Abdul Jabaar Effendi…”164 Khedery’s protest was also signed by his attorney,
Habib bin Mohamed Ameer, second clerk at the Court of First Instance and Khudairi bin
Mohamed, a public notary. MacAndrews and Forbes lost this case and had their root sequestered
by the Ottoman authorities.165 The sequestration was lifted though, due to improper Ottoman
procedure during the seizure of the root and when MacAndrews and Forbes paid a deposit to
guarantee it.166
In 1907, Ottoman officials again interfered in order to stop Arabs from working for
MacAndrews and Forbes. These were workers that had already been paid. They received
advances for the licorice that they were to dig, but were not permitted to dig for MacAndrews
and Forbes by the Ottoman State. They were specifically prohibited from working the lands of
Ramanieh and Khsema (possibly Kesaba) in the Caza of Jezireh.167 What might not be
immediately apparent, was that nowhere in these cases did MacAndrews and Forbes insist that
the Arab workers were on strike, or locked out and forced to remain idle. They were prohibited
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“from digging and delivering licorice root to us…”168 There was no indication that these Arab
workers were not working for native merchants or another foreign merchant. It could very well
be that this arrangement was working doubly to their advantage – they received a cash advance
from MacAndrews and Forbes and then actually have sold the licorice to another bidder. In this
case, the Arabs were prevented from working for MacAndrews and Forbes but also refused to
pay the cash advances back to the company. MacAndrews and Forbes applied to the Ottoman
Government to get soldiers in order to recover their money.169 Ultimately the request was
refused, the Ottoman officials advising MacAndrews and Forbes to take a more civilized course
and take this affair to the court system.170 MacAndrews and Forbes also had to content with
merchants that were well connected with the Ottoman State. Abdul Aziz Effendi was perfectly
positioned to profit from the various troubles MacAndrews and Forbes had in Jezireh and
Azizieh. Abdul Aziz Effendi was a former Ottoman official turned merchant. MacAndrews and
Forbes accused Abdul Aziz of prejudicing the Ottoman officials against them and cited him as
having “caused the Mac Andrews and Forbes Company to have considerable difficulty with the
authorities in the districts of Jezireh and Azizieh and is, evidently, a person who would not
refrain from resorting to underhanded methods in order to gain desired ends.”171
Another issue concerning tax was when tax was levied. The Ottomans argued on several
occasions that taxes were due when the root was dug, and MacAndrews and Forbes continually
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argued that it was due at the time of export. According to MacAndrews and Forbes, fresh green
licorice root was not a viable commodity, it must be dried and pressed and processed before
shipping. Licorice lost 50-65% of its weight in the process.172 This was also why the Ottoman
government wanted taxes paid in cash and MacAndrews and Forbes wanted it levied in kind. If
it were levied in kind, it could be levied at any time, without effect or advantage given to when it
was levied. Ultimately, the Baghdad Vilâyet council acknowledged that “the Government tax on
licorice root is to be collected when the product leaves port…” and the Council would contact
the Kaymakams in question (Hillah, Samara and Jezirah) in order to correct this
misunderstanding.173 This was a disconnect between government officials and perhaps shows
the rogue actions of lower officials. This issue was ultimately decided in the favor of
MacAndrews and Forbes.
In January of 1907, officials in the district of Hillah levied an extra 20 piasters per 1,000
kilogram on licorice that MacAndrews and Forbes was transporting by camel caravan.174
Ultimately, this was decided in their favor, or as stated by MacAndrews and Forbes “in a manner
satisfactory to our interests.”175 The Kaymakam of Jezireh was transferred to be the Kaymakam
of Kut, although MacAndrews and Forbes did not draw a link between the events, they do state
that they hope this means that the previous situation of their licorice being held in Jezireh will
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“soon be adjusted.”176
Piracy was another problem for MacAndrews and Forbes in Iraq. In May of 1907, unrest
near Amara led to the plunder and capture of one of their ships on the river and “In consequence
of this, all navigation by native sailing craft between Baghdad and Basra is at a standstill…”177
Piracy and the perception of Arabs being prone to piracy and brigandage was a theme running
through British and American diplomatic and business correspondence. There was no framing of
the situation involved, and if we solely read the correspondence between MacAndrews and
Forbes and the State Department, the context of this unrest would be overlooked. The unrest
near Amara was caused by severe flooding in mid and late April of 1907. Magelssen noted in a
letter to the American consul in Beirut, G. Bie Ravndal that, “Great damage has been done to
growing crops between the Tigris and the Persian frontier where there has also been considerable
loss of life. The damage is estimated at one million Sterling.”178
Despite their clashes, on several occasions MacAndrews and Forbes asked the Ottoman
State for help in collecting debts and righting perceived injustices. This cooperation occurred in
the same manner as the conflicts, and alongside of them, as negotiations between competing
businesses. MacAndrews and Forbes presented their arguments regarding taxation and work
stoppages to the Ottoman Government by expounding on the merits of the licorice trade, “It is an
undertaking equally helpful and beneficial to the Arabs of their respective tribes, owners of
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lighters, and others, and to the finance department.”179 MacAndrews and Forbes argued as well
that Western merchants, rather than the Ottoman subjects had the true interests of the empire in
mind. MacAndrews and Forbes wrote that Western merchants had spent a great amount of
money improving the industry and that these investments increased the “chances of profits to the
poorest of favor, and to everyone, are being offered.”180 MacAndrews and Forbes also used the
Tanzimat era infrastructure, particularly the court system to press claims or counter claims
against them. MacAndrews and Forbes also appealed directly to the Ottoman State for help. In
May of 1905, MacAndrews and Forbes encountered problems with camel caravans. They had
advanced money to camel owners for the transport of licorice from the Hillah and Mussayeb
districts on the Euphrates River. The Tigris from Baghdad to Basra is navigable, but the
Euphrates is frequently not, thus, they were forced to rely on caravans for transport. They hired
100 camels from Kadim bin Khamis al-Battawee and 150 camels from Dieb al-Abbas, but, both
caravan leaders refused to carry the load stating that if they did, their camels and employees
would be forcefully conscripted by the Ottoman government for the Hedjaz Expedition. In this
instance, MacAndrews and Forbes asked the Ottoman government to assist them in collecting
debts from these camel drivers. They also requested official help in dealing with an Ottoman
Telegraph Director, in charge of a local telegraphic office, accusing the official in question,
Nowrooz Effendi of always asking “for liquor or money from the clerk in charge of our business
there [Azizieh], and on being refused, it leads to threats and leveling false allegations…”181
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Additionally, Rizooki, an Ottoman subject and employee of MacAndrews and Forbes in Azizieh
had been imprisoned by the same allegedly slanderous Mudür Nowrooz Effendi. Nowrooz was
also accused of using an Ottoman soldier, Zaptieh Mahmood Rotha to carry out his nefarious
plans, which included harassing any agent for MacAndrews and Forbes that was apparently
unwilling to pay him bribes in cash and liquor that would help him engage in “pleasure and
merriment…”182 The veracity of the allegations are not important; what is significant is that
MacAndrews and Forbes enlisted the Ottoman State to help them with this issue.
MacAndrews and Forbes applied to the Ottomans for help collecting small debts from
some of the Arab population that they had advanced money to, but had not received licorice
from.183 MacAndrews and Forbes used the Mercantile Court, an institution that Khalaf was
using against them, to try to recover debts from Ottoman subjects. Petros bin Yusif, a Baghdadi
merchant from the Karieh Bashi quarter, was sued for 8062.97 piasters by MacAndrews and
Forbes. This was the value of licorice root that MacAndrews and Forbes believed Petros Yusif,
referred to earlier in this chapter, owed them, based on a January 1906 contract.184 MacAndrews
and Forbes won the case and in lieu of the sum of money, they seized 45 tons of Petros Yusif’s
stockpiled licorice for their own.185
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MacAndrews and Forbes head office demonstrated that they were willing to pay bribes to
overturn decisions made in the Mercantile Courts. The head office in Izmir wrote in the stilted
language of a telegram that, “Decision of Baghdad Administrative Council stating that foreign
merchants have no right of ownership licorice root constitutes violation of Capitulations. Tithe
rate is uniform for whole empire.” But, they seemed willing, on the tax issue, to compromise,
“Would prefer arranging amicably but cannot forego rights and consider forty in cash out of
question. Would give half that.”186 The Ottoman state repeatedly pushed the boundaries of
taxation with MacAndrews and Forbes and the latter, doubtlessly tried the same, even to a
greater extent, for despite protests, MacAndrews and Forbes typically paid any additional taxes
levied on licorice. The Sublime Porte also portrayed themselves as advocates for the locals in
their insistence, or at least petitions, that would allow locals to dig licorice before Western
merchants, yet MacAndrews and Forbes could equally ask for help collecting debts from camel
drivers and Ottoman citizens. Overall, the interactions between MacAndrews and Forbes
demonstrate the competition and cooperation between Western businesses and the Ottoman State
and these interactions illuminate the nuances, the complexity and ultimately the considerable
sophistication present in that relationship.

Global Trends: Progress in Sanitation
The increasing, globalizing trade of the 19th century brought increasing attention and,
ultimately, regulatory scrutiny from Western governments and businesses. In line with this
global trend, there was a growing focus on increasing U.S. exports by the State Department, the
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U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. businessmen. There was also an expanded interest
concerning standardizing hygienic conditions in which the commodities were produced. The new
focus was reflected in the policies of the State Department in Baghdad and Basra. As of July 1st,
1906, the previously unpaid position of Vice Consul became compensated with a $2000 salary
per annum.187 And on July 23rd, 1906, the mission to the Ottoman Empire was elevated to the
status of Embassy by an act of the United States Congress.188 Rudolf Hürner’s long tenure in
Baghdad ended on August 16th, 1906. Hürner never received an official salary. The office was
temporarily taken over by the British Consul in Baghdad, Major Ramsey, who, as was previously
mentioned, felt Hürner lacked professionalism and was illegally pocketing fees.189 The new
attitude that American consuls would bring to the job, would be evident in the more detailed and
focused reports of the new American consul, Magelssen. Another example of the increased
attention being paid to the Ottoman Empire was the mission of the Department of Agriculture.
David Fairchild was the Agricultural Explorer in Charge of Foreign Exploration and worked for
the Bureau of Plant Industry of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. His enviable mission was to
travel around the world and find plants that might increase the agricultural production of the
United States. In Iraq, Fairchild saw similar conditions to inland Southern California and
Arizona – low rainfall but high potential for irrigation from nearby rivers. David Fairchild
himself visited Basra and Baghdad when Hürner was in office, but corresponded with Magelssen
in order to obtain samples of different date varietals. Magelssen collected samples of insects,

187

NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xiii, Subject: Compensation, Bird,
MacAndrews and Forbes, Baghdad, August 15, 1906.
188
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xiii. Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad,
August14, 1906 to Dickenson, Baghdad.
189
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xiii, Subject: Consular Service. August 21,
1906.
164

found different kinds of dates and fledgling date trees to send to Fairchild and suggested that he
would travel about to find different varieties in “Mandalay, Khorasan, Hillah, Sindieh etc..” He
described it as “a service quite different than anything ever undertaken by me...”190 Magelssen,
unlike Hürner, received a salary for the work he did as Vice Consul and was not a merchant
worried about the day to day operations of his business.
Dates were significant enough in 1903 America for the publication of a bulletin written
by Fairchild for the U.S. Department of Agriculture entitled Persian Gulf Dates and Their
Introduction to America. The bulletin was both an introduction to the fruit and its introduction to
the United State where “Date growing in Arizona is rapidly passing the experimental stage.”191
Fairchild’s report, which was quite detailed, mentioned that the date palm plantations also
contained alfalfa (djet), wheat, barley, grapevines and “fruit trees, such as fig, jujubes and
pomegranate are also frequently seen about the houses, and thrive very well.”192 Fairchild noted
that in the 1880’s, European merchants made large profits in the date packing industry in Iraq.
Fairchild asserted that in the last few years, Iraqi Jews had taken over the packing industry
completely. However, this assertion was made by a European merchant and argued that they
operated at a loss in order to keep Europeans out. The profit margins in this trade were slim
according to Fairchild, and it was more lucrative to be the owner of a date plantation, making
profits of between 2% and 10% of the estimated value of the estate. Taxation was about 10–15%
of income of the plantation owner and then trees were also taxed, the rate depending on location
– 2 piasters (8 US cents at the time) per tree per annum at Baghdad, 1.25 piasters per tree per
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annum at Amara and 15 to 180 piasters per one hundred trees per annum in Basra. Fairchild also
discussed ways in which Iraq’s agricultural productivity could be increased and the costs
involved. Fairchild argued that 1.2 million acres of land, if irrigated in Iraq, would become prime
agricultural land. An investment of £8,000,000 would bring in a yearly revenue of £2,000,000. A
very sanguine assessment, but one in line with the arguments of William Willcocks before him.
In the preface to the book, A. J. Peters, the Botanist in Charge of the seed introductions to the
United States acknowledged Fairchild’s debt to the hard work of several American Consular
agents, including Hürner and A. MacKirdy (Muscat), and recorded Fairchild’s thanks for “the
unusual courtesies and aid of H.P. Chalk, of Bassorah.”193
A 1904 cholera outbreak allowed the increased focus of the State Department on
sanitation and disease prevention to be set in motion. Although there were earlier outbreaks
during this period, it is not until 1904 that questions were raised about whether it was acceptable
to export agricultural produce during an outbreak. Although date exports were ultimately
allowed, it took considerable debate and time to reach that conclusion. Rather than wait, Hills
Brothers decided to ship their dates to the United States via Hong Kong, eluding any restrictions
that might apply to a direct shipment.194 Fairchild’s bulletin also called attention to unsanitary
date packing conditions as early as 1903. Fairchild wrote “the conditions in the packing sheds
and the personal uncleanliness of the men, women and children who put up the dates are enough
to disgust a sensitive person and to prevent his ever eating packed dates again without having
them washed.”195 Ultimately, by 1915, the American Consul would be proposing sanitary
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regulations be put in place for the entire date industry in Basra, regulating it at its source.
Brissel, the U.S. Baghdad Consul in 1915, reported that Hills Brothers remained the dominant
corporation in the trade and that packing was done by native labor with little interference and no
supervision by the Ottoman authorities. The activity was performed by both men and women
who worked in temporary sheds of corrugated tin in supposedly filthy conditions. Brissel
recommended that a doctor at one of the American Missions in Basra, Dr. Bennett, be put in
charge of sanitary regulations and that the following be imposed: 1. Firms would be subject to
inspection and inspection status would be noted on shipping invoice. 2. There would be an
unnamed fee charged for inspection. 3. The date packers must use clean water. 4. Workers
must wear shoes in the establishment and these shoes are not to be worn outside. Workers must
have clean clothes and are required to wear overalls, aprons or similar garments that completely
covered their ordinary clothes. These outer clothes were to be washed in hot water twice each
week. 5. Workers must be cleanly. 6. Workers must provide a certificate of health to
inspectors…no certificate, no work. 7. The floors were to be reasonably clean. 8. Foot
washing was to be done in a separate place.196 9. Workers will be required to wash hands after
using toilet.197 C.F. Marvin, the Acting Secretary of Agriculture approved these measures and
recommended their implementation after the war ended.198 The Vice Consuls were thus moving
past their basic functions and becoming involved in sanitary-related regulations of local
industries that traded with the American market.
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American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant
In 1911, a group of Americans came together as the American Chamber of Commerce for
the Levant in the attempt to promote American trade in the Ottoman Empire. This group
included G. Bie Ravndall, and Oscar Heizer, (a future VC of Baghdad), A.T. Chester of the
Chester plan, and James Levack, the current (1911) VC of Baghdad.199 The group published a
quarterly for the American business community, including the publication Levant Trade Review.
The Levant Trade Review listed importers and exporters from each Ottoman city, organized by
commodity. By 1914, the Chamber seems to have had offices in both the United States and
Istanbul and had 572 members.200 In Baghdad, there were several importers ready and willing to
trade with American merchants for items ranging from wines and liquors to stationary.201 In the
list of members, the publication included merchants from several countries and from several
Ottoman cities – only Istanbul, Salonica and Izmir had more members than the 30 listed for
Baghdad.202 This list contained British companies – Lynch and Blockley, Cree, and Co.;
German – Puttnam and Berk and Austrian, with the Austro-Oriental trading company being a
joint stock company that was formed in Vienna in 1905 to promote trade between Austria
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.203 Clearly, a publication like this, put out by an organization
like the ACCL was a step forward for American commerce in the Ottoman Empire and in unison
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with what other countries were doing contemporaneously. The ACCL was composed of both
businessmen and American diplomatic officials. This is a reflection of both the increasing
professionalism of the State Department in the Ottoman Empire and the growing American
interest in exporting to the Ottoman Empire.
American export trade, at the beginning of this period, was limited by the foresight of
American exporters and the lack of information available to them. Before the formation of the
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, businesses that hoped to encourage trade
between the United States and Baghdad/Basra, would do so on their own initiative by contacting
the American consuls in those cities. This was standard practice at the time and these inquiries
occasionally included samples of their wares and/or catalogues. Between 1894 and 1907, these
requests came from manufacturers and professionals ranging from Machinery to Sporting Goods
to legal services. In the calendar year of 1904, these inquiries peaked at a rate of slightly over 3
per month. Overall there were 233 of these inquiries in a 150 month period. By far the largest
category were publishers, who, with 54 inquiries, were responsible for almost 25% of these
missives. Some sought information on trade and on selling their goods, i.e. magazines and trade
reference books in the Iraqi marketplace and others sought to market their magazines to the
largely illiterate and non-English speaking Baghdadi population. The second largest category
was that of non-irrigating machinery at almost 14% of all inquiries. Third place went to general
import-export agents who hoped to be put in touch with local merchants. Many of the other
requests were for items that Baghdad had absolutely no need for. A city that lacked electricity
received 9 requests, or 4% of total requests from light bulb and lighting equipment
manufacturers. 13 requests or nearly 6% concerned automobiles and bicycles, two forms of
transportation that neither the general population nor Western merchants used or could afford
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and another 1% or two requests attempted to sell tires for those vehicles.204 Much of this period,
coincided with the tenure of a Rudolph Hürner. When requests came in that seemed reasonable
to Hürner, his response was typically “the firm Rudolf Hürner in this city is ready to entertain
business with you in all kind of goods suitable for our market, as well as for exports of products
like: Wool, carpets, dates, casings, gum…”205 Therefore, it can be argued that, instead of a
sincere effort to promote American and Ottoman trade in Baghdad, Hürner most likely had a
sincere interest to promote his own interests in regards to this trade, but that as the U.S. state
department professionalized and after the founding of the ACCL, U.S. trade interests grew
increasingly sophisticated.
By examining the conflicts between Western merchants and the Ottoman Empire this
chapter demonstrates several key points. First, it would appear that Ottoman officials, on both
the Vilâyet level and the smaller Kaza level, on the whole, and especially when it was in their
best interest, cooperated with local notables against Western merchants. In the Baghdad area, this
collaboration tended to be with tax farmers. In Basra, local date growers and the Ottoman Vali
conspired to get better prices for the date growers. However, the Ottoman State also cooperated
with Western merchants. These instances suggest tentative conclusions as to the degree of
centralization within the Ottoman Empire. With the substantial power and agency displayed by
local notables, the ability of tax farmers in Baghdad and date palm owners in Basra to utilize the
central government for their own personal gain makes the periphery of the Ottoman Empire look
distant from the core. However, these notables were not acting on their own either and to
maximize their own benefit they would have had to collaborate with the Ottoman power
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structure, which, as far as earlier power sharing is concerned does represent an increase in
Ottoman centralization. The Ottoman State and Western merchants likewise cooperated and
competed, further complicating the dynamics and implying that Hills Brothers and MacAndrews
and Forbes were additional, and aggressive players in an already competitive marketplace.
Secondly, in line with the idea of Ottoman centralization, some Tanzimat era reforms
were definitely in place and at play in these conflicts. The court system became the location for
disputes to play out and from the variability of the results there does seem to be at least some
impartiality to the courts. The Provincial Reform Law of 1864 was also present, both in the
multitude of Kaymakam that appear and in the instance where a financial case is referred to a
local official in charge of finance, as was specified in the Provincial Reform Law. However,
other reforms such as direct taxation do not seem to have been integrated and Baghdad and Basra
continued to rely largely on iltizam for revenue collection. Other administrative reforms like
local councils and organization also seem to have been implemented, however, prohibitions
against monopolistic practices seem to have been ignored. In fact, they were ignored both by the
Ottomans and by Western merchants, with most accusations of monopolistic practices being
levied against Western merchants.
Third, the Ottoman state used a variety of methods to frustrate and exploit Western
merchants. When we examine the date and licorice trade there is little or no evidence of
imperialism. These two trade items, in particular the way they were traded between the Ottomans
and the United States, benefitted both the Western merchants and the Ottoman Empire greatly.
Methods such as attaching extra tax to items, forcing work shut downs, seizing goods, arguing
over when an item was taxed all seemed to work to the benefit of the Ottomans. American
merchants preferred to pay rather than haggle and risk delays or loss of goods. This relationship
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shows that both sides were profiting from the trade and willing to do business in a variety of
ways.
Fourthly, in the date and licorice trades, the Ottoman State collaborated with local
notables. This collaboration implies, to a greater extent in Basra, which was also further away
from Istanbul than Baghdad, that more power existed at the periphery of the empire in local
form. Although this was tempered quite a bit in Baghdad and the latter city was fairly well
integrated with Istanbul, it was less so in Basra. Basra was, the evidence suggested, significantly
less integrated with Baghdad. The Naqib acted with a great deal of independence and was the
most powerful figure involved in the lucrative export trade in dates. However, he was operating
in and profiting from Ottoman governance and profited from stretching the limits of Ottoman
control, rather than trying to break free from it.
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Chapter 4
Crime and American Cultural Agents
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This chapter examines criminal activity perpetrated against and by the Western
community in Ottoman Baghdad and Basra. These instances of robbery, brigandage, piracy, and
attempted smuggling fit into the analytical paradigm of conflict and cooperation used in this
thesis. Therefore, while the previous chapters looked at conflicts and cooperation amongst and
between Westerners and Ottomans, this chapter takes the same approach to instances of crime;
crimes which often also had economic undertones. Westerners worked and lived as part of
Ottoman society and as such, were targeted for these crimes. American and British economic and
cultural agents were viewed as competitors within the Ottoman milieu, rather than as impervious
imperialists. Western businesses functioned as tax farmers, amongst their other economic
activities and Western individuals were expected to behave within societal norms. Ottoman
individuals, as well as the state, were able to utilize American authorities and/or Americans
themselves in order to curb the excesses of their cultural agents both in the realm of archaeology
and missionary activity. Of course, these are only instances and a more complete set of data
would elucidate/or strengthen the above statements. However, there is enough evidence to allow
for such statements to be made, even if in a qualified manner. These instances or case studies, are
based in original sources and are not known in the historiography on Baghdad and Basra and
their environs in this period.
The instances of crime recorded in the archive are demonstrative of several key points in
Ottoman historiography. The robberies and piracy that occurred in the period show the insecurity
of the Ottoman hinterland and the relative prevalence of brigandage. Although these instances
occurred in a specific part of the Ottoman Empire, they were certainly not limited to Iraq at the
time, nor were they limited to any particular part of the globe in this period. The literature
records that brigandage occurred throughout the Ottoman Empire during this period and indeed
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throughout the world. For Ottoman Iraq, as was often the case elsewhere, this insecurity was a
product of the non-absorption of manpower into the local and world economy at large. This
excess manpower, the low capitalization of agriculture and the uneven results of Ottoman
attempts at sedentarizing a nomadic population, created an atmosphere wherein brigandage was
difficult to control. Around Basra, piracy was a problem, particularly for the British community
due to their prevalence in the shipping industry. Piratical attacks on British ships occurred in this
period in and around Basra and were reflective of uncertain economic conditions globally, and
the fact that Westerners, as participants in the local economic system, were targeted as much as
anyone else was. At first, these attacks in Basra were small and the attacks seemed to have been
largely ignored. However, the murder of a British ship captain triggered a panic on the part of the
British consul in Basra, who saw the attacks as indicative of powerful threats facing entrenched
British interests. British interests in the regions had, as Hala Fattah notes, been establishing
themselves economically in Iraq as early as 1798.1 The literature concerning British shipping in
Iraq demonstrates the importance of the British for the international trade and their hegemonic
status locally. Their integration into the Ottoman economic system ensured that they, like
everyone else, would experience some the effects of piracy.
While many of the crimes researched here were committed against Westerners, some
were committed by Westerners. American archaeologists defied Ottoman laws in their attempts
to smuggle antiquities out of the Ottoman Empire. While antiquities had been a substantial
export item from the Ottoman Empire to the U.S., a shift in attitude took place on the part of the
Ottoman State. Antiquities came to be seen as valuable artifacts and a point of pride; their sale
was first regulated and then criminalized. This represented a maturation in the functioning of the
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Ottoman state as it sought, in this period, both to expand its regulatory control and maintain the
ability to craft, via the creation and curation of the Ottoman museum and artifacts, its own
legacy. Deringil argues that a major thrust of Abdul Hamid II’s long tenure was the creation of a
more centralized and far reaching state. The changes in the Ottoman Empire’s reach of
governance were parallels of concurrent changes in Europe.2 Although Deringil does not
specifically discuss archaeology and the state’s new focus on antiquities, it fits in with many of
the changes, such as the creation of emblems and formal symbols for the Ottoman State, the
focus on historicizing the Sultanate as the inheritor of the Roman and Byzantine tradition and the
canonization of Istanbul.3 Bahrani, Çelik, and Eldem contextualize the growing interest in
archeology with the urban planning initiatives in Istanbul beginning in the late 1860s.4 The
period also saw a renewed obsession with early Ottoman history, which was recreated through
elaborate state functions.5 The new focus on antiquities was spurred onward by European
imperialist interest, both by creating an interest in controlling the documents of ancient history
and in resisting colonial encroachment.6 These changes were reflected in Ottoman legal codes. In
1874 antiquities came under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and regulations were
created for the allotting of finds at the excavations, with at least 1/3 going to the Ottoman State.
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A school was created to train archeologists in 1875, and further legislative changes gave the
Ottoman state full control over antiquities that were excavated.7
Beyond the occurrence of crime, the Ottoman State, in this time, also expanded its
control and oversight over foreign missionaries. By trying to regulate the increasingly bold
advances of these cultural agents, the Ottoman State was asserting its sovereignty in the
periphery of its empire. They were also, quite rightly so at times, protecting zealous foreigners
from dangerous situations. On occasion, such as the Miss Melton affair,8 American missionaries
that ventured significantly outside of the established and protected travel areas were attacked and
even killed. By protecting the missionaries discussed in this chapter, the Ottoman State avoided
the lengthy threats, reprimands and demands issued by the United States government.9 They also
avoided the social disruptions and complaints filed by locals against the foreign missionaries.
According to Deringil, the Ottoman state saw missionaries as both irritating foes and as
exemplars worth imitating.10 Sultan Abdul Hamid II, however, felt that missionaries were the
gravest threat to the Ottoman social order. As this chapter discusses, the Ottoman State used the
threat of an agitated local population to attempt to curb missionary activity.11 Deringil notes that
American missionaries were more irritating than other foreign missionaries because they were
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overzealous late comers, and were seen by the Ottomans as encouraging “nests of sedition”
among the local population and particularly among Armenian populations.12
Finally, the Ottoman State paid special attention to citizens that had acquired American
citizenship and then returned to the Ottoman Empire. At issue, whether in a real or perceived
manner, were allegations of tax fraud and the illegal practicing of trades. Adopting American
citizenship did not adequately protect returning former Ottoman nationals. In fact, Deringil notes
that the Ottoman State paid increasing notice both to any influx of foreign nationals asking for
Ottoman citizenship and to Ottoman subjects seeking to become foreign nationals. The Ottoman
Empire began producing official identity cards in 1885 and over time they required their use for
an increasing array of official purposes. Laws pertaining to how Ottoman subjects obtained
foreign protection became stricter and an 1894 memorandum made it clear that all subjects
seeking to get foreign citizenship needed an official irade, further reflecting the Ottoman
perception that Armenian subjects were abusing the citizenship process.13
According to the sources, in Iraq, travelers who stayed on the secured paths between
Ottoman cities in the Arab provinces were generally safe. For the trip between Baghdad and
Basra, this meant a steamship ride on the Tigris. James Nies, an American Episcopal clergyman
and an expert in Babylonian tablet inscriptions, inquired of the American Vice Consulate in
Baghdad for advice about travelling in Iraq. Nies collected a sizeable amount of antiquities for
Yale University, where they are preserved in the Babylonian Collection. In November of 1904,
already in Basra, James Nies wrote to Hürner, to inquire where he and his wife, the daughter of
the President of the New York Chamber of Commerce, could find accommodations in Baghdad.
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Nies further requested Hürner’s help in acquiring an “English speaking servant or dragoman who
knows the country and people, as well as a cook.”14 It was Nies’s intention to take his wife to
meet Edgar James Banks and see both his dig site at Bismaya and the other American-led
excavations at Niffur and Babylon. By following the safe and established route and travelling up
from Basra on a steamer with his wife, Nies arrived in Baghdad safely, where he acquired 82 of
the 180 autograph Babylonian tablets in his 1904 collection.15 Hürner’s reply to Nies was not
recorded in the official dispatches; likely he contacted him as a businessman off the official
record and helped provide Nies with the supplies and expertise he required.
Hürner replied to another, similar request in March of 1905. Hürner wrote his reply to
Robert Skinner, the American Consul General in Marseilles who was famous for leading an
American governmental mission to Ethiopia in 1903. Hürner noted that there was one hotel in
Baghdad that could accommodate Western travelers, at a rate of 10 francs per person per day,
although not at the comfort levels to which they might have been accustomed.16 The steamer
accommodations were apparently good, these being on an English steamer (Lynch Brothers or
ETSN) that took passengers from Basra to Baghdad.17 Skinner also asked if it would be “safe
and agreeable” for a woman to undertake this journey.18 Hürner replied that it was “absolutely
safe for a woman, accompanied by her husband, to visit our city…”19 The only thing Hürner
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cautioned was that the harsh summer weather could be difficult and hence urged against coming
during that season. This was a sentiment echoed by Wratislaw, British Consul in Basra, who
wrote comparing a summer season arrival to the “the custom of immersing live shell-fish in
boiling water…unnecessarily harsh.”20
Both of these inquiries and responses concerned the normal modes of travel in Iraq for
Americans – i.e. steamships. These established routes were safe enough even for Western female
travelers, who viewed the prospect with greater anxiety, yet nevertheless would have been
permitted to travel. The countryside, not surprisingly and likely as it would in most places, in the
early 1900’s, demonstrated the limits of governmental control. W.B. Bundschu, a 1904 graduate
of U.C. Berkeley, arrived in Baghdad, intending to ride his horse through the desert to
Damascus.21 Bundschu, travelling alone and with no stated motive but the spirit of adventure,
rode off into the desert. He was promptly robbed, the victim of brigandage. Hürner, who had
advised Bundschu against his trip, was unsympathetic. After asking Hürner for assistance as an
American, Bundschu was told to reapply for his stolen passport before any help could be
provided to him. Furthermore, if he wanted to be protected as an American, he would have had
to follow Ottoman regulations concerning the behavior of foreigners. In particular, Bundschu
had ignored travel restrictions. Had he enquired, Bundschu would have been afforded armed
Ottoman protection. Due to the maverick nature of Bundschu’s actions, the State Department
did not attempt to recover Bundschu’s property or provide him with an indemnity.22
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Another example of the brigandage along the land route to Syria involves Jason Paige.
Paige was an engineer for the University of Chicago dig at Bismaya. On June 7th, 1904 Paige
was traveling from Baghdad to Damascus via Deir with two Ottoman soldier escorts (zaptiye).23
He was traveling in a caravan, along with Hürner’s servant Ali. The caravan was led by the two
Ottoman zaptiye.24 This small group was attacked by brigands. Paige’s account of the attack was
highly critical of the soldiers, because they took up strategic positions and left his baggage
unguarded. One zaptiye was shot in the chest and the other had his horse killed. The brigands
were able to easily purloin Paige’s goods. Paige wrote, ignoring the wounds that the two zaptiye
received, “they made absolutely no attempt to stand and return the fire of the arabs, much less
any attempt to protect or recover my baggage.”25 In the incident, Paige claimed to have had
8835 gold piasters worth of his own affairs stolen, including pajamas, pipes and neckties.26
By the 20th of June, local Ottoman officials had recovered 36 Turkish Lira, 18 Medijieh
and 22 ½ double kraas (kuruş). By July, Hürner had recovered another 97 Turkish Lira from the
Ottoman state, in addition to the previous sum; the Ottoman state eventually provided
compensation that exceeded the amount lost by Paige.27 Despite the protection accorded to
Paige, the Ottoman government paid an indemnity to Paige to cover the loss of his goods.
Clearly, the Ottoman government was working as it should – trying to prevent crime and when

23

NA RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume ix, Rudolf Hürner, US.. Vice Consul, Baghdad,
June 10, 1904 to Ahmed Faizi Pasha, Vali, Baghdad.
24
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume x, Jason Paige, Engineer for University of
Pennsylvania dig at Bismaya, June 13, 1904 to Rudolf Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad.
25
NA, RG 84, Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume x, Jason Paige, Engineer for University of
Pennsylvania dig at Bismaya, June 13, 1904 to Rudolf Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad.
26
NA, RG 84 Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume x, “Contents of Baggage Lost by Jason Paige”
June 15, 1904.
27
NA, RG 84 Consular Posts, Baghdad, Volume xi, Rudolf Hürner, U.S. Vice Consul, Baghdad,
July 17, 1905 to Jason Paige, Engineer for University of Pennsylvania dig at Bismaya.
181

unable to prevent crime, trying to bring about justice for the victims. Brigandage was a problem
worldwide at the time and its existence here, in the Ottoman periphery should not be seen as a
failure of centralizing policies. While it may well have been a byproduct of the settling of tribes
and the disturbance of populations caused by the growth of the world market, it was not unusual
by any means.
The safe passage afforded Westerners between cities on established trade routes,
indicated the ability of the Ottoman State to provide security within certain boundaries.
Baghdad, Basra and the route that Lynch steamers plied the water between the two cities were
protected from acts of brigandage. Outside of urban areas and established trade routes, the level
of security and the ability of the Ottoman state to control its subjects in Iraq dropped
precipitously. It should be noted that Iraqi terrain and geography made it a greater challenge than
it would otherwise have been. In the final analysis, the result of the two robberies, one without
the presence of Ottoman soldiers and one with, was the same. Essentially, the zaptiye’s presence
and, by consequence that of the Ottoman state, was, in this case insufficient to prevent this
attack. However, since the state was engaged and regulations had been followed in one case but
not the other, the outcomes were substantially different. Bundschu, by leaving without an armed
escort, was in violation of the law. The Ottoman state provided Paige, not just with the amount
of goods he claimed to have lost, but significantly more and they did so in a timely manner,
although it is unclear whether the U.S. government and its representatives ever allowed Paige to
fully collect his indemnity.
Brigandage occurred, but did not seem to be particularly widespread and was somewhat
contained in this period. The same was true concerning piracy, particularly the piracy which
occurred near Basra and the Persian Gulf. The attacks appear to have been infrequent; however,
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the murder of Captain Butterworth stirred the British consul in Basra, Francis Crow, into a
revisionist diatribe that placed piracy and insecurity as overwhelming features of the British
experience in Basra. It is perhaps worthwhile to see the murder of Captain John Butterworth in
the same context as perceived threats from German economic interests. While the threat existed
to a certain degree, the level of the threat was elevated and overblown, either out of real anxiety
or a desire to achieve specific goals. These goals would have included encouraging British
investment in the region and an enhanced military presence strictly to keep other nations out. The
British diplomats in Basra were no doubt doing their job correctly when they insisted that Britain
must maintain its status in Basra as the most involved Western nation.
In February of 1914, Butterworth was found beheaded aboard his ship.28 The Raithwiate
Hall, Butterworth’s ship, measured 200 feet by 28 feet,29 and was considered a steam lighter.30
Steam lighters like the Raithwiate Hall could dock in shallow waters, making them vulnerable to
attacks from shore. The British Consul in Basra, Crow, immediately pinned the crime on
unnamed “Arabs,” due to some clothing left at the scene.31 Despite the assertion that it was
“Arabs” who had slipped aboard the ship while it was docked for the night, the crew of the
Raithwiate Hall was placed under immediate arrest.32 According to Ottoman sources, the men
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arrested were two Iranians and two men of unidentified ethnicity/nationality; however the
Ottoman sources did not identify people by ethnicity, but rather, by nationality, which contrasts
with the British usage of ethnic identifiers like “Arab.”33 British commercial interests in Basra
and Baghdad were endangered by violence, as measured in scale to their presence and, perhaps
more importantly, according to their own sources. As the British were the dominant foreign
economic power in Ottoman Basra, threats to their prestige were numerous, and included the
growing actual and perceived incursion of German manufacturing strength and shipping
capability, both of which had the potential to inflict greater harm economically to the British than
piracy did. Nevertheless, the Butterworth murder triggered memories of a litany of pirate attacks
against British interests, including events that took place the previous year in which a small
British ship was attacked by pirates. These two attacks led Crow to conclude, “it appears to us
that piracy is becoming rife in the Shat-al Arab…”34 Crow, to enforce his point, noted three
additional piratical attacks that had been committed against the British since the previous
September.35 These instances set a precedent wherein the boat’s owners were compensated for
the attack, loss of boat and cargo as well as the death of their employees.36
Messrs. Strick, the owners of the Raithwiate Hall, urged His Majesty’s Government to
dispatch a warship in the stated hopes that this would prevent further attacks on British subjects.
British diplomatic officials balked at the proposal, arguing it would, “not likely contribute to the
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discovery of the perpetrators of the present crime or to deter the turbulence of the Arabs.”37
However, Crow continued to strengthen his position rhetorically and expand the threat that he
perceived to the local community. Crow wrote that, “Captain Butterworth’s murder is only a
culminating event in an extraordinary series of outrages against British and British Indian
subjects which have been perpetrated during the last six months. Many British Indians have
been robbed and there have been two serious piraces[sic] involving the loss of life and property:
the club has been robbed, the Consular’s Doctor’s house twice entered by thieves, and a
considerable sum and all the Doctor’s instruments stolen, while Messrs. Lynch [shipping
company] have been robbed four times, and a watchman killed, Messrs. Strick twice and their
assistants once, and the British India Company’s premises have also been entered.”38 It is worth
noting that the focus was largely on the damage being done to British economic interests,
particularly the corporations that had infrastructure and personnel in the region. Crow added a
personal dimension to the increasingly threatening circumstances that he was describing and
perceiving, complaining that his servant’s quarters were nearly broken into and they had a cow
stolen from them. There had been “marauding” by his garden wall and he needed Gendarmes
constantly patrolling to ensure his safety. He asked the British Government for an increase in his
security allowance, so that he could better arm his guards. Consul Crow wrote that conditions at
Basra had gotten so bad that the British India Company, Messrs. Strick and Messrs. Lynch have
had to import “60 armed watchmen from India.”39
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Continuing with the Butterworth murder, the Strick Company brought the plight of his
widow and her four children to the attention of the Foreign Office.40 Claiming the need to
provide support for the Captain’s widow, the British government demanded 4,000 British pounds
in compensation. By May 12th, Crow felt justified in declaring, “The case for compensation is
materially strengthened by the fact that…the Turkish authorities have neglected adequately to
police the river and port at Basra, and they admit this.”41 Crow elaborated on why this is
criminal neglect, “Thus the facts appear to be that Basra, a most important commercial harbor,
has, for years past, been left by the Turkish Government without any adequate precautions for
the public security, although their attention has been drawn to this by His Majesty’s Consul at
Basra for the past eleven years; while the circumstances of the present case, which is the
culminating outrage of a long series, shows how complete this neglect of the most elementary
police precautions has recently become.”42 However, during a parliamentary debate, Foreign
Office Secretary Grey was asked if there was adequate protection for the Europeans of Basra. It
is significant that this question even made it to Parliament, which shows that, three months after
the Butterworth murder, the case was still in the public domain. Grey, however, dismissed the
concern and answered, “I am not aware that there is any need for the special protection of His
Majesty’s Consul and other Europeans at Basra.”43 On May 31st of 1914, in a Note Verbale from
the British embassy in Istanbul, it was acknowledged that Britain would officially seek
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compensation from the Ottoman Government concerning the Butterworth murder.44 Ȍnder
Kocatűrk, in his examination of the Ottoman sources, noted that the Butterworth murder
investigation showed almost no progress for four whole months, until the case for an indemnity
was pushed by the British.45
Kocatűrk writes that according to the Ottoman sources the demand for compensation on
June 11th kicked the Ottoman justice system into action. Ottoman authorities thought that if they
showed themselves willing to provide justice and arrest people, they could avoid paying this
compensation, “In order to reject this demand formally and legitimately in the light of the
evidence, the outcome of the investigation hitherto and information obtained from the
interrogations of the crew were needed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hence asked to be
quickly reported.”46 The Ottoman system of justice had not been idle, even if few details of their
investigation filtered into the British sources. The Ottoman investigation, by the end of March,
had four suspects in custody; Rüstem bin Şecaaddin, a 50 year old Iranian national who was the
cook and butler; Ali bin Salim, a 30 year old Iranian crew member and Seyyid Nasrallah and
Hemis bin Hüseyin. It seems that Nasrallah and bin Huseyin were former employees who had
been dismissed by Captain Butterworth.47 The evidence of their guilt rested entirely on a hat – a
hat that may or may not have belonged to Captain Butterworth – that was found in Rüstem bin
Şecaaddin’s house. A court date set for May 19th was postponed indefinitely when the
prosecutor of the case was promoted, leaving the post vacant. Kocatűrk records that a note was
passed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior in December of
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1914 which stated that due to the war and the abrogation of the capitulations, no compensation
would be paid to Britain.48
The murder of Butterworth occurred right at the end of this period. The diplomatic
discussion concerning it happened immediately before and then was truncated by the First World
War. The manner in which the events were discussed should be seen in the same light as the
fluctuating anxiety that some British officials had concerning German economic competition.
The perceived threat of losing a privileged position drove British anxiety into the creation of
perceived looming disaster. This fits within the global context of competition between the
European states and their desires for firm control, not just in colonial setting, but also in what
they saw as their spheres of influence. Therefore, the threat of local instability, characterized by
these pirate attacks, led British corporations to expand their security apparatus and local British
diplomats to ask for warships and threaten violent intervention. However, the Americans, as
likely to be robbed or become victims of violence as anyone else, did not perceive these acts of
violence as being a growing threatening trend. Both the British and the Americans asked for
compensation and justice and received some degree of that from the Ottoman state in response.
The brigandage and piracy of the period is more reflective of global conditions than a failure of
the Ottoman State to secure its borders. It may also be anxiety on the part of the diplomats and
the tendency to make themselves and the interests they represent appear as though they were
guarding British prestige in a situation that they perceived to have gotten out of control. The
corporations involved seem to have been pushing the situation along, inflating their problems
and threats in an effort to elicit support from British officials.
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Archaeology
The expansion of the Ottoman State’s regulatory focus and its maturation as a modern
state is evident in its treatment of American archaeologists and of the antiquities trade. Like the
global expansion of sanitary regulations in response to the increase of global trade, the growth of
archaeology and of antiquities smuggling attracted the attention of a centralizing state. While the
Ottoman State already controlled and regulated permissions for Westerners to dig at certain sites,
in the period under study, the Ottoman state extended their oversight into the actual digs
themselves. These initiatives represent both a sincere effort to control and utilize antiquities for
the legitimation of the state and to thwart the ambitions of Western imperialists.
Although a brief instance of Ottoman regulatory oversight, the Sublime Porte intervened
at the University of Pennsylvania dig at Niffur.49 In 1899, Namik Pasha, the Vali of Baghdad
took issue with the buildings that had been erected on the site. Namik Pasha insisted that
buildings erected on the site were not listed in the excavation agreement between the University
and the Ottoman government. This fear of Western archaeologists being the vanguard of imperial
territorial annexation was prevalent in the Ottoman government.50 This specific issue proved to
be straightforward and both sides pushed for compromise. The Vali was willing to allow the
buildings to remain and the dig to continue as long as J. H. Haynes, the director of the dig signed
a document stating, “that these buildings are only for his staying there, and in the end of the
excavations, he must submit to deliver all that in its real state, to the Government, and in the
future he will have in every way no right to pretend that these buildings would be his own.”51
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Haynes, who was born in Massachusetts, was hired to work as a tutor at Roberts College
in Istanbul. He was originally the business manager of the dig when it began in 1888. The
expedition in question was the fourth campaign at the site and procured “many thousands of
tablets and antiquities of other kinds.”52 In this case, the Ottoman state, through the Vali and the
University of Pennsylvania through Haynes, brought a quick resolution to the issue. This
suggests that significant incentives existed for Americans to acquiesce to Ottoman demands and
cooperate with the Ottoman state. It also suggests that Ottoman oversight over antiquities had
matured to an extent that the state was aware of the minutiae of the dig and willing and able to
exert control over that minutiae. While this does represents an increasing focus on antiquities, it
also reflects the Ottoman concern with their territory and jealously guarding the value of their
land.53
The most thrilling case of archeological misbehavior in this period involved Edgar James
Banks, former American Vice Consul to Baghdad and supposed inspiration for the fictional
Indiana Jones (at least according to the Historical Museum of Eustis, Florida where Banks retired
in 1921).54 Banks led the University of Pennsylvania’s excavations in Iraq, beginning in 1903.
Known today as Bismaya55, the dig site was the location of the Sumerian city of Adab. In 1904,
Banks retired to Baghdad to avoid the severe summer heat, where he lived in a house that he
rented from Hürner.56 When Banks returned in September, he was informed by the Sheik he had
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paid to guard the site that the dig had been robbed. Hamesh, a former watchman at the site, was
accused of being in possession of antiquities and selling them; Hamesh was imprisoned in a well,
ready to be turned over to the authorities. Banks alleged that 209 Lira worth of both his own and
the site’s property had been damaged or stolen. He accused Heider Bey, the Ottoman official
appointed to oversee the dig, of being complicit in the robbery, claiming that Heider Bey had
previous knowledge of the affair.57 Although Banks could and did produce witnesses, Hussein
and Ahmed,58 that swore Hamesh was guilty,59 Heider Bey decided not to prosecute Hamesh,
who soon escaped from his imprisoning well.60
Hamdi Bey, the director of the Imperial Ottoman Museum, detected fraud almost
immediately after Hürner and Banks declared that a famous statue that had been excavated at
Adab/Bismaya was stolen.61 Heider Bey, who answered directly to Hamdi Bey, returned with
several officials and ordered Banks to close the excavations and leave Bismaya. Banks, in his
published account of the excavation accidentally foreshadows stealing the statue. First, he
covered up the initial discovery of the statue from the workers that uncovered it, telling them it
was “merely a stone.”62 The day of the initial discovery, Banks waited until Heider Bey was
called from the camp with his assistant, before returning with three workmen; the original
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discoverer of the statue Abbas,63 the foreman of his crew, and Banks’ servant Ahmed. Under
cover of night they excavated the headless statue and secreted it to Banks’ room.64 While Banks
likely intended to keep the statue a secret from the very moment of its discovery, the missing
head to the statue was discovered a month later.65 The general rejoicing around the camp meant
that the statue became public knowledge.66
After being told to leave Bismaya, Banks travelled to Kut, where, on October 1st 1904,
the local Commissioner of Police, Sadek Effendi arrived. Banks wrote that Sadek arrived
intoxicated and demanded to, on the orders of the Vali, search Banks’ luggage. Banks alleged
that the official was so drunk, that during his search he broke “various glass objects” and was
“injuring many things.” The police officer confiscated some “shells and other curios” and some
“worthless tablets.” Banks said that these items were the engineer’s property, referring to the
seemingly luckless Jason Paige.67 Banks listed the objects taken from Mr. Paige’s baggage as
“About 50 sea shells/A Syringe/A modern Arab Skull/4 Modern engraved vases/The few tablets
above mentioned[the ‘worthless ones’]/Other modern curios/Service cartridges.” Banks
continued to list items taken out of the baggage of his wife as being, “A tin of corral beads/2
broaches from Europe/A wedgewood sugar bowl and cream pitcher.” Banks demanded that
Sadek Effendi be removed from his post and that the seized objects be returned. Banks angrily
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noted that the telegraph operator in Kut colluded with Sadek Effendi by refusing to send a
telegram with the excuse that the operator said “he was [busy] reading a Koran...”68
The U.S. State Department and Heider Bey figured out that Banks and Hürner were the
perpetrators of the robbery. Banks and Hürner had apparently sent two of their servants, Ahmed
and Hussein, to stage a fake robbery. Hürner defended his actions, writing that they hid the statue
to keep it from being destroyed in unrest that was occurring in the area.69 Like British Consul
Crow in Basra, this is another example of Westerners, and particularly diplomats, using and
inflating threats locally to justify their actions and to legitimize their pleas for assistance.
Overstating a case would be logical therefore, in order to get the desired reaction and these
perceived threats should not be taken at face value as evidence of rampant unrest in the Ottoman
Empire. Rather, they should be recorded in the context of Western diplomats seeking to protect
their own or national prestige using the means that they had to elicit help and further their
rhetorical points.
According to Hürner, the objects confiscated by the Ottoman police at Kut, particularly
the antiquities were, in fact, the property of Banks and not those of Paige.70 Banks stated that the
other antiquities confiscated were worthless tablets, however, it was still illegal for him to be
transporting them away from the dig site with the intent of removing them from the country.
Complicating things further, Banks, at the urging of Hürner, made an official complaint about
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Heider Bey, attacking his character. This involved denunciations and allegations about Heider
Bey’s level of sobriety, his moral fortitude and supposed ties to revolutionary groups.71 Despite
his recalcitrance, Banks initially received instructions from his directors at the University of
Chicago to return to Bismaya and continue the excavation.72 However, the Board of Directors
back at the University of Chicago rapidly lost faith in Banks and the Ottomans worked
diplomatically to prevent him from returning to the excavations. Under Article 20 of the
Ottoman Regulations on Archeological Excavation, the Sublime Porte had authority to shut
down the dig whenever they felt. The regulation stated that it “empowers the Ministry of Public
Instruction to suspend temporarily any excavation work ‘Should any objections be found.’”73
Additionally, Ottoman officials argued that since Banks’ servant Ahmed had committed the
robbery they wanted to arrest Ahmed and put him in jail.74 Eventually, the Imperial Ottoman
Museum, insisted that Banks be removed or the excavation at Bismaya shut down. Robert
Harper, an Assyrianologist with the dig and the brother of Professor William Rainey Harper,
chairman of the Semitic Languages Department at the University of Chicago, was appointed to
lead the dig. Banks was removed from his position by January of 1905.75
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Hürner, who had the statue hidden in his bedroom, was ordered to turn the statue over to
the Ottoman authorities.76 Leishman, the American Ambassador, upbraided Hürner for his
actions in stealing and hiding the statue, writing, “while it is the duty of every officer of the
Government to protect American interests in every way possible, this should not be carried to the
point of protecting American citizens in the commission of a dishonorable act.”77 Hürner was
also scolded by Leishman for requesting to know how much Heider Bey’s salary was;
presumably Hürner was contemplating a bribe.78 Hürner was slow to comply with the demands
of both the US Legation and Heider Bey to send the statue to Istanbul. At the end of July in
1905, Leishman again reproached Hürner for his slow response and for entrusting the statue to
someone “whose very name is unknown to the Legation…”79 An August 14th Telegram sent by
Hürner states that the statue was handed over to Heider Bey.80
Ultimately, Hürner’s defense was that he had been trying to keep Banks from being
arrested and the University of Chicago’s name from being soiled. Hürner argued that the
secreting out of archeological finds was a common practice (which is was) and that Banks had
mislead him into thinking the United States legation in Istanbul was aware of and complicit in
the subterfuge. Leishman pointed out that it was an illegal practice, stating, “The fact that most
archeologists make a practice of appropriating a certain portion of the hidden treasures they
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unearth cannot be accepted as an excuse for the acts of the University officials in
misappropriating treasures found in the Bismaya expedition, as the permit distinctly states that
all articles found shall remain the property of the Imperial Ottoman Government.”81 Leishman
further informed Hürner that due to the circumstances, a formal complaint would be filed against
him.82 Hürner was also accused of illicitly furnishing copies of official documents to private
individuals, specifically to Harper.83 There was a further breakdown in the, what had once been
friendly, relationship between Leishman and Hürner. By January of 1906 the normally
excessively polite introductions that are common in these official dispatches, devolved into this
greeting, “I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 104 of December 7, 1905, the contents
of which I find both irrelevant and disprespectfull [sic].”84
The Banks case demonstrates that the Ottoman government not only had effective
oversight over the dig at Bismaya, but they were able to discern an attempt to commit a criminal
act by removing antiquities from its borders. Heider Bey and Hamdi Bey had the ability to
uncover the plot, and then the power to pursue both Banks and the stolen statue and other
antiquities. The coordinated efforts between Hamdi and Heider Bey demonstrates the increasing
reach of the Imperial Ottoman Museum as well as a degree of centralization between the center
and the periphery. The Imperial Ottoman Museum worked well with the U.S. State Department,
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which was willing to pursue the statue on their behalf in order not to jeopardize the future of U.S.
archaeology in the Ottoman Empire. Although Hürner actively worked to defraud the Ottomans,
Ambassador Leishman worked diligently to see the statue returned to the Ottomans. Ultimately,
the incident spelled the end for Rudolf Hürner, who held the Vice Consulate position for nearly a
decade. Banks’ career as a working archeologist was severely damaged.
There were two reasons for the increasing Ottoman attention on retaining antiquities. The
first, very simply, was to thwart Western cultural imperialism. Archaeology, like missionary
activity, was a form of cultural imperialism and it drew Western researchers to all corners of the
Empire. Few Ottoman archeologists existed to provide a direct challenge to Western ones. By
stymying the efforts of the Western archeologists to secure and remove antiquities, the Ottomans
kept those artifacts in their domain. And perhaps more importantly they kept them out of
Western museums. In fact, the statue from Bismaya still resides in Istanbul at the archeological
museum. Called either the King of Adab or more commonly the Statue of Luguldalu, the statue
sits calmly in a section on Iraq.85 While archeological finds in Iraq contributed in the West to the
narrative of Western civilization, the Ottoman state would have been aware of potential
narratives that these digs could provide to their own past and to the construction of an Ottoman
nation-state and its historical mythologies.

Missionaries
Likewise, the Ottoman State, in this period, took an increasing interest in the activities of
American missionaries. U.S. missionaries in the Ottoman Empire were cultural imperialists to a
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certain extent. They pushed American interests forward in the Ottoman Empire and, if threatened
or attacked, could bring about conflict between the Ottoman and American states. Perhaps more
importantly, foreign missionaries were, in a sense, pests. They highlighted the short comings of
the state’s infrastructure in terms of education and health care, pushing the Ottoman State into
competition in these fields. They also agitated populations that would otherwise not have been
restive. By expanding oversight and control over American missionaries, the state was both
demonstrating that it had control over its periphery, and was able to mitigate some of the internal
and external disruptions caused by missionary activity.
American missionaries, since they had to operate within Ottoman society as members of
it, were targets of robberies. The Arabian Mission, the first American missionary effort in Basra,
was the brainchild of James Cantine,86 Samuel Zwemer87 and Philip Phelps88 while the trio were
students at the Theological Seminary of the Dutch Reformed Church in New Brunswick, New
Jersey in 1889.89 In May of 1889, this trio presented their “Plan of the Arabian Mission” to the
Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church of America. James Cantine arrived in Basra
in August of 1891 and was joined by Samuel Zwemer; the men wrote back to the Reformed
Church about their desire to use Basra as their base of operations. At an approximate cost of
$25,000, the Arabian Mission was launched. The founders of the Arabian Mission felt “beset and

86

The oldest of the three and a graduate of Union College, Cantine was trained as a civil
engineer. Alfred Mason and Frederick Barny, History of the Arabian Mission (The Board of
Foreign Missions: New York, 1926) p. 57
87
Zwemer was born in Michigan as the son of a minister. He was an aspiring doctor, but instead
chose missionary life. Zwemer was a prolific writer. He attended Rutgers University and became
a Professor at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1929. Lewis Scudder, The Arabian Mission’s
Story: “In Search of Abraham’s Other Son” (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company,1998) p. 140.
88
Phelps is described by Scudder as a “shadowy figure.” Phelps did not participate in the
missionary work. Scudder, The Arabian Mission’s Story, p. 141.
89
Mason and Barny, History of the Arabian Mission, p. 57.
198

frustrated by a cynical and even dangerous Ottoman bureaucracy which viewed their presence as
undesirable.”90 A strategy adopted by the medical focused Arabian Mission was called “touring.”
This involved travelling into the countryside with medical and dental equipment.91 It seems
worth noting that none of the instances of crime examined here occurred while missionaries were
touring. Although it is impossible to know why in these instances, it seems that missionaries
while touring were likely doing so with Ottoman escorts, thereby engaging the protection of the
state. They probably travelled with little or no money and, as they were at least nominally
helping people, were likely conceived as being benign.
John Van Ess, arrived to work at the Arabian mission in 1902. Van Ess was a graduate of
the Princeton Theological Seminary, where he studied Semitic languages.92 On July 20th, 1905,
the Basra house of Van Ess was burglarized. Van Ess reported that 57 Lira and 167 Rupees were
taken, money which, for the most part, belonged to the American missionary organization, rather
than to Van Ess.93 Two Ottoman soldiers were arrested for the robbery, Zangi and Muhammad,
in August of 1905. Both Zangi and Muhammad were imprisoned but quickly released after
giving a “process verbal” or an official statement to the police. The criminal case was dismissed
in Basra. Hürner, however, urged Van Ess to have the men re-arrested and another suit brought
against them. Hürner informed Van Ess that he would instruct Chalk in Basra to put pressure on
the local Vali to provide a guilty verdict. Hürner was convinced that a guilty verdict would be
easily accomplished locally, however, he suggested that, if it were not, Chalk should appeal
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directly to Istanbul in this case, thereby embarrassing the Vali. Hürner also wrote that if an
unfavorable verdict was reached in the case, Van Ess should have it appealed to Baghdad, where
Hürner would use his influence to get a better result.94 The case was later dismissed in Baghdad
by the Court of Default.95 The case was abandoned both for lack of evidence, and the perception
that Van Ess was partially at fault. The court found that because Van Ess had stored his money in
an ordinary travelling box, he was “guilty of gross carelessness.”96
In June of 1907, Dr. Henry Worrall, also of the Arabian Mission, was robbed of 11TL.97
After Worrall discovered the missing case of money, he became aware that more items had been
taken, especially from his hospital dispensary. Dr. Worrall and his staff immediately suspected
two servants, a brother and sister, of pilfering the items. A search of the servants’ home revealed
a cache of currencies, including rupees, and innumerable stolen goods from the mission hospital.
The pair was accused of using duplicate keys to steal items under lock and key, which allowed
them to go a lengthy period without detection while they accumulated such sundry and exotic
items as 3 cheap spoons, 6 pairs of stockings and 42 unbleeched [sic] American sheets from the
store closet. A former employer of the two servants, Nasoorie Noorie, attested to the criminal
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character of the unnamed siblings.98 On July 20th, the Criminal Court ruled in favor of Worrall,
and returned both the money and some of the stolen goods to him.99
These robberies demonstrate the vulnerability inherent in living in any urban
environment of the time. The missionaries were part of the system; they were not targeted but
their houses were robbed because they were there. The missionaries themselves were protected
in Basra, their property was not, or at least not fully. However, outside of the established Arabian
mission, the region also attracted maverick American missionaries. Grace Miller was one such
missionary, although according to the U.S. consul, she was not actively engaged in missionary
work. However, according to the American Bible Society, she was in Iraq on a maverick
trailblazing mission “Miss Miller is making plans to plunge into the very heart of Arabia, and has
made plans with us for any Bible distribution that may become possible for her to do.” The
Bible Society’s report implied that her mission was clandestine, writing “It is not now the time to
speak definitely of her plans…”100 As Deringil noted, the Ottoman State routinely monitored
U.S. missionary publications and may well have read that very report.101 Miss Miller therefore
has the odd distinction of being an undercover, Bible distributing missionary.
The Ottoman Mudür wrote to the Vali and he in turn wrote to Hürner informing him that
Miller was apparently in serious danger. It was unclear exactly how Grace Miller was
threatened, although it could be deduced that the threat to her was a response to whatever
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mysterious missionary work she was engaged in. The border area was also subject to Saudi
raids. According to the American vice consul in Basra, Henry Chalk, while residing in the city
of Zobeir, Grace Miller was willing to “explain her religion to all those that call upon her…”102
The 19th century history of Zobeir and its role as a growing and important market town
controlling trade going from Basra to Najd has been discussed at length by Hala Fattah. Fattah
concluded that the efforts of Ottoman officials to establish control over Zobeir were “only
partially successful, and when imposed, control was often only nominal.”103 Yet Zobeir was an
area where the Ottomans tried to extend their control in this period. The Miss Miller case is
further evidence of their attempt to exert control of the area and of their ability to do so.
When Chalk was notified of the situation and of the Ottoman recommendation that Miss
Miller be removed for her own safety, he conducted a personal interview with her. Chalk
described her as living a “quiet harmless life” in Zobeir. Miller intended to remain in Zobeir for
an additional three months, despite the recent nearby raid by Saudi adventurers.104 Two levels of
Ottoman government, the local (Mudür) and the regional (Vali), effectively took interest in the
personal safety of a single American. The Ottomans contacted American officials to ensure the
safety of that American from threats both inside and outside their state and since they had this
knowledge and it was communicated effectively between government levels, it demonstrates a
high degree of integration and cooperation between the regional and the local government in the
area and an ability to coordinate all the way from Istanbul to the border of Kuwait.
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Issues of Citizenship
Legal questions arose over Ottomans who had become naturalized American citizens.
According to Deringil, under the Ottoman Citizenship Law the Ottoman state had the final say
over the legality of all Ottoman citizens’ attempts to renounce Ottoman citizenship in favor of
another citizenship. Likewise, these former citizens could be forbidden entrance to the Empire.105
These issues were complicated by questions such as whether the individual planned to return to
the United States, did they reenter the Ottoman Empire on their U.S. passport and when that
passport had expired.106 In answer to a question from an Armenian wishing to return to the
Ottoman Empire, Secretary of State Hays noted that while the US officially disputed the policy,
the lack of an international treaty between the two states left returning, naturalized American
citizens vulnerable. The resulting situation was that, once a naturalized American citizen that
was once an Ottoman citizen returned to the Empire, “he [would] regard himself as an Ottoman
subject…” Hays promised that the State Department would do their best on behalf of anyone
caught in this but it could not guarantee that he would “escape molestation or expulsion.”107 A
report by U.S. immigration inspector Marcus Braun, alleged widespread abuses by Armenian
Ottoman subjects of U.S. citizenships. He reported that Armenians that had become naturalized
citizens were returning to the Ottoman Empire with U.S. earned cash, illegally practicing trades
and putting the State Department in embarrassing situations, thus causing “great inconvenience.”
Braun alleged that when Armenians took U.S. citizenship, it was all an elaborate way to dodge
legitimate Ottoman taxation. Braun’s anti-Armenian stance should be attributed to, not a pro-
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Ottoman or Turkish attitude, but his idea that immigrants from the Ottoman Empire were,
regardless of national origin “nothing short of a menace to this [United States] country.”108 When
the question of giving a new passport or renewing an old one arose, the American government
considered the following criteria “How he returned, whether he is engaged in business relations
with any American firms or represents any business, charitable or religious interests or has any
intention to return to his adopted country which carries great weight with the Minister’s
decision.”109
Due to the perception that extending protection to naturalized U.S. citizens or Ottoman
subject was embarrassing to the state and led to unnecessary conflict with the Ottoman State,
Peter Augustus Jay, chargé d’affairs and a descendent of John Jay, refused to provide Hürner’s
servant Ahmed protection from prosecution in the Bank’s case. Jay wrote that “The man being
an Ottoman subject and employed as a Cavass by neither the Legation nor your Vice Consulate,
there can be no grounds for granting him protection.”110 Despite Hürner’s protests that Ahmed
would be tortured into a confession, Jay advised Hürner only to obtain Ahmed’s written
deposition before turning Ahmed over to the Ottoman government.111 However, when it came to
the possibility of the Ottoman courts prosecuting Banks, the answer was a clear and
unconditional negative. Jay was quick to remind Hürner that, according to Article four of the
1830 Treaty between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire, no Americans accused of crimes would
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be tried in Ottoman courts, but only in American courts. If possible, Banks should not even have
been informed if charges were brought against him and if he were tried in absentia by the
Ottoman legal system.112
In July of 1907, a complaint was filed with the American Vice Consul by the Governor
General of Baghdad against a “certain Hagopian” who the Ottomans alleged fraudulently
claimed to be both American and a licensed doctor. Hagopian was accused of “causing much
injury.”113 The Vali reminded Magelssen, the Vice Consul in Baghdad, that it was against
Ottoman law for individuals to practice medicine without both a license and a medical diploma.
In response to an inquiry by Magelssen, A.S. Hagopian defended himself by stating that he was,
in fact, a licensed physician. Hagopian protested that he was a graduate of the University of
Louisville. Records show that he was, in 1888, indeed a graduate of that institution.114 Hagopian
also listed other physicians that he practiced with, seemingly settling the matter.115 It did not,
nor did it necessarily prove that Hagopian was a licensed doctor according to Ottoman law.
Hagopian, apparently, was invited for an audience with the Vali and was promptly arrested.
Magelssen protested his arrest but Hagopian’s citizenship was further questioned by the
Ottomans. Magelssen filed his objections with the Vali and asked that Hagopian be released and
deported to the United States. Magelssen did not however “make strong demands” on the Vali,
supposedly because Hagopian’s passport had lapsed and he had not sent in his renewal form.
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The embassy wrote to Magelssen to inform him that “Insomuch as Dr. Hagopian appears to
manifest no genuine intention of returning to the United States with the intention of residing
there and performing the duties of citizenship and seems to have abandoned all permanent
residence in America the Embassy would not feel warranted in granting him a passport without
further proof of his right to obtain same.”116 Hagopian’s naturalization papers and his 25 piasters
fee were held at the vice consulate and awaited his disposal of them.117
In 1894, a man posing as a wealthy industrialist and claiming to be named John Herbert
Firth, borrowed money from the American vice consul in Baghdad, Dr. John C. Sundburg. Dr.
Sundburg was Vice Consul in Baghdad from 1892 until 1895.118 Firth’s draft of $100
(approximately $2,600 today) was fraudulently drawn against guarantee from an unnamed
American bank. Another attempt by an American trying to defraud the vice consulate prompted
Hürner to write to the U.S. Vice Consul in Madrid, whose name was presumably used as
reference. The Vice Consul in Madrid answered Hürner’s question with this warning “the whole
matter referred in the letter you enclosed, is an old swindle. Every effort is being made to
capture the rascals, but it seems difficult to do. All the parties mentioned as well, as the
documents, are false.”119 These instances wherein the U.S. consulate was targeted by Westerners
emphasizes that the position that Americans and the U.S. state department occupied in the
Ottoman Empire was not one of a privileged outsider. Rather, it was the United States’
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diplomatic agents existence within the Ottoman system and society that led them to be
victimized. As demonstrated in the literature, citizenship and contesting foreign protection was
increasingly a concern for the Ottoman State in this period. The Ottoman State and the U.S.
government were both concerned with the perception that subjects of the Ottoman Empire,
particularly Armenians, were abusing the system. The focus on tax evasion and practicing trades
illicitly, may have been window dressing for other concerns, including the Ottoman perception
of Armenian collusion with American missionaries and the American obsession with racial
purity and eugenics. Either way, the attention paid this situation reflects an issue of concern for
both states. It also demonstrates the Ottoman State’s ability to police its subject’s citizenship and
a manner in which they countered the adoption of foreign nationality.
This chapter details several instances in which American cultural and economic agents,
engaged in the Ottoman system, were subject to or perpetrating some sort of criminal activity.
The response of the Ottoman state to the insecurity within its borders indicates that the Ottomans
were able to respond to brigandage and piracy, but not able to prevent it. This should not be read
as the Ottoman’s inability to control its periphery, rather, this demonstrates the economic
disruption of the expansion of the world economy and of the attempts to settle and harness
previously nomadic populations. Although these disturbances demonstrates the limits of
Ottoman control, the fact that the instances of brigandage were few and completely outside of
official travel routes, indicates that the Ottomans were able to exert centralized control over their
domain. It can be argued that the piracy evident in Basra was overblown by the British embassy;
also, the British kept a warship at Bushire, which may have pushed pirates away from the Iranian
coast and towards the Ottoman.
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The Ottoman state also demonstrated its concern and knowledge of the activities of
American archaeologists, missionaries and Ottoman citizens that adopted U.S. nationality. The
ability to keep track of the various moving pieces within Baghdad and Basra demonstrates the
sophistication of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The Imperial Ottoman Museum was able to push the
dig site at Niffur into a compromise regarding the infrastructure built on site. More impressively,
it was able to discern that a crime had been committed at Bismaya and to stop the smuggling of
the statue, as well as, regain control of the stolen antiquities. The Ottoman state was also able to
determine which missionaries had been negligent in the protection of their property and which
had been more legitimately wronged. These same missionaries toured with their medical
equipment safely in the Basra hinterland. The responsibility for the safety of Miss Miller, a
maverick missionary, was passed on to the U.S. state department. This served to both remove the
Ottoman State’s need to keep her safe and limit the activities of U.S. missionaries that left major
cities, particularly when they were not providing a benefit (such as the medical touring) to that
local population. Finally, the Ottoman State kept close watch on its nationals that accepted
foreign citizenship. They worked to undermine the process by which this occurred and were able
to revoke citizenship from returning Armenians with little or no protest from the U.S.
government.
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Conclusion
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In 1914, at the end of the twenty years examined in this study, the Ottoman Empire
became embroiled in the First World War. For the entire length of the First World War, the U.S.
consulate was the only Western diplomatic mission in Baghdad that operated uninterrupted.
When the Ottomans entered the war, the U.S. was a non-belligerent power and was hence
allowed to operate by the Sublime Porte. The U.S. never formally declared war on the Ottoman
Empire, but this was a moot point locally, since, by the time the U.S. did enter the conflagration
(April of 1917), Baghdad was occupied by British forces (March of 1917). The U.S. consulate in
Baghdad, as was usual in times of war, officially managed the affairs of Western countries that
had withdrawn their diplomats.1 As such, one of their more frequent duties was determining
what to do with foreign nationals (particularly British Indians) that were stranded in Baghdad
and seeking financial relief and protection.2 Between 1894 and 1914, the U.S. State department
and its interests in the Ottoman Empire had become increasingly sophisticated and because of
this process, they were better prepared to assume the wide ranging roles needed during the war.
These duties, which included taking over the official diplomatic roles of European states such as
Britain, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Italy, Russia and France, were in addition to promoting the
economic and political interests of American individuals and businesses. During the war, the
U.S. Consulate in Baghdad protested unfair treatment against their own citizens, such as the
Ottoman seizure of a boat belonging to MacAndrews and Forbes.3 During the war, the U.S.
consulate continued to operate as an economic hub, corresponding with the American Chamber
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of Commerce for the Levant,4 and fielding inquiries from various U.S. companies looking to
continue doing business locally, the global conflict notwithstanding.5 Despite the disruptions of
war and an outbreak of disease in the region, U.S. consul Charles Brissel,6 a career diplomat who
had served previously in Amoy, China, continued to promote American interests and trade in the
city. Brissel noted that kerosene imports were increasing and confided that the British-owned
Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been selling their oil at a loss in order to keep U.S. kerosene
imports out. Brissel believed that irrigation projects would soon make more cultivatable land
available and therefore, would necessitate significant importation of U.S. hoeing, mowing and
threshing machinery. Brissel worried, however, that this presumed expansion of cultivated land
would undercut MacAndrews and Forbes’ harvests of licorice. Brissel was confident that orange
and grape exports would begin to the U.S. and hoped that a wine industry would be established
locally. Optimistically and perhaps even a bit over optimistically, Brissel wrote, "It should be
gathered from the foregoing information that few countries offer a wider field for the
exploitation of economic energy or offer a richer return than Mesopotamia.”7 Brissel provided
U.S. businesses hoping to export to the region advice about local economic conditions. Although
the figures that Brissel cited and sent may not be entirely accurate, they were meant as advice
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and instruction to help in the expansion of U.S. economic activities. According to Brissel, one
could rent premises (one year leases, payment in advance), arrange freight (typically two months
from London to Baghdad), and secure compiaolas or promissory notes (four-twelve month
terms). Brissel estimated that there were promissory notes worth approximately $1.5 million in
circulation at the time.8 Although little could be done due to the obstacles of the war, U.S.
diplomats speculated of a more prominent presence and economic involvement for Americans in
Ottoman Iraq.
The U.S. national archives are an underutilized research source concerning the final
decades of the Ottoman Empire. As such, they provide valuable and unknown case studies and
data. Mostly due to the changes within U.S. foreign policy and the sizeable disturbances of both
the civil war and the Reconstruction Era, U.S. interest and activities in the Ottoman Empire
seems to have waned during the middle part of 19th century. However, and concurrent with shifts
in foreign policy, U.S. interest and American activities in the Ottoman Empire rose during the
period of 1894-1914. The U.S. State Department and Americans in general became more
aggressive in promoting its trade and economic interests and it was a period of expansion in the
global economy. The examples of conflict and cooperation that are recorded in these U.S.
sources are valuable for adding to the literature on the time period and they contribute to the
literature on late Ottoman Iraq in several ways. First, since these sources have been
underutilized, their inclusion widens the scope of possible historical investigation in the study of
Late Ottoman Baghdad and Basra. Second, this research suggests that, in this period, there was
an expanding role/presence for America and Americans that is not currently reflected in the
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historiography. This should, of course, be qualified since Americans and U.S. interests and
activities, although on the increase, were still significantly less than those of other nations. Also,
the expansion of American interests was one, as previously noted, that was carried out by
American individuals, rather than a specific U.S. government plan for targeting the Ottoman
Empire for economic expansion. However, as the global economy expanded, the U.S. imported
increasing amounts of raw materials from the Ottoman Empire. Due to the same economic
forces, U.S. investors also began to see Ottoman Iraq as a possible site for significant financial
development in infrastructure projects. Third, this study seeks to augment established points on a
variety of issues concerning the Ottoman Empire. These issues include, the degree to which the
Ottoman Empire was centralizing, and the implementation of many of the 19th century, Tanzimat
era reforms in the early 20th century. And finally, this dissertation discusses the role of interimperial rivalry, as manifested through the competition of rival Western business groups, in
Ottoman Iraq. The Ottoman State was able to, in line with existing literature, profit from and
exploit inter-imperial rivalry and international business competition. Negotiations over large
scale infrastructure projects showed the Ottomans as savvy negotiators, able and willing to use
one Western group against another. Likewise, Westerners and in particular, Americans worked
with and against each other and Ottomans within the Ottoman Empire.
The use of Western sources for writing the history of the Ottoman Empire is admittedly
problematic. Western diplomats, merchants, missionaries and archeologists all had personal
agendas and inherent biases that tainted their documents. They were frequently hostile, and could
be outright racist; this was an era wherein U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s adherence to a
racial doctrine that privileged Anglo-Saxons as the master race was not unusual in America. By
reading these sources critically however, and using the parameters and particulars of conflict and
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cooperation to illuminate relationships, these sources can be used carefully and legitimately to
augment the existing literature. The focus of this research is on economics and economic
cooperation and/or conflict. Some of these conflicts arose from negotiations, particularly those
concerning infrastructure projects. Others involved legal troubles for American businesses
arising from competition that they had with Ottoman interests. However they also include
instances wherein American businesses sought assistance from the Ottoman State and cooperated
with locals. Crimes that were committed against and by Westerners contained an economic
element. Whether it was burglary, brigandage, or swindling, these criminal activities involved
the exchange of money or goods.
The archives of the U.S. State Department suggest an increasing American economic
involvement in Ottoman Iraq, and a more prominent role in promoting trade, infrastructure
projects and sanitation. During the period under study, the U.S. Foreign Service underwent a
process of professionalization, one that is reflected in the maturation of the official promotion of
U.S. economic activities within the Ottoman Empire. Baghdad was elevated to a consulate and a
salary was provided for the consul, hopefully eliminating conflicts of interest. This promotion
and growth of American interests and activities in the Ottoman Empire was not limited to the
State Department, nor to U.S. business interests and activities. Cultural agents, particularly
American missionaries and archaeologists were active in Ottoman Iraq in this period. While
Americans were neither as present nor as active as British, French or German agents/businesses
and cultural agents in Ottoman Iraq, their activities still warrant an inclusion in the history of the
region. These American cultural agents frequently came into contact with Ottoman officials,
sometimes in very banal ways, other times in conflict and also, frequently in cooperation. In
terms of crime, they were protected when they engaged with the state, and vulnerable when they
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did not. When the victim of criminal activity, these Americans were typically able to seek
redress and fiscal compensation for American investors proceeded from small scale, locally
initiated projects to a large rail and mineral concession proposal. The early projects began as
small, local initiatives of low ranking Foreign Service employees in partnership with local
Ottoman officials trying to engage U.S. based businesses. After 1906, local employees of the
State Department were increasingly focused on increasing U.S. capital penetration in Ottoman
Iraq and on trade promotion. These trends culminated in both the creation and pursuit of the
Chester Project and in the foundation and promotional energies of the American Chamber of
Commerce for the Levant. The removal of Hürner and his replacement with career diplomats,
eliminated both a flexible speculator from the system and also the roadblock to American
business investment in Baghdad that Hürner and Company caused. The infrastructure projects
were unrealized, but their conception and the seriousness with which they were pursued reflect a
more invested and interested American presence in the Ottoman Empire. American investors
were unsuccessful in their attempts to finance and profit from infrastructure projects in Ottoman
Iraq and they were hampered by the lack of American financial institutions in the Ottoman
Empire. In the early part of this period, American infrastructure concession proposals were
stymied in part by the U.S. Foreign Service. An insistence on protocol and a failure to
understand Ottoman economic practices doomed the bridge and boat building concessions
discussed in this dissertation. Rudolf Hürner, although eminently self-interested, was also quite
knowledgeable about these how small scale contracts typically got awarded and acted within and
using the Ottoman system. Hürner’s failed attempts did not directly lead to further American
investors’ interest in infrastructure projects within Ottoman Iraq, however, future projects should
be seen within the same context of growing U.S. interests and activities in the Ottoman Empire.
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American investors seriously pursued a massive rail and mineral project known as the Chester
Plan. The Chester Plan was undermined and ultimately sidelined by entrenched European
interests that were reluctant to make room for new competition. Although these projects did not
occur, the attempts matter; Americans and Ottomans tried to bring American capital actively into
the infrastructure market, indicating that American investors began to see the Ottoman market as
a possible field for investing and, that, quite possibly, the Ottomans saw the U.S. as a useful
additional competitor in this field.
U.S. trade also grew in this period. The export trade to the U.S. from Baghdad and Basra
included almonds, antiquities, carpets, colocynth, dates, dog excrement, gall nuts, ghee, gum
tragacanth, sheep intestines, licorice root, millet seeds, Persian opium, skins/hides of animals and
wool. American imports to Baghdad and Basra remained limited in quantity and variety. They
included oil, Singer sewing machines and American beer. Mosul, although largely outside the
purview of this survey, imported American farm equipment. In terms of trade, this study
investigates conflicts and cooperation surrounding two commodities in particular. American
businesses were active in Iraq and controlled the dominant share of the licorice trade and a
sizable portion of the date trade. These corporations competed with, cooperated with and became
embroiled in conflict with other Western merchants and with Ottoman economic interests.
Overall, as was seen with American cultural agents, American economic agents worked within
the Ottoman system. They understood it, worked with it and used it to their advantage when
possible. While Ottoman officials did cooperate with local notables against Western merchants
in both Baghdad and Basra, the Ottoman State also cooperated with Western merchants,
demonstrating that all parties were working to enhance the benefits of the trade for themselves.
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Besides arguing for an expanded American presence in the historiography of Ottoman
Iraq, the sources researched here provide additional evidence pertaining to several key
historiographical questions. Although at times this evidence provides a limited and potentially
biased view, it also provides further examples of conflict and cooperation between Westerners,
locals and Ottoman officials. These case studies reveal information regarding the relationship
between the Ottoman State in Istanbul and its periphery, and the degree to which 19th century
centralizing and administrative reforms of the Ottoman state were implemented in the decades
before the First World War. The centralization policies of the Ottoman state seem to have
progressed with mixed results. It should, of course be acknowledged that the challenges the
Ottomans faced at the dawn of the 20th century were not unique to them, nor unusual; neither
was its mixed success at meeting those challenges. The existence of the conflicts and cooperation
in the date and licorice trade and the status of American businesses as part of the local fabric
tentatively suggests conclusions as to the degree of centralization within the Ottoman Empire.
With the substantial power and agency displayed by local notables, and the ability of tax farmers
in Baghdad and date palm owners in Basra to utilize the central government for their own
personal gain, these relationships make the periphery of the Ottoman Empire look distant from
the core. However, these notables were not acting on their own. In order to operate and
maximize their own benefit they would have had to collaborate with the Ottoman power
structure, which, as far as earlier power sharing was concerned, represented an increase in
Ottoman centralization. As regards the Tanzimat reforms and their continued implementation in
this period, this study suggests that structural reforms, such as those made in the Provincial
Reform Act were evident in this period. However, and in line with other regions of the Ottoman
Empire, taxation reforms seem not to have been completely implemented. Tax farming continued
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into this period, no doubt for the various advantages it offered to the state. Likewise and as seen
in other parts of the Empire, despite the implementation of trade treaties between the Ottomans
and the Western powers, there was room for monopolies in Ottoman Iraq and for Ottoman
officials to negotiate additional taxes on Western export goods and activities. These additional
fees were typically protested by American businesses, but ultimately paid. The licorice trade in
particular indicates that Westerners were willing to collaborate within the Ottoman system and to
seek redress with the state when needed. The date trade demonstrates that local notables, in this
case the Naqib of Basra, worked with other Ottoman officials and within the Ottoman system.
Both the date trade and the licorice trade and their conflicts and cases of cooperation show an
Ottoman economy that was vibrant.
The sources also suggest that in Ottoman Iraq, the state was present and able to protect
Westerners who stayed within the well protected domains, i.e. on the established trade routes.
The Ottomans typically provided justice to victims of crime, and American diplomats were likely
to ask for redress if the victim were American born and had followed proper procedures for
travel. The examples of brigandage suggest the unfinished incorporation of Iraqi pastoral
populations into the state structure, an incomplete integration economically within the expanding
world economy and the inability of the Ottoman state to fully police its hinterland; a shortcoming
that was widespread among nations, if not universal in this period. The settling of tribes on state
lands was another instance of Ottoman centralizing reforms, which aimed to siphon off surplus
manpower and employ it either economically or militarily. Its incomplete results, as
demonstrated in the limited examples of brigandage, should not be seen as a shortcoming of
Ottoman centralization, but was more likely demonstrative of the disturbances caused by the
expansion of the global economy and its penetration into the Iraqi market. This state of affairs
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ensured that brigandage remained either a possibly more lucrative alternative to sedentary
farming and wage labor or that it was a necessary augmentation to those revenue sources.
While crime occurred and some of it was directed towards Westerners, criminal activity
was neither rampant nor were Westerners especially targeted. In cases where Westerners were
victims of crimes like burglary, the Ottoman state was able to dispense justice and the various
courts that these cases entered showed some of the structural aspects of the Ottoman judicial
system. The cases surrounding American archeologists demonstrate the growing importance and
reach of the Imperial Ottoman Museum. In this period, Hamdi Bey, the head of the museum,
displayed a more focused interest in acquiring antiquities from throughout the empire or, at the
very least, preventing Americans from smuggling them out. The desire to prevent Americans and
other Westerners from smuggling antiquities out of the country reflected the awareness of the
Ottoman state officials of their property and legacy. In this instance, the Ottomans held all the
power; they could and would deny Westerners access to dig sites if they became displeased with
their activities. In addition, the Ottoman desire to regulate antiquities further reflected a trend in
the Sublime Porte’s governing attitude. Antiquities were increasingly seen as important pieces in
the narrative of the Ottoman state and were pursued as such.
As concerns inter-imperial rivalry and the competition between rival Western business
groups, American investors did seem to provide the Ottoman state another option in
infrastructure negotiations, and it used this option to its advantage. This was evident in deals that
concerned the Berlin-Baghdad Railway and in the oil concession. Although the U.S. was
developing an imperialist stance in many parts of the world, in the Ottoman Empire, they did not
appear to have developed one. Ottoman methods of revenue creation such as attaching extra
taxes to items, forcing work shut downs, seizing goods, arguing over when an item was taxed all
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seemed to work to their own benefit because American merchants preferred to pay rather than
haggle and risk delays or loss of goods. This relationship shows that both sides were profiting
from the trade and willing to do business in a variety of ways and as more or less equals. The
U.S. was an increasingly important market for selling Ottoman raw materials, which may
represent the reverse flow of cash that was typical in this period of globalization. The U.S.
Foreign Service and individual Americans were actively working to increase these trade ties and
expand both its export and import trade with Ottoman Iraq. While this trade increase could
perhaps suggest shades of economic imperialism, the benefits of its expansion went to both sides.
American economic agents did not have a free hand in Ottoman markets, but rather, were forced
to integrate into the system and engage it to benefit in the region.
Secondly, this study seeks to engage the inter-imperial rivalry literature, by discussing
several projects wherein Western powers collaborated and compromised with each other and
Ottoman interests. These projects included the carrying concession for the BBR and the oil
concession. The oil concession was a complicated affair wherein multiple nationalities and
groups were involved. These groups worked to undercut each other and provided the Ottoman
state with multiple competitors to play against each other. In both instances, British concerns
were overcome by German compromise and Ottoman concerns were met with Western
compromise. Western and Ottoman groups competed and cooperated with each other in a variety
of ways and circumstances that were, in most ways, mutually beneficial. These groups worked
together well in the years immediately preceding the First World War. The border commission
demonstrated inter-imperial cooperation as well as the advancement of Ottoman centralizing
policies. While the border may have been drawn in part to determine whether oil wells lay in
Ottoman or Iranian territory, an unintended effect was to clarify the nationality of trans-border
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groups and firmly fix the frontier. As noted, imperial competitors collaborated on several
occasions in Ottoman Iraq during this period. Especially regarding infrastructure projects, British
and German groups worked together and made compromises in order to ensure Ottoman support.
Ottoman support was crucial and the withholding of and/or the threatened withholding of official
endorsement in many of these negotiations, but particularly in the oil concession allowed the
Sublime Porte to procure a better deal and to guarantee that there would be at least some
Ottoman representation within the syndicate. With the transport contracts, the Ottomans proved
adept, as they had in earlier periods, at preventing Lynch and the ETSN from expanding their
interests in Iraq. In the negotiations concerning the carrying contract for the Hindiyya barrage,
the carrying contract for the BBR and in the ETNS-BISNC merger, the Ottomans proved
masterful at moving British economic interests towards international syndicates. All of these
demonstrate a high degree of Ottoman control concerning the shipping industry in the region,
suggesting a high level of center-periphery coordination. Additionally, while the British were
definitely concerned with German intrusions, particularly economic ones, the use of the threat of
German dominance seems to have been overblown. In terms of the concessions to improve Basra
pursued in 1914, as well as, in the British Indian Steam Navigation’s takeover of the Lynch
Company, persistent fears of German influence and the latter’s pending domination of Ottoman
Iraq made the British act quickly, possibly against their own economic interests, and in response
to what was likely little or no threat at all. What is seen therefore, is that rather than interimperial rivalry, Western economic competitors sought compromise and worked with and within
the Ottoman system.
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Appendix: Prosopography

U.S. Infrastructure (Chapter 1)
Person
A.T. Chester

Thomas Cridler
Charles Dickinson
Spencer Eddy
Ibrahim Hakki Pasha
Oscar Heizer

Philander Knox
James Levack

Joseph K. McKammon
M. Mougel
Gabriel Bie Ravndall

John Van Wicheren Reynders
Ahmed Rustam
Arshag Effendi Shmavonian
William Willcocks

British Infrastructure (Chapter 2)
Person

Role/Title
Founder of Chester Plan. Retired Navy
official and a founding member of the
American Chamber of Commerce for the
Levant.
Third Assistant Secretary of State, US State
Department.
Consul General, Istanbul, US State
Department.
Chargé d’affaires, Istanbul, US State
Department.
Ottoman Grand Vizir, Istanbul during Chester
Project.
U.S. Vice Consul in Istanbul (1914) and U.S.
Consul in Baghdad (1919) and a founding
member of the American Chamber of
Commerce for the Levant.
U.S. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
during Chester Project.
Vice Consul in Baghdad (1910-1914) and a
founding member of the American Chamber
of Commerce for the Levant.
Lawyer, Pennsylvania Steel.
French engineer, advisor to Ottoman Vali of
Baghdad.
Served as Consul in Beirut (1898-1905 and
1906-1910) and as Consul General in Istanbul
(1910-1917) and was a founding member of
the American Chamber of Commerce for the
Levant.
Superintendent of Bridge Building and
Construction, Pennsylvania Steel.
Ottoman Chargé d’affaires, Washington,
D.C. during Chester Project.
Dragoman at US embassy in Istanbul.
Armenian from Harput.
British engineer, irrigation advisor to the
Ottoman State.

Role/Title
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E.M. Antoniadi

Francis Rawdon Chesney
William Knox D’Arcy

Djaved Bey
Djelal Bey
Francis Crow
Sir Eyre Crowe

Henri Deterding

Sir Edward Grey
Charles Greenway
Calouste Gulbenkian

Ibrahim Hakki Pasha

Sir John Jackson

Mr. Lynch
Antoine Kitabgi

Sir James Lyle Mackey/Lord Inchcape
Sir Louis Mallett
Alfred Marriot
Lord Murray of Elibank

H.E. Nichols

An Istanbul born astronomer, was discussed
as possible competitor in negotiations for oil
exploitation in Mosul.
Led a British expedition to Iraq, 1835-1837.
British born, Australian concession seeker,
head of the Anglo Persian Oil Company and
involved in the syndicate that received the oil
concession in 1914.
Confidant of Baron de Ward. Former
Ottoman Minister of Finance.
Ottoman Minister of Mines.
British Consul in Basra, 1903-1914.
Assistant Undersecretary of the Foreign
Office. Had noted anti-German attitudes.
Also, part German.
Director of Shell Oil and involved in the
syndicate that received the oil concession in
1914.
Secretary of the Foreign Office, 1905-1916.
Managing Director of Board for Anglo
Persian Oil Company.
Ottoman born of Armenian descent, involved
in syndicate that received the oil concession
in 1914.
Former Grand Vizir of Ottoman Empire.
Active in London during Basra concession
negotiations.
Head of Sir John Jackson Corporation.
Secured contract to build Hindiyya Barrage in
Iraq.
Head of Euphrates and Tigris Steam
Navigation Company.
Iranian citizen of Georgian or Armenian
descent that helped APOC secure concession
in Iran.
Head of British India Steam Navigation
Company.
British Ambassador to Ottoman Empire,
1913-1914.
Agent for Anglo Persian Oil Company in
Iraq.
Involved with the Central Mining and
Investment Company that competed for oil
concession.
Agent for Anglo Persian Oil Company in
Iraq.
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Alwyn Parker

Weetman Dickinson Pearson

Thomas Boverton Redwood
L. Reyersbach

George Reynolds

Marcus Samuels

Roland Silley

H.W. Stock
Baron Thomas de Ward

A.T. Wilson

Worked for Foreign Office’s Eastern
Department. Instrumental in setting British
policy in the years around World War One
towards Saudi Arabia and involved in
negotiations concerning the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway.
Worked with Shell Oil in attempts to secure
oil concession, also part of the Central Mining
and Investment Company that competed for
oil concession..
British oil expert.
A director of the Central Mining and
Investment Company that competed for oil
concession.
A director of the Central Mining and
Investment Company that competed for oil
concession.
Director of Shell Oil and involved in the
syndicate that received the oil concession in
1914. British born of Iraqi Jewish descent.
Oil expert, tried to secure concession to
exploit oil in Basra. Also involved in possible
city improvement concession in Basra.
Agent for Anglo Persian Oil Company in
Istanbul.
Austrian Noblemen, worked for the Central
Mining and Investment Company that
competed for oil concession.
British Commissioner of the border
delineation project. British Administrator of
Iraq from 1917-1920.

US Trade (Chapter 3)
Name
Dieb al-Abbas
Seyd Allowee
Habib bin Mohamed Ameer
Abdul Aziz Effendi

Yusif Badam

Company and/or Role
Camel caravan owner, involved in dispute
with MacAndrews and Forbes.
Agent for MacAndrews and Forbes in Jezirah.
Lawyer for Khedery Pasha in dispute with
MacAndrews and Forbes.
Ottoman merchant. Former Ottoman official,
involved in dispute with MacAndrews and
Forbes.
A clerk for the US date firm Hill Brothers.
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Thomas Basmadjean

Kadim bin Khamis al-Battawee
H.P Chalk
Mr. Cree

Shammoon Daniel
Ezra Daniels

De Bono
David Fairchild

Ahmed Bin Fwaili
M. Gareh
Haji Hamed
James Hamilton, of the firm Hamilton and
Hotz
John Hiles
Kazim Beg
Ahmed al Khalaf
Abdul Khader Khedery Pasha
Khesrov Kouyumdjian

James Scott Levack

Mejid Effendi

Agent for British firm Messrs. R.D. Warburg
and Company, a sub-contractor of US date
firm Hills Brothers Company.
Camel caravan owner, involved in dispute
with MacAndrews and Forbes.
US vice consul in Basra, agent for US date
firm Hills Brothers Company.
Agent/owner for British mercantile firm
Blockley, Cree and Co., assessor for
MacAndrews and Forbes in licorice dispute
case.
A tax farmer involved in a dispute with
MacAndrews and Forbes.
Ottoman Jewish merchant from Baghdad
involved in dispute with MacAndrews and
Forbes.
Agent for MacAndrews and Forbes in
Aziziah.
Agriculture explorer for the US Department
of Agriculture. Responsible for bringing date
palms to the Southwest of the United States
and California.
Agent for Ottoman merchant Abdul Khader
Khedery (Khedery Pasha).
Date supplier and packer for US date firm
Hills Brothers Company.
Agent for MacAndrews and Forbes.
US Vice Consul in Basra, agent/owner for/of
British date firm Hamilton and Hotz.
Agent for British date firm Basra (Busreh)
Trading Company.
Kaymakam of Aziziah, seized licorice
belonging to MacAndrews and Forbes.
Ottoman merchant/tax farmer, involved in
dispute with MacAndrews and Forbes.
Ottoman merchant, involved in dispute over
licorice with MacAndrews and Forbes.
Served as dragoman on three mercantile court
cases involving disputes with MacAndrews
and Forbes.
American vice-consul of Baghdad (19101914) and a lawyer that represented
MacAndrews and Forbes in Mercantile Court.
Ottoman official at Kut, involved in dispute
with MacAndrews and Forbes.
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Hanna Minni
Khudairi bin Mohamed
Sayyid Talib al Naqib

Nowrooz Effendi
Mr. Quartermaine
Major Ramsey
Mr. Reynolds
Ristatany
Rizooki
Mahmood Rotha

A.C. Wratislaw

Petros ibn Yusif

Crime and Cultural Agents (Chapter 4)
Subcategory, US Missionaries
US Missionaries
James Cantine
Anna Melton
Grace Miller
Philip Phelps
John Van Ess
Dr. Henry Worrall
Samuel Zwemer

Ottoman merchant/tax farmer, involved in
dispute with MacAndrews and Forbes.
Public Notary worked with Khedery Pasha in
dispute with MacAndrews and Forbes.
A wealthy Basra landowner and date grower,
influential in local politics and sometimes
considered to have tried to create an
independent state in Basra.
Allegedly crooked Ottoman telegraph
operator.
Lawyer that represented MacAndrews and
Forbes in Mercantile Court.
British Consul in Baghdad, briefly replaced
Hürner as US Vice Consul in 1906.
Lawyer that represented MacAndrews and
Forbes in Mercantile Court.
A local agent for MacAndrews and Forbes.
A local agent in Aziziah for MacAndrews and
Forbes.
An Ottoman soldier accused of working for
the allegedly crooked telegraph operator,
Nowrooz Effendi.
British Consul in Basra, agent for British date
firm Messrs. Grey and Mackenzie. Graduate
of the Rossall School, where he was a prize
winner in Latin Elegiacs (1878, 1879 and
1880).
Involved in legal dispute with MacAndrews
and Forbes. A Baghdadi merchant from the
Karieh Bashi quarter.

Place of Residence/Affiliation
Basra/Arabian Mission.
Mosul/ABCFM.
Zobeir/Unknown.
Not applicable/Arabian Mission.
Basra/Arabian Mission.
Basra/Arabian Mission.
Basra/Arabian Mission.
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Subcategory, US Archaeologists
Name

Dig Site/Role

Edgar James Banks

Bismaya (Adab)/Director.

Osman Hamdi Bey

Head of the Ottoman Imperial Museum and
an accomplished painter. Directed efforts to
recover statue stolen by Banks.

Robert Harper

Bismaya/Took over as Director when Banks
is relieved.

J. H. Haynes

Niffur/Director

Heider Bey

Ottoman representative at Bismaya dig.
Directed efforts locally to recover statue
stolen by Banks.

J.G. Leishman

US Ambassador to Ottoman Empire during
the Banks statue dispute.

Namik Pasha

Niffur/Ottoman Vali that took issue with
American construction on site.

Jason Paige

Bismaya/Engineer.

Sadek Effendi

Ottoman police commissioner at Kut.

Subcategory, Miscellaneous
Name
Ali

Captain John Butterworth
W.B. Bundschu

Role
Hürner’s servant. Was present for both
robbery of Jason Paige and theft of the statue
from Adab.
Beheaded British ship captain, employee of
Messrs. Strick and Co.
American adventurer, robbed in desert.
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John Herbert Firth

Accused of defrauding the US vice consul in
Baghdad.
Ottoman Armenian that adopted US
citizenship but was imprisoned for returning
to the Ottoman Empire and accused of
practicing medicine without a license or
credentials.
One of four men arrested for the Butterworth
Murder. Nationality unknown.
Ottoman soldier, accused of robbing
missionary John Van Ess.
One of four men arrested for the Butterworth
Murder. Nationality unknown.
Collector of and expert concerning,
Mesopotamian tablets, Episcopal clergyman
from New York.
Former employer of servants accused of
robbing Dr. Worrall.
A 30 year old Iranian national. One of four
men arrested for the Butterworth Murder.
A 50 year old Iranian national, cook and
butler. One of four men arrested for the
Butterworth Murder.
Ottoman soldier, accused of robbing
missionary John Van Ess.

A.S. Hagopian

Hemis bin Hüseyin
Muhammad
Seyyid Nasrallah
James Nies

Nasoorie Noorie
Ali bin Salim
Rüstem bin Şecaaddin

Zangi

US Vice Consuls in Baghdad

Name
John Sundburg
Rudolf Hürner
William Magelssen

Title
Vice Consul
Vice Consul
Consul

Years
1894-1897
1897-1906
1906-1909

A.E.C. Bird
Frederick Simpich

Vice Consul (acting)
Consul

1909
1909-1911

Emil Sauer

Consul

1911-1914

James Levack
Charles Brissel

Vice Consul
Consul

1914
1914-1916 (died in
office of cholera)
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Nationality
Norwegian/American
Swiss (Bern)
American
(Minnesota)
British
American (Urbana,
IL)
American (Stonewall,
TX)
American
American (Brooklyn,
NY)

US Vice Consuls in Basra
Note : the post existed largely to facilitate the exports of dates to the US. Therefore, outside of
the date season (August-November) it might be vacant and this accounts for some of the years
VC’s served overlap.
Name
James Hamilton
Henry Chalk
William Havemeyer
Herbert Poulter
Henry Chalk

Title
Vice Consul
Vice Consul (Acting)
Vice Consul
Vice Consul (Acting)
Vice Consul

Years
1896-1904
1903
1904 (died in office)
1905
1905-1906

Nationality
British
British
British
British
British

Businesses and Known Agents in period
Name
Anglo-Persian Oil Company
Busreh (Basra) Trading Co.

Nationality
British
British

Central Mining and
Investment Corporation

British

Frank Strick and Co.

British

Gray Mackenzie and Co.
Hamilton and Hotz
Hills Brothers

British
British
American

Sir John Jackson, LTD
Lynch Brothers and Co.

British
British

MacAndrews and Forbes

American

R.D. Warburg and Company

British

Ottoman Valis of Baghdad
Name
Atteallah Pashsa Kawakeby
Namik Pasha
Ahmed Feyzi Pasha
Abdülvahab Pasha
Mecid Bey

Agent
H.W. Stock
R.D. Marshall
John Hiles
Baron Thomas De Ward
L. Reyersbach
Lord Murray
George Reynolds
J.K. Mackie
Captain Butterworth
Forbes Garden
James Hamilton
William Hills Jr.
H.I. Andrews
Yusif Badam
Arthur Whitley
William Havemeyer
H.W. Timewell
A.E.C. Bird
H.P. Chalk
Thomas Basmadjean

Year(s) in Office
1896-1899
1899-1902
1902-1904
1904-1905
1905-1906
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Ebubakir Hȃzim Pasha
Mustafa Nȃzim I Pasha
Najemaldeen Beg
Mohamed Fadil Pasha
Shawket Pasha
Hussain Nadim Pasha
Youssef Agah Pasha
Djemal Pasha
Ali Redha Pasha
Mohamed Zaki Pasha
Mohamed Fadil Pasha
Süleyman Nazif Pasha
Nurialdeen Pasha
Khalil Pasha

Ottoman Valis of Basra
Name
Muhammad Atullah
Arif Pasha
Mehmed Enis Pasha
Hamdi Pasha
Muhsin Pasha
Mustafa Nuri Pasha
Muhlis Pasha
Mecid Bey2
Abdurrahman Hasan Bey
Süleyman Nazif Bey
Hüseyin Celal Bey
Hasan Riza Pasha4
Sefik Pasha
Colonel Subhi Bey

1906-1907
19081
1908-1909
1909
1909-1910
1910-1911
1911
1911-1912
1912
1912-1913
1913-1914
1914-1915
1915-1916
1916-1917

Year(s) in Office
1896
1896-1898
1898-1899
1899-1900
1900-1901
1901-1904
1904-1906
1906
1906-19083
1909-1910
1910-1911
1911-1912
1913-1914
1914

1

Info from Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq.
Note : Mecid Bey was Vali of Baghdad and Acting Vali of Basra in this period. Çetinsaya,
Ottoman Administration of Iraq.
3
Information from Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq.
4
Information from Visser, Basra, The Failed Gulf State.
2
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Foreign Terms

Cavass – A police officer, often associated with a Consulate.
Cherdagh - Temporary sheds where date packing occurred.
Defterdar – Bookkeeper or official usually in charge of finance.
Goofah – Round single oared boats on the Tigris.
Firman – Ottoman governmental decree.
Iltizam – A tax farm.
Iradeh – An Ottoman governmental decree.
Kaza – An Ottoman administrative division, smaller than a Sancak and in the post-Tanzimat era,
governed by a Kaymakam. More or less included a city and its hinterlands.
Kaymakam – Ottoman official in charge of a Kaza in the post-Tanzimat period.
Kuruş – An Ottoman measure of money. A subdivision of the Turkish Lira, it is frequently also
called piasters in Western sources.
Müdür – A manager or supervisor.
Mültizam – A tax farmer.
Sancak – Ottoman administrative division. Subdivision of Vilâyet, and made up of Kaza.
Sefinah – Small sail boats on the Tigris.
Serai (Saray) – Government, government building.
Vali – Ottoman governor. Appointed to administer a Vilâyet.
Vilâyet – Largest Ottoman administrative division, more or less equivalent to a U.S. state.
Zaptiye – An Ottoman Soldier.
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Addendum

Table 4 Export Inquiries to U.S. Vice Consulate in Baghdad November 1894-August 1907
Item

1. Machinery, both Industrial and Agricultural
2. Irrigation and Pumping Machinery
3. Alcohol
4. Pianos/Musical Instruments
5. Clocks/Watches
6. Sugar
7. Generators/Electrical/Lighting
8. Foodstuffs
9. Import/Export
10. Publishers
11. Safes/Locks
12. Vehicles (motor cars) and bicycles
13. Phonographs
14. Typewriter, office supplies, stationary
15. Slate and school supplies
16. Guns
17. Furniture, shelving
18. Picture frames and portraiture
19. Stoves
20. Sample collectors
21. Bondsmen
22. Clothing (suspenders)
23. Dentists
24. Knive sharpeners
25. Toilets
26. Rail Cars
27. St. Louis World’s Fair/ Other expositions
28. Leather products (saddlery, leather oil)
29. Photographers
30. Paint and Varnish
31. Pharmaceuticals
32. Hardware
33. Tires/Rubber
34. Freight/Shipping
35. Wallpaper
36. Cotton/Fabric
37. Tobacco
38. California
39. Sewing machines, not singer
40. Chambers of Commerce
41. Razors
42. Correspondence Club
43. Graphite
44. Plows
45. Sporting Goods
46. Attorneys
47. Schools, educational institutes
48. Steel
Total
Months in Period
Per Month Average

Nov 1894-Jan 1896 Jan 1896-Jan 1901Jan 1901-Dec 1903 Jan 1904-Dec 1904

Dec 1904-Dec 1905 Feb 1906- Aug 1907

Total

% of total

2

5

8

5

5

6

31

13.90%

1

1

0

0

0

4

6

2.69%

1

2

1

0

0

0

4

1.79%

1

0

1

0

0

0

2

0.90%

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

0.90%

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

1

0

3

3

0

2

9

4.04%

1

4

0

1

0

1

7

3.14%

1

4

8

5

2

0

20

8.97%

4

18

11

8

5

8

54

24.22%

1

0

1

0

0

1

3

1.35%

0

8

3

1

0

1

13

5.83%

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

3

2

0

0

1

6

2.69%

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

2

1

1

0

2

6

2.69%

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

4

0

0

0

0

4

1.79%

0

1

4

0

0

0

5

2.24%

0

1

1

1

1

0

4

1.79%

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

2

0

0

2

4

1.79%

0

0

0

2

0

2

4

1.79%

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0.45%

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

0.90%

0

0

0

1

2

1

4

1.79%

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

0.90%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0.90%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0.90%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

3

0

3

1.35%

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0.45%

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0.45%

16

58

50

34

21

44
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17

150

15

60

35

11

12

1.066666667

0.966666667

1.428571429

3.090909091

1.75
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2.588235294 1.815175

Figure 3 Examples of tablets excavated at Niffur by American led digs. Currently housed at the Istanbul Archaeology Museums.
Picture is by the author.
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Figure 4 The statue stolen by Banks at Bismaya. There is no mention of the controversy surrounding its excavation in this
display. Currently housed at the Istanbul Archaeology Museums. Picture is by the author.
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Figure 5 Close up of statue stolen by Banks at Bismaya. Note that the head and the body were discovered separately, exposing
Banks’ original attempt at keeping the statue a secret. Currently housed at the Istanbul Archaeology Museums. Picture is by the
author.
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